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Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from Caring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2014

HILLA JACOBSON
HILLA JACOBSON*
Affiliation:
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
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Abstract

According to ‘strong cognitivism’, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena—particular desires.

Selon le «cognitivisme fort», toutes les raisons d’une action trouvent leurs sources dans des caractéristiques normatives par lesquelles l’individu motivé (explicitement ou implicitement) prend des objets comme avoir (ou manque), indépendamment de son attitude à l’égard de ces objets. L’objectif majeur de cet article est de contester les arguments du cognitivisme fort, en d’autres termes, de démontrer que toute attitude volitive donne aux individus des raisons pour entreprendre une action. À cette fin, l’argument principal consistera à procéder par le biais de l’analyse du phénomène complexe de la préoccupation, pour en extrapoler une conclusion relative à la nature (incitative et normative) d’un phénomène mental plus fondamental encore : les désirs spécifiques.

Type
Articles
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 139 - 158
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2014 

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