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Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Patricia Marino
Patricia Marino
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo
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Abstract

Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible—metaphysically troubling and overly general—or trivial—collapsing into deflationism's “‘P’ is true iff P.” Philip Kitcher argues for a “modest” correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, “modest” theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , Winter 2008 , pp. 81 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

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