1 See my “Kant on International Law and Armed Conflict” (Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 11 [July 1998]: 329–81)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for more on the exact content of what I call “contemporary Kantian internationalism.” I list here the following elements of it: (1) moral universalism; (2) human rights protection; (3) such protection grounded in terms of protecting free rational agency; (4) deontology; and (5) maintaining a role for nation-states on the international stage, albeit within the context of a new cosmopolitan federation.

2 The second proposition distinguishes just-war theory from pacifism, to be discussed below. The first proposition distinguishes just-war theory from realism. For more on realism, see Chapter 1 of Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977).Google Scholar

3 Just-war theory stipulates that a country may declare war on another only if it meets all the following conditions of jus ad bellum:

1. It has a just cause. The just cause most frequently recognized is either self-defence, or other-defence, from attack by a rights-violating aggressor.

2. It has the right intention—namely, rights-protection—in going to war.

3. It publicly declares war.

4. It resorts to war only after plausible means of peaceful dispute resolution have been exhausted.

5. It has some probability of success.

6. The benefits of going to war, in terms of rights-protection, are at least proportional to the costs, notably, casualties.

Once a state finds itself in the midst of war, just-war theory declares that it ought to adhere to the following principles of jus in bello:

1. Its soldiers may aim directly only at legitimate military, political, and industrial targets in the enemy state. While some collateral civilian casualties are excusable, it is illegal to take deliberate aim at civilian targets.

2. Its soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek.

3. Its soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are labelled “intrinsically heinous.” These include: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; torturing captured enemy soldiers; and using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like chemical or biological agents.

Jus post bellum, the third phase of just-war theory, is really just getting under way in terms of its development. For examples of rules regulating the process of war termination, see my “Terminating War and Establishing Global Governance,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 12 (July 1999): 253–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

For more on just-war theory in general, see: Walzer, Wars; Regan, R., Just War Theory: Principles and Cases (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996);Google ScholarWasserstrom, R., ed., War and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970);Google ScholarElshtain, J. B., ed., Just War Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992);Google ScholarLuban, D., “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1980): 160–81;Google ScholarNagel, T., “War and Massacre,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971/1972): 123–45;Google Scholar and Fullinwider, R. K., “War and Innocence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1975): 90–97.Google Scholar

4 For the content of these laws, see: Reisman, W. M. and Antoniou, C., eds., The Laws of War A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict (New York: Vintage, 1994).Google Scholar See also: Bailey, S., Prohibitions and Restraints in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972);Google ScholarBest, G., War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994);Google ScholarBrownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963);CrossRefGoogle ScholarDelupis, I. Detter, The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);Google ScholarDinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);Google ScholarHoward, M., ed., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994);Google ScholarLauterpacht, H., International Law (Vols. 3-4: The Law of Peace) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977–1978);Google Scholar and O'Brien, W. V., The Law of Limited Armed Conflict (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1965).Google Scholar

5 Teichman, J., Pacifism and the Just War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).Google Scholar On the vexed question of pacifism as anti-violence, see Holmes, R., On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 19–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a devastating counter-argument to this conception, see Narveson, J., “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis,” in Morality and War, edited by Wasserstrom, R. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 63–77Google Scholar, and Narveson, J., “Violence and War,” in Matters of Life and Death, edited by Regan, T. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1980), pp. 109–47.Google Scholar Two excellent collections on this issue are: Brady, J. B. and Garver, N., eds., Justice, Law and Violence (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991)Google Scholar, and Frey, R. G. and Morris, C. W., eds., Violence, Terrorism and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The most influential analysis of violence remains Arendt, H., On Violence (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970).Google Scholar

6 The works of Yoder, John Howard (e.g., When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking [Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1984])Google Scholar offer a good example of such a religious justification for pacifism. There are many other sources relevant here, including the following: Burns, J. P., War and Its Discontents: Pacifism and Quietism in the Abrahamic Traditions (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1986);Google ScholarCahill, L. S., Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism and Just War Theory (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1994);Google ScholarCartwright, M. C., "Conflicting Interpretations of Christian Pacifism,” pp. 197–213Google Scholar, and Koontz, T. J., “Christian Nonviolence: An Interpretation,” pp. 169–96Google Scholar, both in The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives, edited by Nardin, T. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996);Google ScholarDombrowski, D., Christian Pacifism (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991);Google Scholar and Hauerwas, S., Should War Be Eliminated? Philosophical and Theological Investigations (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

7 It should be noted that this CP/DP distinction is only intended as one of degree and not necessarily one in kind. There are many well-known problems with regard to distinguishing clearly between consequentialism and deontology. See Holmes, On War and Morality; Regan, T., “A Defence of Pacifism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1972): 64–81;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Norman, R., Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; Walzer, M., “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1979/1980): 209–29;Google Scholar and Nagel, T., “Ruthlessness in Public Life,” in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 75–90.Google Scholar

9 See note 3 for these criteria.

10 Walzer, M., “World War II: Why Was this War Different?” philosophy and Public Affairs (1970/1971): 3–21Google Scholar, and O'Brien, W. V., The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 35–65.Google Scholar

11 See note 3.

12 And this could have been foreseen, given that the unpopulated desert was to be the battlefield.

13 On the Gulf War and just-war theory, see: Walzer, M.'s “Preface” to the second edition of Just and Unjust Wars (1991);Google ScholarElshtain, J. B. et al., But Was It Just? Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, edited by DeCosse, D. (New York: Doubleday, 1992);Google ScholarGeyer, A., Lines in the Sand: Justice and the Gulf War (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1992);Google ScholarHallett, B., ed., Engulfed in War: Just War and the Persian Gulf (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991);Google ScholarMoore, J. N., Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1992);Google ScholarVaux, K., Ethics and the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992);Google Scholar and Johnson, James T. and Weigel, G., eds., Just War and Gulf War (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991).Google Scholar

14 Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 80-93.

15 Ibid., pp. 290-93, and Narveson, “Pacifism,” pp. 62-77.

16 This pacifist argument is developed, as a foil, by Walzer, in Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 329-36. It is also defended in Holmes, War and Morality, pp. 260-96, and in Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 210-15.

17 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 370–82.Google Scholar

18 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 329-36.

19 Holmes, War and Morality, pp. 146-213, esp. pp. 183-213.

20 Anscombe, G. E. M., “War and Murder,” in War and Morality, edited by Wasserstrom, R. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 41–53.Google Scholar For similar considerations, consult the excellent study in Uniacke, S., Permissible Killing: The Self-Defense Justification of Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 Perhaps clarity should be added to this conception of human rights. It is very minimal and thinly conceived, focusing on entitlements designed to protect genuinely vital human needs, notably physical security, material subsistence, and some space for personal liberty. Only violations of these human rights constitutes a serious, lethal threat to vital needs, and so justifies violent response. For more on my conception of human rights, see Chapter 4 of my War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

22 Narveson, “Pacifism,” pp. 63-78, and Narveson, “Violence and War,” pp. 109- 47. Similar notions are expressed in Shue, H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U. S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980)Google Scholar, and Gewirth, A., Human Rights: Essays in Justification and Application (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).Google Scholar

23 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 50-75.

24 See, for example, Fletcher, G., “Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor,” Israel Law Review (1973): 367–90.Google Scholar

25 Thomson, J., “Self-Defence and Rights,” in her Rights, Risk and Restitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 33–50Google Scholar, and Thomson, J., “Self-Defence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1991): 283–310.Google Scholar The first of Thomson's articles displays a marked hostility to the notion of forfeiture, whereas the second one appears to offer a rather muted, uneasy support of the concept.

26 Thomson, if she did not invent this distinction, is certainly most closely associated with it.

27 See Fletcher, “Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor,” pp. 367-90, and Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).Google Scholar

28 Otsuka, M. appears to support this claim in his “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1992): 74–94.Google Scholar It is also present in Holmes, War and Morality.

29 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 34-50 and 138-43; Holmes, War and Morality, pp. 114-213; Fullinwider, “War and Innocence,” pp. 90-97; Malvrodes, G., “Conventions and the Laws of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1975): 117–31;Google ScholarAlexander, L. A., “Self-Defence and the Killing of Noncombatants: A Reply to Fullinwider,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1975/1976): 408–15;Google Scholar and Dubik, J. M., “Human Rights, Command Responsibility and Walzer's Just War Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1982): 354–71.Google Scholar

30 Holmes, War and Morality, pp. 146-213.

31 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 138.

32 We should now realize how the DDE, thus denned, could not have been employed earlier in the case of the innocent aggressor. Say soldier S is considering shooting soldier T, who under some description is an innocent aggressor. S cannot appeal to the DDE here because, while he might say that he intends only to defeat the aggression and not kill an innocent, and while he might contend that the defeat of the aggression is worth the price, he cannot plausibly contend that killing the innocent is not a means to his end of defeating the aggression, since the innocent and the aggressor are (by hypothesis) one and the same person. Innocent aggressors, if such there be, must thus be dealt with differently than innocent non-aggressors.

33 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 152-59, 257, 277-83, and 317-21, and Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 73-118 and 159-200.

34 See note 3.

35 I owe this last suggestion to Thomas Pogge.

36 Besides, it has been frequently contended that military strategists, in general, want to avoid civilian casualties for purely strategic reasons: wasting civilian targets is not usefully connected to military objectives. Simply put, bombs which fall on civilian targets are wasted bombs. Far better for bombs to fall on armies, and their supply lines, than for them to take out residential areas. It is not implausible to suggest that civilian bombardment only serves to harden the attitudes of the people against the enemy state, and so the argument that civilian casualties can be employed to force capitulation seems weak.

37 See note 3.

38 I would like to thank David Johnston, Frances Kamm, Bonnie Kent, Jane Lomic, Thomas Pogge, Jeremy Waldron, and two anonymous reviewers for constructive criticism of this article. Thanks also to all those at Dialogue. Work on this article has been supported by funding from Columbia University, University of Waterloo, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

I discuss these and related issues in two books: War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000)Google Scholar and Michael Walzer on War and Justice (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).Google Scholar