Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-29T21:26:57.602Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Probabilité conditionnelle et certitude*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Bas C. Van Fraassen
Bas C. Van Fraassen
Affiliation:
Princeton University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Personal probability is now a familiar subject in epistemology, together with such more venerable notions as knowledge and belief. But there are severe strains between probability and belief; if either is taken as the more basic, the other may suffer. After explaining the difficulties of attempts to accommodate both, I shall propose a unified account which takes conditional personal probability as basic. Full belief is therefore a defined, derivative notion. Yet we will still be able to picture opinion as follows: my subjective probability is only a grading of the possibilities left open by my beliefs. My conditional probabilities generally derive — in a sense to be explicated — from the strongest belief I can maintain when admitting the relevant condition.

Type
Articles and Interventions/Articles et Discussions
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , Winter 1997 , pp. 69 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

References bibliographiques

Birkhoff, G. 1967 Lattice Theory, 3e ed., Providence, American Mathematical Society.Google Scholar
Blume, L., Brandenburger, A. et Deckel, E. 1991a «Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty», Econometrica, vol. 59, p. 61–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blume, L., Brandenburger, A. et Deckel, E. 1991b «Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements», Econometrica, vol. 59, p. 81–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eells, E. et Skyrms, B., dir. 1994 Probability and Conditionals: Belief, Revision and Rational Decision, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Field, H. 1977 «Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role», Journal of Philosophy, vol. 74, p. 374–409.Google Scholar
Finetti, B. de 1936 «Les probabilites nulles», Bulletin des sciences mathematiques, vol. 60, p. 275–288.Google Scholar
Finetti, B. de 1972 Theory of Probability, New York, John Wiley, 2 vol.Google Scholar
Foley, R. 1993 Working Without a Net, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gardenfors, P. 1988 Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hajek, A. 1992 «The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability», thèse de doctorat, Université de Princeton.Google Scholar
Harper, W. L. 1976 «Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions, and Counter-Factuals», dans C. Hooker et W. Harper, dir., Foundations of Probability Theory, vol. l, p. 73–112.Google Scholar
Hintikka, J. 1962 Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Kappos, D. A. 1969 Probability Algebras and Stochastic Spaces, New York, Academic Press.Google Scholar
Leblanc, H. et Morgan, C. 1984 «Probability Functions and Their Assumption Sets — the Binary Case», Synthese, vol. 60, p. 91–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leblanc, H. et Roeper, P. 1993 «Getting the Constraints on Popper's Probability Functions Right», Philosophy of Science, vol. 60, p. 151–157.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leblanc, H. et 1979 «On Carnap and Popper Probability Functions», Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 44, p. 369–373.Google Scholar
Maher, P. 1990 «Acceptance without Belief», PSA 1990, vol. 1, East Lansing, MI, Philosophy of Science Association, p. 381–392.Google Scholar
McGee, V. 1994 «Learning the Impossible», dans E. Eells et B. Skyrms, p. 179–199.Google Scholar
Popper, K. 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York, Basic Books.Google Scholar
Rényi, A. 1970 Foundations of Probability, San Francisco, Holden-Day.Google Scholar
Rényi, A. 1970 Probability Theory, Amsterdam, North-Holland.Google Scholar
Skyrms, B. 1983 «Three Ways to Give a Probability Function a Memory», dans J. Earman, dir., Testing Scientific Theories (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. X), Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 157–161.Google Scholar
Spohn, J. M. 1986 «The Representation of Popper Measures», Topoi, vol. 5, p. 69–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1979 «Foundations of Probability: A Modal Frequency Interpretation», dans G. Toraldo di Francia, dir., Problems in the Foundations of Physics, Amsterdam, North-Holland, p. 344–387.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1981 «Probabilistic Semantics Objectified», Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 10, p. 371–394 et 495–510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1988 «Identity in Intensional Logic: Subjective Semantics», dans U. Eco et al, dir., Meaning and Mental Representation, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, p. 201–219.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1995 «Fine-Grained Opinion, Probability, and the Logic of Full Belief», Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 24, p. 349–377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vickers, J. M. 1988 Chance and Structure, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar