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Justice, Pluralism, and the Egalitarian Ethos

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2020

KRISTIN VOIGT
KRISTIN VOIGT*
Affiliation:
McGill University
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

One of the central aims of Kyle Johannsen’s monograph, A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, is to defend the idea that we should think of justice as a fundamental value—a value that can come into conflict with other fundamental values. This pluralism is associated in particular with G.A. Cohen’s work and his critique of John Rawls’s theory of justice. In this commentary, I sketch some of the implications of Cohen’s pluralism for a Cohenite ethos of justice.

L’un des objectifs centraux du livre de Kyle Johannsen, A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, consiste à défendre l’idée selon laquelle nous devrions concevoir la justice comme une valeur fondamentale pouvant entrer en conflit avec d’autres valeurs fondamentales. Ce type de pluralisme est principalement associé aux travaux de G.A. Cohen et à sa critique de la théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Dans le cadre ce commentaire, je propose une esquisse des implications du pluralisme de Cohen et de ce à quoi pourrait ressembler un ethos de justice à la Cohen.

Keywords

egalitarianismethosjusticepluralismdistributive justicefairness
Type
Book Symposium: Kyle Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 721 - 728
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2020 

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References

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