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Wittgenstein et les théories du jugement de Russell et de Meinong

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Jimmy Plourde
Jimmy Plourde
Affiliation:
Université du Québec a Montréal
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Abstract

One of the main challenges faced by Russell's theory of judgement was to provide a satisfactory account of judgement that was not committed to the existence of true, false, or non-existent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article. I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell's theory of judgement find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in the Notebooks between a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible (non-existing) complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in the Tractatus.

Résumé

Un des principaux enjeux de la théorie du jugement de Russell consistait à élaborer une théorie qui n'engage pas à admettre des entités complexes vraies, fausses ou inexistantes tels que les objectifs meinongiens. Dans l'etude du débat entre Russell et Wittgenstein sur cette théorie, on n'a jamais sérieusement envisagé que Wittgenstein n'ait pas suivi Russell sur cette question et qu'il ait plutôt adopté une position plus proche de celle de Meinong. Dans cet article, j'aborde cette question et soutiens que Wittgenstein a trouve la solution aux problèmes posés par la théorie du jugement de Russell dans la théorie de l'image et qu'il a longuement hésite dans les Carnets entre des versions de la theorie de l'image en accord avec la position de Russell et des versions en accord avec celle de Meinong. Enfin, je soutiens qu'il a finalement tranché la question dans le Tractatus en optant pour une théorie du type de celle privilégiée par Meinong.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , Spring 2005 , pp. 249 - 284
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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References

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