¹ Some time after writing this paper I learned that ideas similar to several it contains are presented in an article by Jan Lukasiewicz (a revised version, first published in 1961. of an address delivered in 1922) in which, among other things, he criticizes an argument that purports to derive, from what he calls ‘the principle of causality’, the conclusion that there exists at every instant earlier than any given fact a cause of that fact. See Lukasiewicz, Jan. «On Determinism,» Polish Logic (Oxford. 1966), ed. McCall, S.Google Scholar. especially sections 5, 6, and 7 in which the principle is explained and the argument is stated and criticized. I am in debt for this reference to Stephen Bale.

² Perhaps causes do not necessarily precede their effects. It seems, for example, that an eclipse of the Sun might be caused by the interposition of the Moon even if the propagation of light from the Sun were instantaneous. So Causal Determinism, in simplest terms, may be, not the principle that whatever takes place has a cause, but the principle that whatever takes place has a prior cause. I owe this point to Willa Freeman Sobel.

³ See Lehrer, Keith, “Doing the Impossible: A Second Try.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XLII (1964), pp. 249–250CrossRefGoogle Scholar, “An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?” Freedom and Determinism (New York. 1966), ed. Lehrer, K.. pp. 200–1Google Scholar, and in Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction (New York, 1968), Cornman, J.W. and Lehrer, K., pp. 157–8, 184–6. and 188Google Scholar: Taylor, Richard, Metaphysics: Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs. 1974). pp. 51 and 54Google Scholar: Alston, William and Brandt, Richard B., The Problems of Philosophy (Boston. 1967), p. 284Google Scholar; Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis: Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), pp. 337–8.Google Scholar

⁴ Causal Determinism is not the Doctrine of Necessity examined by Peirce. the doctrine “that the state of things existing at any time, together with certain immutable laws, completely determine[s] the state of things at every other time.” (“The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” Philosophical Writings of Peirce. ed. J. Buchler. Dover 1955. p. 325.) Causal Determinism cannot say that “all arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one dose, in the beginning” (for Causal Determinism, though consistent with there being a beginning in the sense of an earliest temporal bound, excludes beginnings in the sense of first events or first causes) and need not say that all arbitrary specification has been present always, prefigured in sufficient causes. It is compatible with Causal Determinism that, as Peirce himself would have it, “specification has been continually taking place.” (p. 334.)

Nor is Causal Determinism what has been called ‘window shade’ determinism, the doctrine that “if time could be ‘rolled back’ to any past instant, and then allowed to ‘go forward again”, then there is no question but that history would ‘repeat’ itself.” The name, I am told, is due to Arthur S. Murphy. The informal characterization of determinism is by Peter van Inwagen, “A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism,” Theoria (1974, Part I), p. 9. Clearly ‘window shade’ determinism is not the Doctrine of Necessity. The main difference between them is that it is not part of ‘window shade’ determinism that each state of the world has only one causally possible past. All that doctrine maintains is that each state of the world has only one causally possible future.

Of passing interest perhaps is the fact that the formal characterization of determinism set out by van Inwagen in the generally excellent article cited above is in fact not. as intended, of ‘window shade’ determinism but rather of ‘each world state to every world state’. Doctrine of Necessity determinism. Had van Inwagen considered times before 1066 he would have noticed this discrepancy. (Consider pp. 13–4 of his article.)

⁵ Wisdom, John. Problems of Mind and Matter (Cambridge, 1963), p. 130, n. 3.Google Scholar

⁶ Why contentious? Because some contend that ‘causes in no way necessitate”, that causal laws do not record ‘real, somehow necessary, connections’. On this view, past causes are, because past, of course out of all control, but their still to come effects need not be.

⁷ Deduce first that at no time are we in control of what we then do. Next, enlarge upon this result. Argue that at no time are we in control of anything that would take place then, at any earlier time, or at any later time. Argue, that is, that at no time are we in control of anything. Given this and Causal Determinism the conclusion under discussion would be an easy inference, though at this stage this conclusion would be something of a ‘come down’ and one might well not be moved to gather it in.

⁸ The Doctrine of Necessity and ‘window shade’ determinism are not other examples. These doctrines, since compatible with first causes, do not entail, and are not forms of. Causal Determinism. (See n. 4 above.) But they provide easy access to the ‘especially threatening doctrine’ — one need only assume that the world is ancient — and so are alternatives to forms of Causal Determinism as launching pads for discussions of free will.