1 The distinction between instrumental and end friendships is a familiar one; for the rest of this discussion, the terms “friends” or “friendship” refer to non-instrumental friends in an end friendship. See, e.g., Badhwar, Neera, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48 (1987): 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett write, “The interests of the other in friendship, whether serious or slight, are not, in general, filtered through one's antecedent tastes and interests or subjected to rational or moral scrutiny before they acquire action-guiding force” (“Friendship and Moral Danger,” The Journal of Philosophy, 97 [2000]: 278–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. p. 285). See also James Grunebaum, who writes that friends “are giving to one another with little thought of a moral duty to do so and with little thought that such benevolence will be repaid” (“Friendship, Morality, and Special Obligation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 30 [1993]: 51–61Google Scholar, esp. pp. 51–52).

3 Williams, Bernard, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Indeed, a friend who always balked at such asymmetric exchanges would seem a poor friend indeed. For a related discussion, see Badhwar, Neera Kapur, “The Circumstances of Justice, Pluralism, Community, and Friendship,” journal of Political Philosophy, 1 (1993): 250–76, esp. pp. 263–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Aristotle discusses the importance of equality for friends Nicomachean Ethics 8.1158b–1159b. Note that parties in some caring relationships may be willing to contribute with neither expectations of reciprocity nor any actual reciprocating gestures. Such relationships, such as parent-child relationships, would often involve differential power that is not characteristic of the sort of friendship under discussion in this article. Sustaining the equality appropriate to friends (or, more precisely, sustaining perceptions of some such equality) also seems to track actual feelings of satisfaction in friendships, especially romantic friendships. See the discussion of reciprocal “minding” of relationships at Harvey, John H. and Omarzu, Julia, Minding the Close Relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 91–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 There are two caveats here. First, though a motive is not necessarily a reason, the rewards of friendship count in favour of sustaining friendship. Second, as friendships deepen, the terms of reciprocity (and the very process of defining and refining the terms of reciprocity) may become less rigid and less explicit. Close friendships are far more flexible in their terms than are mere acquaintance relationships. Even in close friendships, however, dispositions to care for a friend may be conditioned by considerations of reciprocity. For an interesting discussion of studies of the behaviours and attitudes of friends in light of conditions of reciprocity, see Roloff, Michael E., “Communication and Reciprocity within Intimate Relationships,” in Interpersonal Processes: New Directions in Communication Research, edited by Roloff, Michael E. and Miller, Gerald R. (London: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 11–38.Google Scholar

7 Cicero, , De Amicitia XVI.61, in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, edited by Pakaluk, Michael (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1991), pp. 100–101.Google Scholar

8 Michael Sandel writes, “If, out of a misplaced sense of justice, a close friend of long-standing repeatedly insists on calculating and paying his precise share of every common expenditure, or refuses to accept any favor or hospitality except at the greatest protest and embarrassment, not only will I feel compelled to be reciprocally scrupulous but at some point may begin to wonder whether I have not misunderstood our relationship”(Liberalism and the Limits of Justice [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], p. 35Google Scholar). Neera Badhwar criticizes Sandel's position insofar as he casts justice as demanding such rigid calculations within friendships. See Badhwar, “The Circumstances of Justice,” pp. 258–65.

9 Grunebaum, “Friendship,” p. 52.

10 See also Jeske, Diane, “Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57 (1997): 51–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. p. 65, and “Families, Friends, and Special Obligations,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28 (1998): 527–56, n.22, for remarks about the open-ended but defeasible force of duties owed to friends. See related discussions in Badhwar, Neera Kapur, ed., “Introduction,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 15Google Scholar, and Cocking, Dean and Oakley, Justin, “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation,” Ethics, 106 (1995): 86–111, esp. p. 109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 See, for example, the helpful discussion in Badhwar, “Friends as Ends in Themselves.”

12 Cocking and Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism,” p. 96.

13 Ibid., p. 95

14 See the helpful discussion of the distinction between governing conditions and motivating reasons at ibid., pp. 90, 95–96.

15 See the helpful discussion of reciprocal self-disclosure at Harvey and Omarzu, Minding the Close Relationship, pp. 32–35, 41–42.

16 Viewers of the movie will recognize the limitations of this example: Hank and Letitia were of uneven virtue and in a developing romantic friendship. Here I also pass no judgement on whether their decisions not to disclose were correct. I only suggest that reciprocity in self-disclosure may have legitimately factored into their decisions without jeopardizing their relationship. The decisions they made, and the ways they made them, may have even strengthened the distinct character of their mutual commitment.

17 William K. Rawlins discusses how friends deepen their relationship by defining and negotiating the boundaries between disclosure and restraint. See his discussion of the study at “Openness as Problematic in Ongoing Friendships: Two Conversational Dilemmas,” Communication Monographs, 50 (1983): 1–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 For discussions of such sources of potential conflict in friendship and how friends monitor their relationships in the face of competing expectations and demands, see, for instance, Baxter, Leslie A. and Simon, Eric P., “Relationship Maintenance Strategies and Dialectical Contradictions in Personal Relationships,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 10 (1993): 225–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 225–29; Burleson, Brant R. and Samter, Wendy, “A Social Skills Approach to Relationship Maintenance: How Individual Differences in Communication Skills Affect the Achievement of Relationship Functions,” in Communication and Relational Maintenance, edited by Canary, Daniel J. and Stafford, Laura (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1994), pp. 73–76Google Scholar, 80; Montgomery, Barbara M., “Relationship Maintenance Versus Relationship Change: A Dialectical Dilemma,” Journal ofSocial and Personal Relationships, 10 (1993): 205–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 206–208, 221; and Rawlins, “Openness as Problematic in Ongoing Friendships,” pp. 5–8, 12–13. See also a discussion of studies that show relationship satisfaction loosely tracks perceptions of overall reciprocity in Harvey and Omarzu, Minding the Close Relationship, pp. 91–92.

19 See a related discussion of the lack of conflict among character friends at Jeske, “Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality,” pp. 68–69.

20 It may seem that the Abby/Ben example is not so much a case of a failure of reciprocity as it is a failure of communication. (I am grateful to Neera Badhwar for stressing this possible interpretation.) Communication clearly is a crucial ingredient in preventing and resolving a misunderstanding such as that of Ben and Abby, but the considerations the friends need to discuss would include important issues of reciprocity—particularly expectations of reciprocal or mutual support.

21 This is not necessarily the only or best way of securing friendships. Here I intend only to demonstrate both the practical possibility of attending to considerations of reciprocity and that doing so does not clash with dispositions we expect of friends.

22 Some virtue theorists would resist putting a wedge between epistemic success and moral virtue. When speaking of the connection of motives to virtue, Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski notes, “‘Virtue’ is a success term. … A person does not have a virtue unless she is reliable at bringing about the end that is the aim of the motivational component of the virtue” (in Virtues of the Mind [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 136). Zagzebski also questions the split ethicists often draw between moral and intellectual virtues (see, for instance, ibid., pp. 137ff). We can set such concerns aside in this case because the point stands: virtue is no guarantee of epistemic infallibility. Given that reasonable virtuous persons can make mistakes, there is much corrective room for proper consideration of the terms of reciprocity in a friendship.

23 Badhwar provides a helpful discussion of human fallibility and the legitimate expectations friends may have for one another in “The Circumstances of Justice,” pp. 267–70. See also Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” pp. 288–89, for a related discussion of the relevance of fallibility and luck in friendship.

24 The sort of mutual “drawing” that marks friendship would also seem to call for friends to reflect on the terms of their particular friendship. See the account of how friends mutually “draw” out their identities in Cocking, Dean and Kennett, Jeannette, “Friendship and the Self,” Ethics, 108 (1998): 502–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Parties external to an immediate friendship may serve some role in monitoring the relationship for compliance with legitimate expectations. That is what (other) friends are for. But these agents would not have the intimate access to developments in the relationship in such a way as reliably to secure some fitting terms of reciprocity.

26 Cocking and Kennett discuss examples in which friendship provides independent reasons that defeat moral considerations. They write, “if there is some essential conflict between being a true and good friend and being a good moral agent, then morality has only a limited claim upon us” (“Friendship and Moral Danger,” p. 291).

27 Ibid. I offer Cocking and Kennett's comments for illustrating the critic's position that I develop in the text, even though I suspect they would reject the view.

28 See the discussion of loyalty and friends at Fletcher, George P., Loyalty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 6–11Google Scholar; see also the discussion of friends as irreplaceable at Badhwar, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,” pp. 3, 5–8, 14–15.

29 Nicomachean Ethics 8.1157a20–25 and 1163a22–25.

30 This would be unconditional love in the truest sense of the term. For a fuller criticism of the notion of unconditional love, see Badhwar, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,” pp. 9–11, 22–23.

31 This account should be neutral regarding whether friendship counts as a source of moral reasons.

32 Some critics may claim assessing the friendship against moral considerations is not the problem so much as assessing the friendship at all. But we can set such worries aside. After all, most of us have more than one friend. Sometimes our various commitments to different friends cannot all be fulfilled. In such cases we should determine what to do after examining the competing considerations. Such reflection alone would not seem to count against having a disposition to treat any given friend as an end. There may then be room to reflect on a friendship for other moral considerations. Any remaining concerns about examining a friendship would then have to be directed not toward reflection per se but toward the sort of considerations one examines.

33 Deigh, John, “Morality and Personal Relations,” in Person to Person, edited by Graham, George and LaFollette, Hugh (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 118.Google Scholar

34 Kalin, Jesse, “Lies, Secrets, and Love: The Inadequacy of Contemporary Moral Philosophy,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 10 (1976): 253–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 Ibid., pp. 256–57.

36 Ibid., p. 258.

37 Ibid., p. 261; see also p. 258.

38 See Badhwar, Neera's helpful discussion of the relevance of justice to friendship in “Friendship, Justice and Supererogation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 22 (1985): 123–31Google Scholar; and Badhwar, “The Circumstances of Justice,” pp. 258–71.

39 See, e.g., Kalin, “Lies, Secrets, and Love,” p. 257.

40 Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” p. 278.

41 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 284–85, 295.

42 Ibid., p. 295.

43 Badhwar, admits this as well at “Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship,” Ethics, 101 (1991): 483–504Google Scholar, esp. p. 500. See also Cocking and Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism,” p. 109. See a related discussion of the possibility of moral conflict at Jeske, “Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality,” pp. 67–69.

44 Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” pp. 278–83, 290.

45 Steinbeck, John, Of Mice and Men (New York: Viking Press, 1963).Google Scholar

46 Colin's interest in resuming his art also seems to give him a reason to do so; this reason may be a non-moral reason. Certain moral theories, on the other hand, would also see Colin's interest as the basis of the moral reason for Colin to resume art. In any case, Dominique may understandably believe she is responsible for helping Colin not to neglect his interests—moral or otherwise.

47 Here, of course, I also assume that self-regarding actions such as self-indulgence and sloth are capable of being virtuous or vicious. But the point does not stand or fall with this example. Other-regarding wrongs may invite some friendly moral stewardship as well. (I am indebted to Neera Badhwar for a discussion of this point.)

48 Korsgaard, Christine M. discusses various moral dimensions of the reciprocity appropriate to friends at “Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations,” Philosophical Perspectives, 6 (1992): 305–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 305–10. Compare the discussion of the importance of urging a friend toward moral improvement at Jeske, “Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality,” pp. 64, 69, and the discussion of the mutually dynamic permeability among friends at Amélie O. Rorty, “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes,” in Badhwar, ed., Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, pp. 76–78.

49 Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and the Self,” p. 514.

50 See, e.g., Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” pp. 282–87.

51 Cocking and Kennett write, “It might not be morally praiseworthy for me to spin a tale to my colleague and break my promise to her so that my friend and I can go off to the movies together. But it is hardly the case that I am not being a good friend here. I might be a perfectly good friend. I might just not be a perfectly moral one” (“Friendship and Moral Danger,” p. 287).

52 Ibid., p. 287, n.14.

53 Wolf, Susan suggests that one does not truly love something if one is always assessing it against the demands of morality (“Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy, 79 [1982]: 419–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted in Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael Slote [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997]). Wolf argues that an overriding commitment to moral perfection precludes a proper affection for the objects of one's values (Wolf, in Virtue Ethics, pp. 83–84, 88–90). In the case of friendship, then, the constant assessment of friendship clashes with the trust and spontaneous mutual regard that are part of friendship.

54 See a related discussion of clear mistakes at Perry, Steven R., “Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory,” Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989): 913–94Google Scholar, esp. pp. 934–36; Regan, Donald H., “Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom” Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989): 995–1096Google Scholar, esp. pp. 1015–18; and Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 61–62.Google Scholar

55 See, for instance, Baron, Marcia's discussion of tempering typically automatic partiality for one's friend with a disposition to take up an impartial perspective in “Impartiality and Friendship,” Ethics, 101 (1991): 836–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 849–55.

56 Here I focus purely on how friends may assess their relationship while still being disposed to treat one another as ends. While it may be interesting to examine the particular dynamics involved in moving into and out of a friendship in light of considerations of reciprocity or morality, I do not explore this issue here.

57 See, e.g., Wiseman, Jacqueline, “Friendship, Bonds and Binds in a Voluntary Relationship,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 3 (1986): 191–211, esp. p. 199; see also pp. 200–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58 Based on data from in-depth interviews, Jacqueline Wiseman theorizes that friends may tacitly think of their commitments to a relationship as contributing to what she calls “banked resources, voluntarily maintained, that can be withdrawn upon need, although they may never be used at all.” Wiseman notes that individuals sometimes do speak of “‘calling the chips in’ when they want a favour” (ibid., p. 205).

59 Compare Marcia Baron's discussion of how and whether a disposition to take up “an objective view of the person one cares for deeply” is consistent with being a close friend (“Impartiality and Friendship,” pp. 854–55). Cocking and Kennett similarly worry that subordinating friendship to some moral framework may impose a sort of “rigidity” that restricts the good available in friendship (“Friendship and Moral Danger,” p. 295).

60 For detailed and constructive feedback on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Bernie Boxill, Andrew Jason Cohen, Harry Dolan, Christiaan D. Mitchell, Jennifer Samp, Ed Sankowski, Earl Spurgin, Chris Stephens, and an anonymous referee for this journal. Thanks also to audiences at the Humanities Forum of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point and the May 2001 meeting of the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love at the Central APA in Minneapolis. Many thanks to Diane Jeske, who commented on the SPSL paper. I am especially indebted to Neera Badhwar for her stimulating conversation and extensive comments.