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Reflections on Frege*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2010

E. W. Kluge
E. W. Kluge
Affiliation:
The University of California, Irvine
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Extract

A recent addition to the growing corpus of Frege literature is Reinhardt Grossmann's metaphysical study of Frege's philosophical theories. Grossmann approaches Frege as a metaphysician whose philosophical concern centers around four main problems: the nature of logic, the analysis of various kinds of propositions, identity and truth. He has a genetic view of Frege's answers to these problems, and this is reflected in the arrangement and content of the chapters. In chapter I, Grossmann considers Frege's introduction of these problems in the Begriffsschrift and his initial attempt at solutions in terms of the distinctions between thinking and judging, sentence and content, concept and object, function and argument. Grossmann here diagnoses Frege's alleged failure to recognize states of affairs as the fundamental shortcoming of these early views.

Type
Critical Notices/Études critiques
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , December 1970 , pp. 401 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1970

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References

1 Jena, May 24, 1891; to appear in G. Frege: Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel.

2 Reflections, p. 5

3 Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Breslau (1884), §5.

4 Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens. Halle (1879) § 2; Cf. G. Frege : Nachgelassene Schriften, Kambartel, Hermes and Kaulbach, , edits. (Hamburg, 1969) p. 273Google Scholar, where Frege says that judging, “being an act of the person who understands, must be relegated to psychology.”

5 Cf. Begriffsschrift, §2.

6 loc. cit.

7 Ibid., §2 note **.

8 “Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung”, pp. 35–6 (in Patzig, G., Funktion, Begriff Bedeutung, Göttingen, 1962)Google Scholar.

9 “Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift” (1880/81), espec. pp. 18ff; in Nachgelassene Schriften (pp. 9-52).

10 Jahresbericht der deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, vol. 12 (1903), pp. 371ffGoogle Scholar.

11 Reflections, pp. 98-9.

12 “On the Foundations of Geometry” (1903), p. 371.

13 “On the Foundations of Geometry” (Jahresbericht, vol. 13 (1906) p. 302Google Scholar. Undeniably, all this requires a re-examination of the distinction between what can and what cannot be judged; but this transcends the present scope.

14 Reflections, p . 208.

15 loc. tit.

16 ibid., p. 56 et pass.

17 ibid., p. 56.

18 I shall not attempt to evaluate Grossmann's counterproposal to Frege's theory of quantification and Grossmann's theory that numbers are quantifiers.

19 ibid., pp. 173-4 e t pass-

20 ibid., pp. 142 et pass; pp. 152 et pass.

21 ibid., p. 116 note 180.

22 Presumably this reference is to “Begriindung meiner strengeren Grundsatze des Definierens” (1897/98) in Nachlass, pp. 164-170.

23 Nachlass, pp. 227ff.; Cf. “Foundations of Geometry” (1906) I, especially pp. 302fF.

24 An example of this would be the definition of God underlying the ontological argument. Here a first-level concept is defined as involving existence, a second-level concept. (“Foundations of Geometry” 1903, pp. 371ff.; 1906, pp. 383ff.) This, by the way, shows how wrong Grossmann is in his claim that Frege ruled out definitions of concepts. But then, Grosmann apparently deemed the “Foundations of Geometry" too unimportant to consult in this matter.

25 Reflections, p . 157.

26 loc. cit.

27 Nachgelassene Schriften, pp. 286-302; especially pp. 298-299.