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Savoir que l’on sait. La question de la transparence dans les attitudes épistémiques

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2009

Neil Kennedy
Neil Kennedy*
Affiliation:
UQAM/Université de Paris 1-IHPST
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I revisit arguments for and against various theses concerning higher-order knowledge in order to fully gauge their impact on the principles of positive and negative introspection. I argue that the expression “knowing that one knows” has at least two salient understandings: the more common one, labelled “transparentist”, validates the principle of positive introspection, while the other which is less common, labelled “agrippean”, supports some of the arguments against this principle.

RÉSUMÉ : Dans cet article, je réévalue les arguments pour et contre certaines thèses concernant la connaissance d’ordre supérieur afin d’évaluer leur portée réelle sur les principes d’introspection positive et négative. Je défends l’idée que la locution «savoir que l’on sait» possède au moins deux interprétations notoires : l’une, plus courante, dite «transparentiste», valide le principe d’introspection positive et l’autre, moins courante, dite «agrippéenne», endosse certaines critiques de ce principe.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 451 - 478
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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References

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