Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t8hqh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T16:27:14.661Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Can Strategic Reasoning Alone Account for the Formation of Social Norms?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

James Swindal
James Swindal
Affiliation:
John Carroll University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Joseph Heath's Communicative Action and Rational Choice stands out clearly as one of the most astute and original of the several critiques of Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action to have emerged in the last decade. Heath refrains from engaging merely in skirmishes with various details of Habermas's theory; he rather aims directly at its core issue: the critique of instrumental reason. Heath argues that Habermas's key criticism—that instrumental reason cannot account for successful communication—is not critical enough. Heath argues that instrumental reason cannot account even for the successful monological action. Heath then claims that one can construct a critical rational theory without much of the problematic addenda that Habermas requires, particularly the need for a tripartite theory of validity claims.

Type
Book Symposium/Tribune de Livre
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , Spring 2005 , pp. 363 - 372
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Brandom, Robert 2002 Tales of the Mighty Dead. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Cooke, Maeve 1994 Language and Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald 2001 “The Emergence of Thought.” In Subjective. Intersubjcctivc. Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Donagan, Alan 1987 Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Dray, William 1974 “The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered.” In The Philosophy of History. Edited by Gardiner, P.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 66–89.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David 1986 Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David 1994 “Assure and Threaten.” Ethics, 104: 690–721.Google Scholar
Habermas, Jürgen 2003 Truth and Justification. Translated by Fultner, B.. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Heath, Joseph 1999 “A Pragmatic Theory of Convergence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Suppl. Vol. 24: 149–77.Google Scholar
Heath, Joseph 2001a Communicative Action and Rational Choice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Heath, Joseph 2001b “Problems in the Theory of Ideology.” In Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn. Edited by Rehg, W. and Bohman, J.. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 163–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heath, Joseph 2003 “The Transcendental Necessity of Morality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67, 2: 378–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel 1998 Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Guyer, P. and Wood, A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClellan, Edward 1990 Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McMahon, Christopher 2001 Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Pollock, John 2002 “Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence.” The Philosophical Review, 111, 1: 1–23.Google Scholar
Slote, Michael 1992 From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard 1981 Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar