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Will, Belief and Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

H.G. Classen
Affiliation:
Ottawa

Extract

In her recent paper, “Belief, Values and the Will,” Trudy Govier raises several interesting and challenging points. Most interesting is her conclusion that it is at least logically possible for a person to believe something “simply in virtue of having taken that decision,” i.e., by fiat. In otherwords, it is possible to believe something by an act of will.

Type
Notes/Discussions
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1979

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References

Notes

1 Dialogue, XV, 4, December 1976.

2 Republic, concluding portion of Book V. See also Theaitetos and Meno.

3 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edwards, P., Editor in Chief, New York, 1972, Vol. 2, p. 351.Google Scholar

4 A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix.

5 Ibid., Book I, Part III, Section VIII.

6 Knowledge, Belief and Opinion, New York 1930, p. 157.Google Scholar

7 Broome, J. H., Pascal, London 1965, pp. 165174.Google Scholar

8 Edgley, Roy, Reason in Theory and Practice, London 1969, p. 64.Google Scholar

9 Price, H. H., “Belief and Will,” Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXVII 1954.Google Scholar

10 O'Hear, A., “Belief and Will,” Philosophy, 1972.Google Scholar

11 Chisholm, R. M., Perceiving, Ithaca 1957, pp. 3637.Google Scholar

12 Hampshire, Stuart, Thought and Action, London 1969, p. 158.Google Scholar

13 Needham, Rodney, Belief, Language and Experience, Oxford 1972, pp. 8596.Google Scholar