Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rdxmf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-29T13:06:58.689Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Defence of AI-Functionalism Against Brandom’s Arguments from Holism and the Frame Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2012

Reiner Schaefer
Reiner Schaefer*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Brandom argues that functionalism must ultimately fail because it will not be able to explain how we can holistically update our beliefs solely in terms of abilities possessed by non-linguistic things. In this paper I respond to this argument by arguing that non-linguistic animals encounter and overcome an analogous sort of holistic updating problem. I will also try to demystify holism and de-intellectualize language use/reasoning.

RÉSUMÉ: Brandom soutient que le fonctionnalisme doit ultimement échouer parce qu’il ne saurait expliquer comment nous pouvons actualiser nos croyances de façon holistique uniquement en termes de capacités possédées par des objets non linguistiques. Dans cet article, je réponds à cet argument en soutenant que les animaux non-linguistiques rencontrent et surmontent un problème semblable d’actualisation holistique. Je vais aussi tenter de démystifier le holisme et de désintellectualiser l’utilisation du langage et le raisonnement.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 741 - 750
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bickhard, Mark, and Terveen, Loren 1995 Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science: Impasse and Solution. Elsevier Scientific.Google Scholar
Brandom, Robert 1994 Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, & Discursive Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Brandom, Robert 2008 Between Saying & Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, Jerry 1987 “Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs, & the Music of Spheres.” In The Robot’s Dilemma. Ed. Pylyshyn, Zenon. Norwood: Ablex. pp.139–149.Google Scholar
Shanahan, Murry 2011 “The Frame Problem.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Zalta, Edward N.. Winter 2009 Edition. Web.Google Scholar