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Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2018

SERGI OMS
SERGI OMS*
Affiliation:
University of Barcelona, Logos Group
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified.

L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels la théorie minimaliste de la vérité de Paul Horwich doit faire face est le problème de la généralisation. Horwich soutient que le minimalisme a un rôle explicatif fondamental, mais le problème de la généralisation montre que cette théorie est trop faible pour tenir ce rôle. Dans cet article, je défends la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation à partir d’une objection soulevée par Bradley Armour-Garb. Je prétends également que ma réponse à Armour-Grab nous permet de formuler d’une manière plus simple la réponse d’Horwich au problème de la généralisation.

Keywords

MinimalismtruthPaul Horwichgeneralization problemconceivability
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 287 - 297
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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