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Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalisme

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Christine Tappolet
Christine Tappolet*
Affiliation:
Université de Montréal
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate to it, but this view allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. Against its normative version, I argue that its descriptive version can best satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument while giving an answer to the Wrong Kind of Reason Objection. Finally, I argue that the circularity that is involved is not vicious: understood epistemically, neo-sentimentalism remains instructive.

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Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 7 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

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