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Early Studies in Human Reasoning: A Case Study of the Pitfalls of Interdisciplinary Work

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2018

VANESSA LEHAN
VANESSA LEHAN*
Affiliation:
York University
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

In this paper, I describe some of the history of work on human reasoning done by philosophers and experimental psychologists. This particular interdisciplinary work is interesting because it shows the ways that interdisciplinary research can solidify pervasive preconceptions in a particular field. Work in experimental psychology has shown that certain normative systems fail to model reasoning in natural language contexts. Thus, I will argue, philosophers could instead take this psychological research as motivation to amend these normative models or radically change our ideas about how these models are applied to reasoning in natural language.

Dans cet article, je décris une partie de l’histoire des travaux sur le raisonnement humain mené par les philosophes et les psychologues en psychologie expérimentale. Ce travail interdisciplinaire particulier est intéressant, car il montre de quelles façons la recherche interdisciplinaire peut solidifier certaines idées préconçues omniprésentes dans un domaine particulier. Les travaux en psychologie expérimentale ont démontré que certains systèmes normatifs ne parviennent pas à modéliser le raisonnement dans des contextes de langage naturel. J’affirmerai, par conséquent, que les philosophes devraient se servir de cette recherche psychologique comme motivation pour modifier ces modèles normatifs ou changer radicalement nos idées sur la manière dont ces modèles sont appliqués au raisonnement en langage naturel.

Keywords

logichuman reasoningpsychologyinterdisciplinarityheuristicsbiases
Type
Special Issue: Philosophy and its Borders
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 353 - 366
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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