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Annas: Virtuous Person, Relativism, and the Circularity Objection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 March 2015

HUSAIN SARKAR
HUSAIN SARKAR*
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
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Abstract

This paper is informed by two principles: the Partiality Principle and the Impartiality Principle. Relying upon a relatively-unknown argument in Kant, the latter principle is stated and defended. The former principle is shown to be connected to Annas’ claim, in her theory of virtue ethics, that no mature, responsible adult wants to be told what to do, as well as to her developmental account of teaching and learning of virtue. I argue that Annas’ theory of virtue ethics is susceptible, as Kant’s theory is not, either to the Circularity Objection or (inclusive) to the Relativism Objection.

Cet article est fondé sur deux principes : le principe de partialité et le principe d’impartialité. M’appuyant sur un argument relativement peu connu de Kant, j’énonce et je défends le second principe. Je démontre ensuite que le premier principe est lié à la thèse présentée par Annas dans sa théorie sur l’éthique de la vertu, selon laquelle aucun adulte mûr ne souhaite qu’on lui dise quoi faire, ainsi qu’à son récit sur l’enseignement et l’apprentissage de la vertu. Je soutiens que la théorie d’Annas sur l’éthique de la vertu est susceptible, contrairement à celle de Kant, de donner prise soit à l’objection de la circularité, soit (ou ainsi que) à l’objection du relativisme.

Type
Articles
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 285 - 311
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Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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