¹ Feuerbach, Ludwig, The Essence of Christianity, translation by Eliot, George, with an Introduction by Karl Barth, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, p. xxxiii. (Hereafter referred to as “F” in the text).Google Scholar

² Barth, Karl Fxxviii, xxix, xxx. Of course, this is not Barth's sole response to Feuerbach. He grounds this response in the Calvinist doctrine that “we men are evil from head to foot and … must die” and the admission that “even in our relation to God, we are and remain liars, and that we lay claim to His truth, His certainty, His salvation as grace and only as grace.”

³ Engels, Frederick, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, New York, International Publishers, 1941, p. 18.Google Scholar

⁴ Marx, Karl, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right” in Early Writings translated and edited by Bottomore, T. B., McGraw Hill, New York, 1964, p. 44.Google Scholar

⁵ If Feuerbach's account parallels Hegel's account, why consider Feuerbach rather than Hegel? If it were clear that the Hegelian enterprise had succeeded or if it were clear that it had failed in such a way as clearly to demonstrate that it is in principle impossible, then there could be no justification for considering Feuerbach's work. But none of this is clear, and this unclarity provides a practical justification for considering Feuerbach, for Feuerbach claims that his work is clearly presented in “plain speech.” (F xxxiii). Not only does Feuerbach promise plain speech, however, he also claims his work to be a significant departure from Hegelian philosophy as far as philosophical method is concerned, a departure which makes it possible for his speech to be plain where Hegel's must remain obscure. Whereas Hegel was one of those philosophers “who pluck out their eyes that they may see better,” who engage in “absolute, immaterial, self-sufficing speculation,” Feuerbach intends to base his ideas “on materials which can be appropriated only through the activity of the senses.” (F xxxiv) Feuerbach in providing a justification for his own effort to attempt afresh the Hegelian enterprise, provides us with further justification for considering his philosophy rather than remaining exclusively with the Hegelian account.

⁶ Let any Christian make the following thought experiment. Suppose the worship of God were of no consequence for an after life. Suppose either final oblivion or heaven or hell were a certainty and suppose your present happiness were a fixed matter. Would you continue to worship?

⁷ Bergson, Henri, “Laughter,” in Sypher, Willie, Comedy, Doubleday and Company Inc., Garden City, New York, 1956, p. 165.Google Scholar

⁸ It is another sign of the systematic confusion evident in this book that we have to go to the end of it to find anything resembling a rejection of the religious standpoint. Chapter XXVI systematically belongs at the beginning of the book.

⁹ cf. F, xxxvii. Feuerbach seems to be employing a principle here similar to Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles.

¹⁰ F 154. Though I suppose that to the degree to which he does not care about the species the votary is indifferent to this.

¹¹ Even “secondary” (F xxxvii) and “insignificant” (F xxxviii) in comparison with the species.