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The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2017

ROBERTO HORÁCIO DE SÁ PEREIRA
ROBERTO HORÁCIO DE SÁ PEREIRA*
Affiliation:
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modelled as a propositional function, that is, the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation.

Mon objectif est de défendre une version épistémique de la thèse de la particularité qui résulte d’une combinaison sui generis de ce que j’appelle la «vision relationnelle singulière» et de ce que j’appelle la «vision relativiste du contenu». Les particularités ne sont pas représentées dans le supposé contenu singulier. Au lieu de cela, nous les connaissons de manière perceptive dans le sens pertinent où l’expérience nous met en contact perceptuel direct avec elles. Le contenu de l’expérience est le contenu d’un prédicat complexe qui est vrai ou faux seulement par rapport à certaines circonstances d’évaluation.

Keywords

content viewrelational viewparticularity of experiencerelativistic contentacquaintance relations
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 93 - 114
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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