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John King-Farlow and Roger A. Shiner (Eds.): New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Myles Brand
Myles Brand
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle
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Extract

It is difficult to understand why this volume is named New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Some of the essays are better classified as metaphysics, some as philosophy of science, and at least one as philosophy of language. But no matter, the name of the volume is unimportant: it is the contents that count. And the contents are very interesting. The general quality of the papers is high, higher than is often found in contemporary journals. The articles all share the methodological trait of being well-argued, and perhaps it is this trait more than anything else that unifies the volume. In what follows, I shall comment briefly on two articles on action theory, and then even more briefly on the remaining six papers.

Type
Critical Notices—Études Critiques
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 1976 , pp. 679 - 685
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1976

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References

1 See, for example: Chisholm, Roderick, 'Human Freedom and the Self,” in Reason and Responsibility (2nd edition), ed. by Feinberg, J., pp. 359–66Google ScholarDavidson, Donald, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes,' The Journal of Philosophe, LX (1963), 685–700CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Melden, A. I., Free Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), esp. Chapter 13Google Scholar.

2 Fodor, Jerry, Psychological Explanation (New York, 1968), p. 35. Quoted by Browne, p. 151Google Scholar.

3 Malcolm, Norman, 'The Conceivability of Mechanism,' Philosophical Review, LXXVII (1968), pp. 45–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Another problem for Browne's main argument is that, as stated, it is invalid. The context 'A person cannot identify a desire except under the description…' is not closed under entailment.

5 Brandt, Richard and Kim, Jaegwon, 'The Logic of the Identity Theory,' The Journal of Philosophy, LXIV (1967), p. 521Google Scholar.

6 Kim, , 'On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory,” in Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Brain Identity, ed. by O'Connor, J. (New York, 1969)Google Scholar.