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Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Uriah Kriegel
Uriah Kriegel
Affiliation:
Brown University
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , Summer 2002 , pp. 517 - 540
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Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2002

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