Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T21:29:28.615Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Explication et pertinence : du sel ensorcelé à la loi des aires

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2012

Cyrille Imbert
Cyrille Imbert*
Affiliation:
Conseil national de la recherche scientifique, France
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Whereas relevance in scientific explanations is usually discussed as if it was a single problem, several criteria of relevance will be distinguished in this paper. Emphasis is laid upon the notion of intra-scientific relevance, which is illustrated using explanation of the law of areas as an example. Traditional accounts of explanation, such as the causal and unificationist accounts, are analyzed against these criteria of relevance. Particularly, it will be shown that these accounts fail to indicate which explanations fulfill the condition of intra-scientific relevance. Finally, the significance of this latter criterion is emphasized, and the epistemic benefits of explanations that fulfill it are highlighted.

RÉSUMÉ : À rebours des discussions sur l’explication, qui semblent faire de la pertinence explicative un problème unique, plusieurs critères de pertinence explicative sont ici distingués. Est en particulier soulignée l’importance de la notion de pertinence intra-scientifique, qui est analysée de façon précise sur la base de l’explication de la loi des aires. Les conceptions traditionnelles de l’explication, et notamment la théorie causale ainsi que la théorie unificationiste de Kitcher, sont évaluées à l’aune de ces différentes critères. Il est en particulier montré quils ne fournissent pas d’outils suffisants pour identifier les explications qui satisfont la condition de pertinence intra-scientifique.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 689 - 723
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Batterman, Robert 1998 «Why Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics Works: Universality and the Renormalization Group», Philosophy of Science, vol. 65, p. 183–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Batterman, Robert 2003 The Devil in the Details. Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence, New York, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blay, Michel 2002 La science du mouvement de Galilée à Lagrange, Paris, Belin.Google Scholar
Dowe, Phil 2000 Physical Causation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glennan, Stuart S. 1996 «Mechanisms and the nature of causation», Erkenntnis, vol. 44, no 1, p. 49–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, Carl et Oppenheim, Paul 1948 «Studies in the Logic of Explanation», dans Hempel, C.G., dir., Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York, Free Press, p. 245–291.Google Scholar
Humphreys, Paul 2000 «Analytic and Synthetic Understanding», dans Fetzer, J., dir., Science, Explanation, and Rationality. The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 267–286.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, Philip 1984 The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kitcher, Philip 1989 «Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World», dans Kitcher, P. et Salmon, W., dir., Scientific Explanation, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 410–505.Google Scholar
Kyburg, Henry 1965 «Comment», Philosophy of Science, vol. 32, p. 147–151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machamer, Peter 2004 «Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms», International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 18, p. 27–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machamer, Peter, Darden, Lindley et Carver, Carl F. 2000 «Thinking About Mechanisms», Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, p. 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newton, Isaac 1989 [1756-1759] Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, traduction française de l’édition de 1727 de la marquise du Chastelet, Paris, Gabay.Google Scholar
Railton, Peter 1978 «A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation», Philosophy of Science, vol. 45, p. 206–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Railton, Peter 1981 «Probability, Explanation, Information», Synthese, vol. 48, p. 233–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, Wesley 1971 «Statistical Explanation», dans Salmon, W., dir., Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 29–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, Wesley 1984 Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton, Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Salmon, Wesley 1994 «Causality Without Counterfactuals», Philosophy of Science, vol. 6, p. 297–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, Wesley 1997 «Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critiques», Philosophy of Science, vol. 64, p. 461–477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas 1980 The Scientific Image, Oxford, Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodward, James 1979 «Scientific Explanation», British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 30, p. 41–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodward, James 1997 «Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention», Philosophy of Science, vol. 64 (Proceedings), p. S26–S41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodward, James 2000 «Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences», British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 51, p. 197–254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodward, James 2003 Making Things Happen, New York, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Woodward, James 2010 «Scientific Explanation», dans Zalta, E.N., dir., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, printemps 2010, en ligne: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/scientific-explanation/>.Google Scholar