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Scepticism, Sentiment, and Common Sense in Hume1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Terence Penelhum
Affiliation:
University of Calgary

Extract

Norman Kemp Smith began his famous work on Hume by reminding us how difficult Hume is: not difficult to follow paragraph by paragraph, but difficult to interpret as a whole. He then went on to try to remedy this situation by offering an overall interpretation that essentially reversed the dominant reading of Hume as a sceptic, and argued instead that he is a naturalist—a thinker who views our beliefs, as well as our moral commitments, as products of the instinctive and passionate natures with which we are endowed. On this view, the key Humean text is the famous pronouncement that reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions; for it is in his account of the passions that we must find the basis of the natural history of our cognitive and moral commitments. This lends a systematic unity to Hume's thought, by making his epistemology and his ethics offshoots of his psychology of the emotions. It also allows Kemp Smith to emphasize the importance of the influence on Hume of the work of his older contemporary Francis Hutcheson.

Type
Critical Notices/Etudes critiques
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1985

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References

2 Smith, Norman Kemp, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 David Fate Norton, “Hume's Moral Ontology”, forthcoming in Hume Studies.

4 Stevenson, C. L., Ethics anil Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944). see particularly 136ff.Google Scholar

5 See Baier's, Annette review in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1983), 127131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar