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Actual Agreement Contractualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2015

DAVID BORMAN
DAVID BORMAN*
Affiliation:
Nipissing University
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

In this paper, I defend a metaethical position described as ‘actual agreement contractualism’: the view that norms arise from actual attempts to arrive at legitimate terms for social cooperation among all those affected. I distinguish the actual agreement approach from hypothetical approaches to contractualism, and defend the former against objections from Thomas Scanlon, in particular. The attractiveness of a focus on actual agreements, I argue, is seen in the way it resolves problems internal to the hypothetical approach as well as in its implications for the purpose of moral theory and for the obligation to justify our actions to others.

Dans cet article, je défends une position métaéthique pouvant être désignée comme «contractualisme de l’accord réel», soit la position voulant que les normes découlent d’efforts réels pour s’entendre sur les termes légitimes de la coopération sociale entre tous ceux qui sont touchés. Je distingue cette approche des approches hypothétiques du contractualisme et je défends la première, notamment contre les objections de Thomas Scanlon. L’attrait d’une approche basée sur les accords réels se voit dans la façon dont elle permet de résoudre certains problèmes internes de l'approche hypothétique, mais aussi dans ce qu’elle implique quant à l'objet de la théorie morale et quant à l'obligation de justifier nos actions auprès des autres.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 519 - 539
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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