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How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2011

David Matheson
David Matheson*
Affiliation:
Carleton University
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism might be generalized beyond the epistemic domain to the ethical.

RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, je défends un pluralisme des valeurs épistémiques selon lequel la croyance vraie, la croyance justifiée et la connaissance sont toutes des valeurs épistémiques fondamentales. Après avoir examiné des raisons en faveur d’un rejet des formes principales de monisme des valeurs épistémiques, je présente une option pluraliste et je montre en quoi ce pluralisme peut expliquer adéquatement la plus grande valeur épistémique de la connaissance par rapport à la croyance vraie et à la croyance justifiée, en dépit de leur caractère fondamental. Je conclus en esquissant une façon de généraliser ce pluralisme du domaine épistémique jusqu’au domaine éthique.

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Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 2: Special Issue / Numéro spécial: Normativity: Epistemic, Mental and Moral Aspects / La Normativite : aspects epistemiques, mentaux et moraux , June 2011 , pp. 391 - 405
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

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