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Defining Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Russell Cornett
Affiliation:
University of Calgary

Extract

Contemporary philosophers have laboured long and hard over the “is-ought” problem (Can moral judgments be derived from purely factual judgments?) and the definition of “moral” (Can moral judgments be derived from purely factual judgments with the addition of à definition of morality?). As a result, it is something of an intellectual shock to find Peter Singer informing the philosophical community that their efforts have been in vain. The importance of Singer's criticism has not gone unnoticed. And others have made the central claim of Singer's criti-cism, but not with such force and clarity.

Type
Interventions
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1986

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References

1 Singer, Peter, “The Triviality of the Debate Over ‘Is-Ought’ and the Definition of ‘Moral’”, American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 5156Google Scholar.

2 See Nielsen, Kai, ”Why there is à Problem about Ethics: Reflections on the Is and the Ought“, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 15 (1978), 6896Google Scholar.

3 See Monro, D. H., Empiricism and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 146Google Scholar.

4 For à more ample and qualified version of this position, compare Monro, 213. For à more recent update see: Harman, Gilbert, “Critical Review: Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right”, Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), 119139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar