1 Campbell, Keith. Body and Mind (Macmillan. London: 1970), especially Chapter 6:CrossRefGoogle ScholarGoldman, Alvin. A Theory of Human Action (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs: 1970). especially Chapter 5. Section 5Google Scholar.

2 Cornman, James. Materialism and Sensations (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1971), passim. Cornman carefully distinguishes between identification and materialist reduction, the latter implying the former, but not conversely. Perhaps the most circumspect defence of reductive materialism isGoogle ScholarArmstrong's, D.M.A Materialist Theory of Mind (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1968)Google Scholar.

3 Rorty, Richard, “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories”, Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965). pp. 24–54:Google ScholarDennett, D. C.. Content and Consciousness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1969).Google Scholar

4 Cornman regards as a distinct option what he calls adverbial materialism.I prefer to view it as a form of reductive materialism, in which “phenomenal properties” or “sensa” are eliminated prior to reduction. See Cornman. passim, for a fuller characterization of this position.

5 Strawson, P. F., Individuals, An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), chapter 3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 The word “attributable” here must be understood in a strong sense, as implying that, on the appropriate occasions, predicates of this range are true of the relevant individual. It is also worth noting that a weaker formulation of eliminative materialism than Rorty's, like the one incorporated in adverbial materialism (see footnote 4), would not be falsified by the attributability of these predicates.

7 Bloor, David. “Explanation and Analysis in Strawon's 'Persons'”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1970), pp. 2–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 In my view these arguments can settle no issues in serious philosophy without support from a theory of categories and a demonstration that cross-categorical reference is “absurd”, “senseless”, or whatever. But we have no such theory: a fortiori then we have no such demonstration.

9 Dennett, pp. 114–31.

10 An example of explicit commitment to reductive materialism is Shallice, T.. “Dual Functions of Consciousness”, Psychological Review 79 (1972). pp. 383–93. This article is also noteworthy for intriguing suggestions about mapping the concept of consciousness onto an information-processing concept.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 It will be replied that the ordinary man's beliefs are irrelevant to the soundness of category-mistake arguments. But in the absence of a theory of categories (see footnote 8), they seem to be at least one source of appeal in order o t reinforce a charge of a category-mistake, though I am not assuming that they are massgebend. But neither are the conflicting beliefs on this matter of, say, Ryle and Armstrong.

12 Campbell, 110.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 112.

15 Ibid., 110.

16 Ibid., 111.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Campbell. 52.

20 If two events A and B overdetermine an event C, then if only A or only B occurred. C would still occur. This is not true, however, if A and B are simultaneous nomic equivalents; more exactly, the occurrence of one nomically necessitates the occurrence of the other, which is not the case in instances of overdetermination.

21 Campbell, 5

22 Ibid., 111.

23 Goldman. 170.

24 Campbell. 37.

25 Ibid.

26 Putnam, Hilary, “Psychological Predicates”, in Capitan, W. H. and Merrill, D. D., eds., Art, Mind, and Religion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).Google Scholar

27 Goldman, 165.

28 Campbell, 106.

29 See Hinton's, J. M.. Experiences (Clarendon Press. Oxford: 1973) for this and other points about the notion of experience. Hinton's work casts serious doubt, I think, on the whole notion of APP's, and therefore lends some support to the adverbial form of reductive materialism mentioned in footnote 4.Google Scholar