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The Virtues of Vagueness in the Languages of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1975

Alexander Rosenberg
Alexander Rosenberg
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
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Extract

Philosophers have traditionally decried vagueness as an unmitigated evil, and natural scientists have consistently agreed with them. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, the vagueness of scientific terms has some important advantages for the theories in which these terms figure. In so arguing I do not mean to put the best face on some unpleasant facts or to make a virtue out of a necessity. I shall begin, however, by arguing that on some contemporary accounts of scientific language the vagueness of many scientific terms is unavoidable; if it is unavoidable then lamenting it is futile, and justifying it is idle. I shall go on to argue that, independent of these accounts, the advantages of exactness attained can sometimes be substantially outweighed by the disadvantages of vagueness foregone.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 1975 , pp. 281 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1975

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References

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