‘From Moscow to Vichy’ chronicles the political trajectory of Jules Teulade, Albert Vassart and Henri Barbé, three French labour militants of modest origins who were rapidly whisked into the top ranks of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the early 1920s, but later fell out of favour with Moscow just as the PCF entered its halycon years in the mid-to-late 1930s. Each of them, though for different reasons, turned against their former Russian patrons so violently that political participation in the ‘anti-Communist’ Vichy regime became thinkable. An examination of their unpublished memoirs – long ignored by Gaullist and communist historians, to whom the recollections of ex-Communist Vichy ‘collaborators’ gave little comfort – reveals both the powerful allure the Russian Revolution had for its earliest devotees, and the profound disillusionment that could result for working-class Communists who saw their faith in Moscow betrayed. In their stories, and those of others like them, we can discern something of the devastating fallout of Moscow's invasion of French politics between the two world wars.

There has been extensive debate on changing attitudes within the French left-wing intelligentsia in the decades following the Second World War and more specifically on why so many intellectuals became fellow travellers and were attracted to Stalinism in the period between 1945 and 1953. Esprit's reactions to de-Stalinisation from the time of the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956 to the Soviet suppression of the Czech attempt to reform communism from within in 1968 are of interest, since Esprit was the most prominent Catholic left-wing but non-Marxist journal in France. In view of Esprit's very strong reaction to the Hungarian Revolution, its relative silence in 1968 on the drama that was being played out in Czechoslovakia requires explanation. Finally, because Esprit broke with communism in late 1956, intellectuals writing for that journal experienced little difficulty in adjusting to the new French intellectual climate of the mid-1970s.

This article examines the interaction between Danish European and Nordic attitudes and policies in the postwar period. Attention is primarily dedicated to an analysis of how Nordic attitudes and policies have influenced Denmark's relations with Europe, and especially with the EEC/EU project. The article highlights how this interaction has moved through several different phases, and how priorities have shifted over time, with the Nordic policies functioning as an alternative to, as a platform for, and as a supplement to, Danish European policies. Despite the fact that most of the political elite early on lost belief in Norden as an alternative to Europe, this idea, stimulated by the intensive official and private cultivation of Nordic co-operation, kept its attraction among broad segments of the population. As a consequence a schism has developed between elite and popular attitutudes twoards European integration, and part of this schism must be explained with reference to how the vision of a Nordic alternative has continued to serve as a de-legitimiser of Danish involvement with the EEC/EU. However, this interdependence may be entering a new phase as a result of Finland and Sweden entering the EU in 1995.

Between 1958 and 1963 Charles de Gaulle attempted to replace supranational integration in Europe with a French-dominated confederation able to become a ‘Third Force’ in the Cold War. The United States took a tolerant approach toward de Gaulle's proposals, in the hope of modifying them to suit American goals. It hoped to contain the anti-supranational and anti-American aspects of the plan and channel it to increase the cohesion of Western Europe so that the continent would become a stronger American partner. When European supporters of the Amercian view of the confederation refused to follow de Gaulle's more sweeping ambitions, he abandoned the plan and turned to a unilateral foreign policy instead.

Within one week of his election to the presidency of the Fifth Republic de Gaulle had taken a number of decisions which were to lay the basis for the foreign and economic policies pursued throughout his tenure of office. Contrary to all expectations de Gaulle confirmed his support for the European Economic Community, against the initial advice of his ministers he devalued the franc, and at variance with his partners in the EEC he vetoed Britain's plans to set up a free trade area in Europe. This article examines the reasons for de Gaulle's critical policy choices.

This article assesses the impact of Marshall aid on the economy and politics of Britain in the 1940s. It draws on recent literature on the domestic policies of the Attlee government and on the general impact of Marshall aid on Western Europe, together with the notion of the ‘shortage economy’ developed by Kornai. The central argument is that the deployment of Marshall aid primarily to maintain British consumption levels derived not from a governmental disregard for the importance of reviving investment and industrial output, but from a realistic appreciation of the economic and political consequences of trying to hold consumption down to an excessively austere level.

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