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Kane and Double on the Principle of Rational Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2017

NEIL CAMPBELL
NEIL CAMPBELL*
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

Using Jaegwon Kim’s framework of explanatory realism versus explanatory irrealism, in addition to some observations about the metaphysics and epistemology of explanation, I re-examine the disagreement between Robert Kane and Richard Double over the principle of rational explanation. I defend Kane’s account of dual rationality and argue that Double’s principle has a narrower range of application than he claims. I also show that, contrary to what Double assumes, Kane’s approach to action explanation does not lapse into a form of explanatory irrealism.

En utilisant le cadre théorique développé par Jaegwon Kim, soit l’opposition entre le réalisme explicatif et l’irréalisme explicatif, ainsi que quelques observations sur la métaphysique et l’épistémologie de l’explication, je réexamine le désaccord opposant Robert Kane à Richard Double au sujet du principe de l’explication rationnelle. Je défends la position de Kane sur la double rationalité et je soutiens que le principe proposé par Double possède un champ d’application plus limité qu’il le prétend. Je montre aussi que, contrairement à ce que suppose Double, la façon dont Kane entend expliquer l’action ne se transforme pas en une forme d’irréalisme explicatif.

Keywords

libertarianismindeterminismexplanationrationalityunderstanding
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 45 - 63
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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