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Emotions: Rationality Without Cognitivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Stanley G. Clarke
Affiliation:
Carleton University

Extract

In the aftermath of emotivism and behaviourism, cognitivist theories of emotion became current in both philosophy and psychology. These theories, though varied, have in common that emotions require propositional attitudes such as beliefs or evaluations. Accordingly, cognitivist theories characterize emotions themselves with features of such attitudes, including syntax, semantic meaning, and justifiability.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1986

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References

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16 A feeling module on the lines of the perception module in Fodor, J. A., The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983)Google Scholar seems plausible, but I do not argue so far as to support informational encapsulation of either sensation or feeling.

17 Referred to in: Buck, R., The Communication of Emotion (New York: Guilford Press, 1984).Google Scholar

18 Ibid., 55–58.

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27 I would like to thank Ronald de Sousa, Mark Vorobej, and especially Evan Simpson for criticisms and encouragement, as well as Carleton University for providing research leave.