1 See Curtis, Mattoon Monroe, An Outline of Locke's Ethical Philosophy (Leipzig: Gustav Fock, 1890), pp. 58–88Google Scholar; von Leyden, W., “John Locke and Natural Law,” Philosophy 21 (1956): 23–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in Life, Liberty, and Property: Essays on Locke's Political Ideas, edited by Gordon J. Schochet (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), pp. 12–25; Leo Strauss, “Locke and the Modern Theory of Natural Right,” in Life, Liberty, and Property, pp. 26–32; Cranston, Maurice, John Locke: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 64–67Google Scholar; Ayers, Michael, Locke, Vol. 2: Ontology (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 131–202Google Scholar; Eterovich, Francis H., Approaches to Natural Law: From Plato to Kant (New York: Exposition Press, 1972), pp. 111–21Google Scholar; Weinreb, Lloyd L., Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 76–83Google Scholar; Lemprecht, Sterling Power, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962)Google Scholar; Dunn, John, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 187–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar and passim; Yolton, John W., John Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 160–80Google Scholar; Colman, John, John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), pp. 29–50Google Scholar and passim; but compare Wild, John, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 127–32Google Scholar.

2 There are only four references to the “natural law” or the “law of nature” in the Essay. See Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Nidditch, Peter H. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1.3.2, p. 66; 1.3.6, p. 68; 1.3.13, p. 75; 2.28.11, p. 356Google Scholar. Further references to the Essay will be by book, chapter, and section.

3 Cranston, John Locke: A Biography, pp. 140–41, and Grant, Ruth W., John Locke's Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.3.18, 4.12.8.

5 Sidgwick, Henry, Outlines of the History of Ethics: For English Readers, with an additional chapter by Alban G. Widgery (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 175–178Google Scholar; Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, foreword by John Rawls, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 205–206Google Scholar; Grant, John Locke's Liberalism, pp. 12–51.

6 Locke, John, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, edited by John W., and Yolton, Jean S. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 186.Google Scholar

7 Locke, John, The Reasonableness of Christianity, edited by Tipton, I. T., A Library of Modern Religious Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 19 and 241–243.Google Scholar

8 Ayers, Locke, Vol. 2: Ontology, pp. 184–95, and Tully, James, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.294ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Ibid., pp. 226 and 312ff.

10 If my account is correct, there are closer affinities than are usually acknowledged between Locke's moral theory and egoistic interpretations of Hobbes.

11 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Selby-Bigge, L. A., 2nd ed., edited by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 484–526Google Scholar; Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 189–95.Google Scholar

12 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.21.

13 Locke, John, Essays on the Law of Nature, edited by von Leyden, W. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 109.Google Scholar

14 Since Essays on the Law of Nature is an early work (1660), it might not reflect Locke's mature views. Hence, I shall refer to it only to illustrate points that unquestionably are raised in his later works.

15 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.21.55, and Essay 1.3.3.

16 Ibid., 4.2.3.

17 To examine this issue in detail is beyond the scope of the present paper.

18 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.28.6; cf. 1.3.12.

19 Ibid., 2.28.7.

20 See also Ibid., 1.3.6.

21 Ibid., 2.28.10.

22 Ibid., 2.22.1.

23 Ibid., 2.30.4 and 2.31.3.

24 Ibid., 2.22.1.

25 Ibid., 2.22.3.

26 Ibid., 2.22.12.

27 Ibid., 2.12.4–5 and 2.22.1–3.

28 Ibid., 2.22.3 and 9.

29 Ibid., 2.22.9.

30 Ibid., 2.22.3.

31 Ibid., 2.32.10.

32 Ibid., 2.30.4.

33 Ibid., 2.31.3.

34 Ibid., 2.31.4–5.

35 Cf. Ibid., 3.9.6.

36 Ibid., 3.5.8.

37 Ibid., 3.11.16, 4.3.18, and 4.12.8.

38 Ibid., 4.4.5; emphasis in original.

39 Cf. Ibid., 4.4.7.

40 Ibid., 3.9.6.

41 Ibid., 2.30.4.

42 Here one might object that my account is ahistorical. Among the paradigms of systems following the geometrical method in the seventeenth century were Descartes's “Arguments Proving the Existence of God and the Distinction between the Soul and the Body Arranged in Geometrical Fashion” (Descartes, René, Second Set of Replies, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 2, edited by Cottingham, John, Stoothoff, Robert, and Murdoch, Dugald [London: Cambridge University Press, 1984], pp. 113–20Google Scholar) and Spinoza's Ethics. In these cases, as in that of Euclid's Elements, the definitions, axioms, and postulates were taken to be self-evident. It is my suggestion that Locke ascribed something less than self-evidence to these elements of a geometrical/deductive system that raises the objection. But in Locke's case, the sole ground for deeming these elements “self-evident” is that the ideas corresponding to them are mixed modes. Hence, they have no external referents. Hence, the sole ground for deeming a conceptual system based on mixed modes adequate is internal consistency. If there is an apparent difference between a mathematical system and a Lockean moral deductive system, it would seem to be that mathematical ideas are simpler (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.9.6), and the mixed modes providing the meaning to mathematical terms are formed by explicating the meaning of a word (Ibid., 2.22.9). Further, insofar as one is concerned with the construction of such a deductive system, it is unclear what Locke could deem necessary beyond consistency; unlike Descartes, for example, Locke did not countenance eternal truths that are recognized as true by the natural light on their first consideration. And even Descartes deemed conceptual consistency a necessary—though not a sufficient—condition for the acceptability of a deductive system of beliefs (see Flage, Daniel E. and Bonnen, Clarence A., Descartes and Method: A Search for Method in Meditations [London: Routledge, 1999])Google Scholar.

43 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.10.19.

44 Nicholas Wolterstorff contends that there is a conflict between what he calls the “theistic project”—Locke's divine command theory—and his “archetypal project”—Locke's attempt to derive morality from considerations of mixed modes alone. See Wolterstorff, Nicholas, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief, Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 145–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I argue in Section 4 that those “two” projects are two sides of a single project.

45 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.20.2, 2.21.42, and 2.28.5.

46 Ibid., 2.7.1.

47 Ibid., 2.7.4; cf. Essay 2.7.3.

48 Ibid., 1.3.3.

49 Ibid., 2.21.42.

50 Ibid., 2.20.2, 2.21.42, and 2.28.5.

51 Ibid., 2.7.1.

52 And the cause itself might be unknown. See Flage, Daniel E., “Locke's Relative Ideas,” Theoria 47 (1981): 142–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53 Locke acknowledges a similar distinction between short-term and long-term goodness in his discussion of the drunkard who finds pleasure in satisfying the “habitual thirst after his Cups, at the usual time,” even though it results in “the loss of health and plenty, and perhaps the joys of another life” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.21.35).

54 Ibid., 2.28.5.

55 Ibid., 1.3.13.

56 Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Noonday Press, 1954), pp. 24–25.Google Scholar

57 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.28.6.

58 Cf. Ibid., 2.28.5.

59 Ibid., 2.28.8; emphasis in original.

60 Ibid., 2.28.10.

61 It is worthy of notice that in his paraphrase of Romans 2:14–15a, Locke stresses that the law of God is a positive law. The King James Version renders the verse as follows: “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves, Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts” (Rom. 2:14–15a). Locke paraphrases it: “For when the Gentiles who have no positive law given them by God doe by the direction of the light of nature observe or keep to the moral rectitude conteined in the positive law, given by god to the Israelites they being without any positive law given them, have nevertheless a law within themselves, and shew the rule of the law written on their hearts …” (Locke, John, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul to the Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians, Vol. 2, edited by Wainwright, Arthur W. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987], p. 499Google Scholar). The stress on positive law continues in Locke's note to the verse, “The Apostle by the word law generaly in this Epistle signifying a positive law given by god and promulgated by revelation from heaven with the sanction of declared rewards and punishments annexed to i t …” (Paraphrase, p. 499, n. 14). There is a similar emphasis on positive law in his paraphrase and notes on Ephesians 2:15. See Paraphrase, pp. 633–35, note p.

62 Some might contend that I have misunderstood the intent of this phrase. The sentence from which it is taken reads, “It would be vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule for the Actions of another, if he had it not in his power, to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the Action itself.” Does this not mean that we should assume that the good and evil following an action is a natural consequence of an action, since it would be vain to suppose some being makes laws while it is unable to get the laws enforced? (I wish to thank one of Dialogue' s referees for bringing this alternative reading to my attention.) I am not convinced that this is plausible. The sentence is a conditional asserting that if the law-giver did not have the power to reward and punish, then it would be in vain to set the law (rule). But if Locke's model of a law-giver is the civil magistrate—and, as shown in the previous note, he held that even divine laws are positive laws—then it seems implausible to suggest that the punishment for breaking a positive law is a “natural” consequence of the action. If I am stopped for speeding, the legal consequence of my speeding might be a fine or a period in jail. But the natural consequence of my speeding might be arriving at my destination a bit sooner than I otherwise would or a traffic accident. So, it seems reasonable to suggest that the consequence (punishment) of breaking a positive law is something different from the consequence that arises from the laws of physics or psychology. Further, understanding the phrase in terms of something other than consequences of the laws of physics or psychology is consistent with the sentence that follows the phase. Notice how Locke continues: “For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of itself without a Law.” If the consequences were natural—such as the consequences of the laws of physics—then there would be no need for a positive law. This also suggests that when a law-giver promulgates a law, there must be some kind of “threat” behind it—some possible or probable legal (non-natural) punishment—so that anyone subject to the law will be disinclined to violate the law.

63 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1.2.3.

64 Ibid., 1.3.3.

65 Ibid.

66 This would require at least some linguistic understanding of the term “good” lest the proposition “Pleasure or that which produces pleasure is good” be reduced to a tautology.

67 Given Locke's discussion of relishes—that is, individual differences regarding what is taken to be good—this similarity could occur only at a fairly high level. The bibliophile might take pleasure only in a good book. The ice cream aficionado might take pleasure primarily in the various gustatory delights derived from consuming variations on Ben and Jerry's. Nonetheless, each takes a certain kind or kinds of pleasure to be the mark of the good. Pleasure is the common factor.

68 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.21.52.

69 Nor is this only evidence that Locke was a psychological hedonist and, insofar as he identified motive and obligation, what I call below “a natural egoist.” His discussion of the passions in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.20, tends to show that all concerns of pleasure and pain that define the passions apply primarily to the individual who immediately experiences the pleasure or pain. Love is “the Delight, which any present, or absent thing is apt to produce in him. For when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he loves Grapes, it is no more, but the taste of Grapes delights him; let an alternation of Health or Constitution destroy that delight of their Taste, and he then can be said to love Grapes no longer” (2.22.4). And this applies to the love of sentient beings in the same way as it does to food. As Locke notes at 2.22.5, “But Hatred or Love, to Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or Delight, which we find in ourselves [emphasis added] arising from a consideration of their very Being, or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing Delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our Ideas of Love and Hatred, are but Dispositions of the Mind, in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caused in us” (2.22.5; cf. 2.22.6–14).

Notice that the notions of love and hatred have a reference to the self vis-à-vis one's experience of pleasure and pain. Love consists of the experience of pleasure vis-à-vis the object of one's consideration; hatred its opposite. Throughout, Locke's considerations of pleasure and pain are, in part, considerations of motives to action. As motives to (causes of) action, they are the motives of individuals, even if all individuals are motivated by pleasure and pain and even if there are differences in the relishes (objects identified as pleasant or painful) of individuals. As Locke notes, “By Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean, not only bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever Delight or Uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful, or unacceptable Sensation or Reflection” (2.22.15). In identifying the motive and obligation (2.21.52), one, as an individual, not only inclines toward but is obligated to seek one's own pleasure or pain. Thus, Locke's discussion of the passions tends to support my contention that Locke was a natural egoist.

70 I do not focus on epistemic obligations, although they do re-emerge later. For a fascinating discussion of such obligations, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief.

71 To develop a thoroughgoing discussion of the theory of PNL in the Two Treatises of Government (edited by Laslett, Peter [New York: New American Library, 1960]Google Scholar; references will be made by treatise and section) is beyond the scope of this paper. But since some will certainly claim that my account of Lockean PNL differs from that in the Two Treatises, I outline a reply in this note. I focus on four issues. (1) Does the content of PNL in the Two Treatises differ from that I ascribe to Locke? (2) Does the Two Treatises account of how PNL is known differ from that I develop? (3) If the PNL in the Two Treatises is egoistic, why does Locke not say so? (4) If the account of PNL in the Two Treatises is as far removed from traditional PNL theory as my account suggests, why did Locke set forth his argument in the Two Treatises in terms of PNL?

(1) Content. Little space is devoted to the question of the precise content of PNL in the Two Treatises. As I argue in the next section, if PNL is identical, at least in part, with divine law, and if such laws are understood as at least the last six or seven commandments in the Decalogue (depending whose enumeration system one uses), then my egoistic account of Lockean natural law would seem to sanction the same commandments. (I suspect the account could be expanded to include the first three or four commandments, those dealing with one's duties to God. Interestingly, there is no discussion of such divine laws in the Two Treatises) So, the difference does not seem to be one of content.

(2) Knowledge of PNL. In §6 of the Second Treatise Locke says, “Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (see also T2, §8). But this tells one very little. In the Two Treatises Locke provides a systematic account of neither how the laws of nature are known on the basis of reason nor what constitutes reason. His appeal to reason is consistent with traditional natural-law theory; but apart from an account of the nature of reason assumed, no conclusion can be drawn regarding how PNL is known. Since I prove an account of how Lockean PNL can be known, the critic must show that an alternative account of reason is implicit in the Two Treatises if he or she is to establish that the account of one's knowledge of PNL differs from that I provide.

(3) Egoism. If Locke was an ethical egoist, it is not a claim one would have expected him to trumpet from the housetops. The foremost ethical egoist of the period was Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes's philosophy was almost universally criticized by British moral and political philosophers for a century following the publication of Leviathan. As a defender of absolute monarchy, Hobbes's political philosophy differed markedly from Locke's. Had Locke been an explicit proponent of an egoistic moral theory, it is likely that he would have been branded a Hobbesean and his philosophy would not have received a careful and impartial reading. So, there were “political” reasons why Locke would not have openly embraced ethical egoism. Further, as I argue below, Lockean egoism focuses on long-term self-interest. So, Lockean ethical egoism is inconsistent with popular, stereotypical accounts of ethical egoism. So, for Locke to have openly embraced ethical egoism would have been at least misleading.

(4) Why natural law? If Lockean PNL differs markedly from traditional natural-law theory, why did he write as if he were a proponent of traditional PNL in the Two Treatises? There seem to be two reasons. First, the Two Treatises is a political polemic as well as a treatise on political philosophy. As has been recognized for nearly forty years, Locke wrote the Two Treatises not only to justify but also to provoke the Revolution of 1688 (see Laslett's “Introduction” to the Two Treatises, particularly pp. 45ff). If traditional PNL theories were correct, then there are eternal and universal laws that justify certain kinds of actions. Certainly, if there were such laws, they would provide the best basis for the justification of a revolution. So, polemical considerations might explain why Locke wrote the Two Treatises as if he were a proponent of traditional PNL. Second, as I suggested above and argue below, there is reason to believe that Lockean PNL differs little in content from traditional PNL. This is suggested by the fact that he recommends the study of Grotius and Puffendorf in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, §186. If the content of Lockean PNL is identical—or nearly identical—with that of traditional PNL, it might be reasonable to recommend that a youth study works on traditional PNL for its content, even if one maintains that the ground for the moral law is different from that proposed by traditional PNL. (Analogously, an atheist might applaud religious education for its moral content, while holding that a religious basis for morality is mistaken; the atheist might maintain that, upon more mature reflection, either the youth will recognize that there is a different ground for morality, or, if not, at least she will have a system of moral beliefs that allows her to function well in society.)

If these remarks are sufficient to explain theprima facie differences between my account of Lockean PNL and what one seems to find in the Two Treatises, fine and good. If not, the critic must show that there is an alternative account of reason implicit in the Two Treatises, an account that explains how traditional PNLs are known.

72 See Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke, pp. 10–14.

73 Locke's remarks on the state of nature in §6 of the Second Treatise of Government suggests that the Law of Nature is God's law. Insofar as this is a positive law, it can be binding even if it is unknown. For the purposes of this thought experiment, however, I leave open the question of divine law. We shall see this makes little difference.

74 Some might object at this point that if one appeals to such a principle of natural egoistic obligation, this will sanction obligations which few would deem PNLs. For example, since jumping off tall buildings generally results in a balance of pain over pleasure to the jumper, one ought not do so. I grant this, but two remarks should be made. First, as I have reconstructed Locke's account in this thought experiment, this is not a moral obligation. Second, any teleological moral theory must sanction such a rule as a moral obligation. The ethical egoist might argue that smoking is morally wrong because, in the long run, the smoker will (probably) suffer more pain than pleasure from the activity. The utilitarian might—and the recent attacks on smoking suggest he or she will—argue that smoking is morally wrong not only because of the harm to the individual smokers, but also because of the dangers of second-hand smoke and the increased health-related costs to the society. So, if my account of Lockean natural egoistic obligation seems to sanction prescriptive laws that one might not be inclined to deem moral rules, such a “problem” is common to virtually any teleological theory of moral obligation.

75 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine Locke's argument for the existence of God. Suffice it to say that it rests on an ambiguity. His initial argument is as follows: “If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Nonentity cannot produce any real Being; it is an evident demonstration, that from Eternity there has been something; Since what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning and what had a Beginning, must be produced by something else” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.10.3). Even if one grants that “from Eternity there has been something,” this commits one only to the claim that something or other existed from eternity, that is, that at any given point in time something existed; it does not commit one to the claim that there was exactly one thing that existed at all times “from Eternity,” although Locke takes it in the second sense.

76 Ibid., 4.10.4 and 4.10.6.

77 Ibid., 4.10.5–6.

78 Ibid., 4.10.10–18.

79 Cf. Ibid., 2.21.49, 2.21.50, 2.28.8, 3.6.12, and 4.14.2.

80 Cf. Ibid., 2.21.35.

81 Ibid., 4.17.24.

82 Ibid., 4.18.10; emphasis in original. Cf. 4.18.8.

83 Ibid., 4.17.23.

84 Ibid., 4.17.23.

85 Ibid., 3.9.9.

86 Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, §241.

87 Presumably Locke had the law, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” in mind. See Some Thoughts Concerning Education, §159.

88 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.9.9.

89 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, §61; see also §42, 108, and 185.

90 T2, §121.

91 See Essays on the Law of Nature, p. 171, where Locke delineates some of the intersocietal differences regarding the notions of modesty and chastity.

92 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4.17.24.

93 Research for this paper was supported by a Summer Research Grant from James Madison University. I wish to thank Dr. Ronald Glass, Dr. William O'Meara, Dr. Thomas Adajian, and two anonymous readers for Dialogue for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.