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Public Wrongs and Public Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 June 2016

CHAD FLANDERS
CHAD FLANDERS*
Affiliation:
Saint Louis University School of Law
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

The distinction between crimes that involve wrongs in themselves and crimes that are wrong because the law makes them so has long puzzled theorists. This essay argues that the distinction, while getting at something real, is based on a mistake. That mistake is made both by those who see moral wrongness as a necessary condition for criminality and by those who believe merely making something illegal is sufficient to make it criminal. Neither is correct. Rather, what makes something a criminal wrong is that it involves a violation of a law that has been justified in terms of “public reason.”

La distinction entre les crimes qui impliquent un mal en soi et les crimes qui sont mauvais parce que la loi les désigne ainsi a longtemps intrigué les théoriciens. Le présent article soutient que cette distinction, bien qu’elle touche une différence réelle, est fondée sur une erreur. Cette erreur est commise tant par ceux qui considèrent le mal moral comme une condition nécessaire de la criminalité que par ceux qui croient que le simple fait de rendre une chose illégale suffit à la rendre criminelle. Aucune de ces positions n’est correcte. Plutôt, ce qui rend un acte criminel, c’est le fait que cet acte implique la violation d’une loi qui a été justifiée en termes de «raison publique».

Type
Special Topic: Mala in se and Mala prohibita
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 45 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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