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Analogy and Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

William H. Shaw  and
L. R. Ashley
William H. Shaw
Affiliation:
Tennessee State University
L. R. Ashley
Affiliation:
New York State University
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Extract

The nature of analogies, and their legitimacy in argumentation and inference, is a disputed subject. This essay is intended to shed some light on the tangle of issues that it involves. After discussing in section one the different functions of analogy, in particular in explanation and in science, we present in section two a prima facie defense of analogical argument against those who repudiate it entirely and in section three an account of its logical structure. Section four argues that analogical inference does not collapse, as some of its critics contend, into standard induction, and section five attempts to explicate more precisely the warrant for analogical inference. We conclude in section six by suggesting a typology for arguments from analogy.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 415 - 432
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1983

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References

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