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Luck and Manipulation Cases: A Response to Professor Haji

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2015

NEIL LEVY Open the ORCID record for NEIL LEVY [Opens in a new window]
NEIL LEVY*
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Macquarie University
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*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

In his paper published in this issue, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that the challenge to compatibilism from luck is not novel. Rather, the challenge is identical to that from manipulation cases, and compatibilists already have responses to that challenge. In response, I distinguish two different luck problems for compatibilism. One challenge is seen in manipulation cases, but the challenge he identifies is different from the challenge from manipulation. The luck problem is therefore novel, and the existing solutions to the challenge from manipulation fail to address it.

Dans un article publié dans ce numéro, Ishtiyaque Haji soutient que la difficulté posée par la chance au compatibilisme n’est pas nouvelle, mais qu’elle est en fait identique au problème inhérent aux cas de manipulation, auquel les compatibilistes ont déjà répondu. Dans cet article, je distingue deux problèmes que la chance pose au compatibilisme. Si l’un des deux est bien celui que l’on trouve dans les cas de manipulation, celui identifié par Haji est cependant différent. La difficulté soulevée par la chance est donc bien originale, et les solutions au problème des cas de manipulation échouent à y répondre.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 633 - 646
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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