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Doxastic Obligations and the Traditional Definition of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Peter H. Hess
Peter H. Hess
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

In the sixth chapter of his Theory of Knowledge Roderick Chisholm refers to an example suggested by Alexius Meinong in order to show that the traditional definition of knowledge is in need of some modification. In this paper I should like to show that Chisholm's argument rests on a mistaken assumption as to what an individual's doxastic responsibilities are.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 291 - 298
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1983

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References

1 Chisholm, Roderick M., Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1977)Google Scholar. Subsequent references to this work will appear in the text.

2 Meinong, Alexius, Gesamtausgabe, ed. Chisholm, R. M. (Graz, 1973), 398–399.Google Scholar

3 “h is evident for S = Df (i) h is beyond reasonable doubt for 5 and (ii) for every i, if accepting i is more reasonable for S than accepting h, then i is certain for S” (12).

4 I am assuming, of course, that accepting, rejecting, and withholding a proposition always involves entertaining that proposition.

5 Cf. Armstrong, C. M., Belief, Truth and Knowledge, 151–152.Google Scholar

6 This interpretation suggests that the terms of epistemic appraisal should not only be denned in a manner which renders them person- and time-dependent, but that the person referred to in these definitions must be an “ideal Observer”, i.e., an individual who meets minimal requirements of intelligence and rationality and who has at least minimal access to relevant data. This would call for additional changes in Chisholm's definitions.

7 Chisholm's comments on what he calls “critical cognitivism” (cf. 119–134) strongly suggest that he shares this view.

8 Cf. my “Justified True Belief is Knowledge”, in Dialogue XX/4, 665–673.Google Scholar