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Le problème dynamique de l’induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2010

Brian Hill
Brian Hill*
Affiliation:
HEC Paris et IHPST (CNRS)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Since Goodman’s classic monograph (1954), it has been known that any reasonable theory of induction must involve non formal elements. However, the right to make theoretical use of such an element comes with responsibilities. This article argues for an apparently new desideratum for a theory of induction: namely, that it accounts for the dynamics of the non formal element used. None of the main existing theories of induction satisfies this desideratum. The recognition of the importance of dynamics does however have the advantage of suggesting where to look for a more acceptable and complete theory of induction.

RÉSUMÉ : Depuis l’ouvrage classique de Goodman (19954), on sait que toute théorie de l’induction doit comporter une composante non formelle. Or, la liberté théorique offerte par le recours à un tel élément implique des responsabilités. Cet article propose comme desideratum d’une théorie de l’induction qu’elle rende compte de la dynamique de sa composante non formelle. Ce desideratum, qui est nouveau, n’est pas satisfait par les principales théories existantes de l’induction. L’identification de l’importance de la dynamique a pourtant l’avantage de suggérer une voie vers une théorie plus acceptable et plus compléte de l’induction.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2009 , pp. 701 - 715
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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References

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