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Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 April 2009
Abstract
I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about reference and reduction. I show how the irreducibility of the mental follows from the holistic and flexible character of our criteria for attributing beliefs and intentional states.
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- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , Summer 2005 , pp. 419 - 437
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- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005