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Epistemology and Possibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Rebecca Hanrahan
Rebecca Hanrahan
Affiliation:
Whitman College
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Abstract

Recently the discussion surrounding the conceivability thesis has been less about the link between conceivability and possibility per se and more about the requirements of a successful physicalist program. But before entering this debate it is necessary to consider whether conceivability provides us with even prima facie justification for our modal beliefs. I argue that two methods of conceiving—imagining that p and telling a story about p—can provide us with such justification, but only if certain requirements are met. To make these arguments, I consider those of Paul Tidman, whose position I use as a foil.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , Fall 2005 , pp. 627 - 652
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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