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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2007
In summer 1936 Vladko Maček's priorities lay with rebuilding the Croatian Peasant Party after its six years of illegality under King Aleksandar's dictatorship in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yet the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) was to have a polarising and radicalising effect on Croatian society. Both communists and supporters of the fascist Ustaša movement looked to Spain as a model for resolving the ‘Croat question’ at a time when Croats were becoming increasingly frustrated with Maček's passivity. As a propaganda war raged in the press of the radical left and right, the Croatian Peasant Party tried to ignore the conflict. Maček's failure to realise the impact of the war in Spain on the political situation in Croatia is indicative of some of his weaknesses as a leader in difficult times. The Croatian Peasant Party missed the opportunity to take a strong moral stance against fascism during the Spanish conflict, and Maček's fence-sitting from the 1930s onwards permitted the more extreme ideological movements in Croatia to take advantage of the rapidly changing conditions of a Europe engulfed in war.
Durant l'été 1936, la priorité de Vladko Maček était de reconstruire le Parti paysan croate après six ans où il avait été frappé d'illégalité sous la dictature du roi Alexander dans le royaume de Yougoslavie. Pourtant, la guerre civile espagnole (1936–9) allait avoir des effets de polarisation et de radicalisation sur la société croate. Les communistes, comme les adhérents au mouvement fasciste Ustasa, regardaient l'Espagne comme un modèle pour résoudre la ‘question croate’, au moment où les Croates étaient très frustrés par la passivité de Maček. Alors qu'une guerre de propagande faisait rage dans la presse des radicaux de droite comme de gauche, le Parti paysan croate tenta d'ignorer le conflit. L'incapacité de Maček à mesurer l'impact de la guerre d'Espagne sur la situation politique croate souligne ses faiblesses de leader dans des moments difficiles. Le Parti paysan croate rata l'occasion de tenir une position morale forte contre le fascisme durant le conflit espagnol, et la barrière posée par Maček à partir des années trente a permis aux mouvements idéologiques extrêmes en Croatie de tirer avantage des conditions nouvelles d'une Europe engloutie dans la guerre.
Im Sommer 1936 lagen Vladko Mačeks Prioritäten im Wiederaufbau der Kroatischen Bauernpartei, die unter der Diktatur König Alexanders im Königreich Jugoslawien sechs Jahre lang illegal gewesen war. Doch der Spanische Buergerkrieg sollte einen polarisierenden und radikalisierenden Effekt auf die kroatische Gesellschaft haben. Beide, Kommunisten und Unterstützer der faschistischen Ustaša Bewegung, sahen Spanien als ein Modell für die Lösung der ‘Kroatischen Frage’ und dies zu einer Zeit, als die Kroaten immer unzufriedener mit Mačeks Passivität wurden. Während der Propagandakrieg in der Presse der radikalen Linken und Rechten tobte, versuchte die kroatische Bauernpartei, den Konflikt zu ignorieren. Mačeks Unvermögen, die Auswirkungen des Krieges in Spanien auf die politische Situation in Kroatien zu realisieren, weist auf seine Schwächen als Führer in schwierigen Zeiten hin. Die Kroatische Bauernpartei versäumte die Gelegenheit, während des spanischen Konfliktes eine entschiedene moralische Haltung gegenüber dem Faschismus einzunehmen. Mačeks abwartende Haltung in den 1930ern erlaubte es den extremeren ideologischen Bewegungen in Kroatien, Vorteile aus den sich rasant verändernden Bedingungen eines im Krieg befindlichen Europas zu ziehen.
1 Arthur, Koestler, Spanish Testament (London: Victor Gollancz, 1937), 117.Google Scholar
2 See for example Fearghal, McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork: Cork University Press, 1999);Google Scholar and Marek, Jan Chodakiewicz, ‘Affinity and Revulsion: Poland Reacts to the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (and Beyond)’, in Marek, Jan Chodakiewicz and John, Radziłowski, eds., Spanish Carlism and Polish Nationalism: The Borderlands of Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Charlottesville, VA: Leopolis Press, 2003).Google Scholar
3 See Ljubo, Boban, Maček i politike Hrvatske seljačke stranke, 1928–1941, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Liber, 1974)Google Scholar; Fikreta, Jelić-Butić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka (Zagreb: Globus, 1983)Google Scholar; and Hrvoje, Matković, Povijest Hrvatske seljačke stranke (Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić, 1999)Google Scholar.
4 The Popular Front tactic by the Comintern reversed previous policies, which had rejected co-operation with other democratic and socialist parties, in order to challenge more effectively the fascist threat posed by German and Italian expansionism. Communist parties across Europe were instructed to form anti-fascist fronts with ‘bourgeois parties’, although Popular Front governments were able to come to power only in Spain and France.
5 Washington Post, 5 Aug. 1936, 1.
6 Stojadinović was appointed prime minister by the regent, Prince Paul, after the government party's candidates fared poorly in national elections in May 1935. Although his economic policies were significant for Yugoslavia's recovery after the world financial crisis of the 1930s, Stojadinović's unwillingness genuinely to negotiate with the Croats and his increasing flirtations with the Axis powers contributed to the country's internal weaknesses by the time he was replaced by Prince Paul in early 1939.
7 Quoted in a letter from Ambassador Charles Wilson to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, ‘Spanish–Yugoslav Relations’, Report no. 667, 14 January 1937, US National Archives, RG 84, Belgrade Legation and Embassy, box 9, vol. 6 (1937); and Jutarnji list (Zagreb), 5 March 1937, 4.
8 ‘Naredba o zabrani vrbovanja dobrovoljaca i sakupljanja priloga za Španiju’, Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, Odeljenje za državnu zaštitu I, br. 3992 (3 March 1937), Croatian State Archives, coll. 1360, group XVII (Španjolski dobrovoljci), box 1, no. 25. The decree's provision that any volunteer in the Republican army would lose his or her citizenship resulted in the internment of several hundred Yugoslavs in French camps for two years after the Spanish Civil War ended.
9 See ‘Yugoslav Newspapers and the Spanish Situation’, Report no. 621, 6 November 1936, US National Archives, RG 84, Belgrade Legation and Embassy, box 4, vol. 8 (1936); and ‘Review of Events in Yugoslavia October 1–December 31’, Report no. 661, 8 January 1937, Doc. 860H/887, US National Archives, RG 59, Department of State Microfilm, M1203, roll 3, 303.
10 For example, see Seljački dom (Zagreb), 25 March 1937, 3.
11 Hrvatski radnik (Zagreb), 1 Aug. 1936, 2. All translations of quotations from untranslated sources are by the author.
12 Hrvatski radnik, 28 Nov.1936, 5.
13 Hrvatski dnevnik (Zagreb), 6 Jan. 1937, 1.
14 Seljački dom (Zagreb), 8 April 1937, 4.
15 Ivan, Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske, 1937–1945, vol. 1 (Zagreb: Globus, 1981), 83–4.Google Scholar See also commentary in Hrvatski radnik, 15 March 1937, 2.
16 Nova riječ (Zagreb), 12 Nov. 1936, 5.
17 Kraljevskoj banskoj upravi Savske banovine, Odeljak za državnu zaštitu, Pov. br. 279–1937 (1 March 1937), Croatian State Archives, fond 145 (SBODZ), box 508, no. 6182.
18 Kraljevska banska uprava Savske banovine, Odeljak za državnu zaštitu, Pov. broj 1857/37 (2 January 1938), Croatian State Archives, fond 145 (SBODZ), box 528, no. 33/38.
19 The Ustaše, once in power, specifically targeted SDS members as part of their anti-Serbian policies. Historian Jozo Tomasevich asserts that SDS followers ‘formed the most important element of Partisan forces in Croatia during the first two years of resistance, and they remained an essential part of these forces until the end of the war’. Jozo, Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 368Google Scholar. See also Drago, Roksandić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1991), 129.Google Scholar
20 Pavlek-Miškin (1887–1942), a poet and peasant activist, was executed in the Jasenovac death camp for his opposition to the Ustaša regime during the Second World War.
21 Hrvatska straža (Zagreb), 31 Jan. 1937, 3. The paper generally supported the unity of the Croatian national movement, but adopted a pro-fascist position by the late 1930s as the ‘clericalist’ faction grew more influential among the Church hierarchy.
22 Seljački svijet (Zagreb), 5, 1 (April 1937), 2. An excellent biography of Magovac can be found in Zdenko, Radelić, Božidar Magovac: Radićem izmedju Mačeka i Hebranga, 1908–1955 (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 1999).Google Scholar
23 Narodni val (Zagreb), 5 June 1937, 1.
24 The letter was reprinted in Radnik (Zagreb), 4 June 1937, 2.
25 Seljački dom, 29 April 1937, 3.
26 Hrvatski radnik, 17 April 1938, 8.
27 Hrvatski radnik, 9 Feb. 1939, 2.
28 Ivo, Goldstein, Hrvatska povijest (Zagreb: Novi liber, 2003), 252;Google Scholar and Boban, Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke, I, 53.
29 Quoted in Matković, Povijest Hrvatske seljačke stranke, 291.
30 Nova riječ, 8 July 1937, 1. Vilder (1878–1961), of Czech background, was active in Croatian politics even before the First World War, and was closely allied with Independent Democratic leader Svetozar Pribićević. Despite his uncompromising anti-fascism, he remained in exile in London after the Second World War, accused by the Tito regime of being a British agent.
31 Nova riječ, 28 Jan. 1938, 1.
32 Proleter, 13, 1 (January 1937), 4. Tito even uses the term ‘Spanish Četniks’ in describing the Nationalist forces, aware that Croatian peasants resented the fiercely nationalistic Četnik organisations supported by the Yugoslav regime.
33 Ibid.
34 Jelić, , Komunistička partija Hrvatske, vol. 1, 233–4Google Scholar.
35 See for example Hrvatska prosvjeta (Zagreb), 24, 1–2 (February 1937), 24, 28.
36 Ivo, Bogdan, ‘Španjolska u krvi i plamenu: Dalji i bliži uzroci gradjanskog rata’, Moderna socijalna kronika, 4, 30 (Zagreb: MOSK, 1937), 13.Google Scholar
37 Christian Science Monitor, 16 Aug. 1938, 4.
38 Matija, Kovačić, Od Radića do Pavelića: Hrvatska u borbi za svoju samostalnosti (Munich: Knjižnica hrvatske revije, 1970), 78Google Scholar.
39 Letter from Consul John J. Meily to Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, 26 March 1938, US National Archives, RG 84, Belgrade Legation and Embassy, box 17, vol. 10 (1938); and ‘Political Situation in Croatia’, 3 November 1938, Report no. 408, Doc. 860H.00/970, US National Archives, RG 59, Department of State Microfilm, M1203, roll 3, 644.
40 Sulzberger, C. L., A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934–1954 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969), 42.Google Scholar
41 At the national level, Stojadinović received 1,643,783 votes, or 54 per cent of all ballots cast, compared with 1,364,524 votes, or 44.9 per cent, for Maček and his allies. However, in the two Croat-majority administrative units, the Savska and Primorska banovinas, Maček won 82.6 and 78.8 per cent of the vote, respectively. Ferdo Čulinović, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, vol. 2 (Zagreb: Jugoslavenske akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1961), 132–3Google Scholar. See also John, R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2ndedn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 176–80Google Scholar.
42 Letter from Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, ‘Political conditions in Croatia’, 26 October 1939, Report no. 755, Doc. 860H.00/1102, US National Archives, RG 59, Department of State Microfilm, M1203, roll 3, 1061.