1 Cf. Andrén, Nils and Möller, Yngve, Från Undén till Palme. Svensk utrikespolitik efter andra världskriget (Stockholm: Nordstedt, 1990), 63–76.Google Scholar

2 Paul M. Cole, ‘Neutralité du Jour: The Conduct of Swedish Security Policy since 1945’, Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1990.

3 For a summary see Dahl, Ann-Sophie, ‘The Myth of Swedish Neutrality’, in Buffet, Cyril and Heuser, Beatrice, eds., Haunted by History. Myths in International Relations (London: Berghahn, 1998), 28–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; af Malmborg, Mikael, ‘Sweden – NATO's Neutral Ally? A Post-Revisionist Account’, in Schmidt, Gustav, ed., A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years, vol. 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 295–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Agrell, Wilhelm, Den stora lögnen. Ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i alltför många akter (Stockholm: Ordfront, 1991)Google Scholar. In summer 1992 the Swedish government set up an independent commission to investigate the true extent of Sweden's military collaboration with the Western Alliance. The commission reported in early 1994 with a nuanced assessment of Sweden's neutrality policy. It confirmed that Sweden had received substantial injections of Western military technology, and that there had been a lively exchange of information between both the secret services and the military leaderships of Sweden and the Western powers; Sweden had also been prepared to accept military assistance from NATO if attacked. This did not mean, however, that there had been any binding agreements for joint operations or any pledge by Sweden to fight alongside NATO in the event of war. The commission was of the opinion that the Swedes had not overstepped the bounds of neutrality, and further that their policy of neutrality had not debarred them from investigating, in peacetime, the possibility of common defence with other states, or even a military alliance, in case of an attack by an unfriendly power. See Om kriget kommi t. . . Förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949–1969. Betänkande av Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen, Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU 1994:11) (Stockholm: Fritze, 1994), 301–8. The commission's report, submitted by Rolf Ekéus in 2002, concludes that the same applied to Sweden's security policy between 1969 and 1989: Fred och säkerhet: Svensk säkerhetspolitik 1969–1989. Betänkande av den säkerhetspolitiska utredningen, Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU 2002:108) (Stockholm: Fritze, 2003), 754–5.

5 Bengt, Nilsson, ‘Undéns tredje väg: Sverige i det kalla kriget 1950–1952’, Scandia, 60 (1994), 67–97.Google Scholar

6 Mikael Holmström, security policy editor for the Svenska Dagbladet, thought that Petersson's dissertation supplied yet more proof of Sweden's ‘double game’: see his article ‘Svenskt dubbelspel under kalla kriget’, Svenska Dagbladet, 10 Nov. 2003. This ‘defamation’ of Sweden's foreign policy has been counter-attacked more than once by Sverker Åström, a former senior official in the Foreign Ministry who contributed substantially to shaping Sweden's neutrality policy after the Second World War. See his ‘Hån av svensk neutralitetspolitik i SvD’, Svenska Dagbladet, 24 Nov. 2003. Holmström, however, has stuck to his interpretation of Swedish neutrality, which he interprets as a ‘semi-alliance’ with NATO: Mikael Holmström, ‘Normal rapportering är inte en kampanj’, Svenska Dagbladet, 24 Nov. 2003.

7 Petersson also points out that no binding agreement had been made between Sweden and NATO to cover the eventuality of war. See Magnus, Petersson, Brödrafolkens väl. Svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949–1969 (Stockholm: Santérus, 2003)Google Scholar. This has been confirmed by the American historian Charles Silva in his studies of Swedish–US relations from 1948 to 1952, and by the Finnish historian Juhana Aunesluoma looking at relations between Britain and Sweden from 1945 to 1954. See Charles, Silva, Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly. Swedish–American Relations and the Pax Americana 1948–1952 (Stockholm: Akademitryck, 1999);Google Scholar Juhana, Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War 1945–1954: Understanding Neutrality (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).Google Scholar

8 The article is based on the thesis I defended in 2004 at the Ernst Moritz Arndt University in Greifswald, published as Die beiden deutschen Staaten und das neutrale Schweden. Eine Dreiecksbeziehung im Schatten der offenen Deutschlandfrage 1949–1972 (Münster: Lit, 2005).Google Scholar

9 E.g. Michael, F. Scholz, ‘Östen Undén und die DDR. Schwedische Deutschlandpolitik in den fünfziger Jahren’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 41, 4 (1993), 391–417.Google Scholar Other studies dealing with particular aspects of Sweden's attitude to the German question are Rainer Plappert, Zwischen Zwangsclearing und Entschädigung. Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Schweden im Schatten der Kriegsfolgefragen 1949–1956 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), 17–58; Misgeld, Klaus, Sozialdemokratie und Außenpolitik in Schweden. Sozialistische Internationale, Europapolitik und die Deutschlandfrage 1945–1955 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1984)Google Scholar; Ekengren, Ann-Marie, Av hänsyn till folkrätten. Svensk erkännandepolitik 1945–1995 (Stockholm: Nerenius and Santérus, 1999)Google Scholar; Linderoth, Andreas, ‘Schweden und der Bau der Berliner Mauer’, in Timmermann, Heiner, ed., 1961– Mauerbau und Außenpolitik (Münster: Lit, 2002), 245–67Google Scholar; idem, ‘Schweden und der Juniaufstand 1953’, in Timmermann, Heiner, ed., Juni 1953 in Deutschland. Der Aufstand im Fadenkreuz von Kaltem Krieg, Katastrophe und Katharsis (Münster: Lit, 2003), 164–87.Google Scholar Linderoth's dissertation, ‘Kampen för erkännande. DDR:s utrikespolitik gentemot Sverige 1949–1972’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Lund, 2002, explores the GDR's policy towards Sweden; Swedish attitudes to the GDR are dealt with only tangentially.

10 Statement by Premier, Otto Grotewohl, 12 Oct.1949, in Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der DDR, vol. I (East Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1954), 30.Google Scholar

11 Statement by Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer in the Bundestag, 21 Oct.1949, in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, vol. II: 2, 1949 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 214.Google Scholar

12 Buckow, Anjana, Zwischen Propaganda und Realpolitik. Die USA und der sowjetisch besetzte Teil Deutschlands 1945–1955 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003), 517–26.Google Scholar

13 Becker, Bert, Die DDR und Großbritannien 1945/49 bis 1973. Politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Kontakte im Zeichen der Nichtanerkennungspolitik (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1991), 76.Google Scholar

14 Putensen, Dörte, Im Konfliktfeld zwischen Ost und West. Finnland, der Kalte Krieg und die deutsche Frage (1947–1973) (Berlin: Spitz Verlag, 2000).Google Scholar

15 Hanns Jürgen Küsters, ‘Die Schweiz und die Deutsche Frage (1945–1961)’, in Fleury, Antoine, Möller, Horst and Schwarz, Hans-Peter, eds., Die Schweiz und Deutschland 1945–1961 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 99–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 Conversation between Eng, Brynolf and von Bittenfeld, Herwarth, 19 Dec. 1949, in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949/50) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), Doc. 19, 46–7.Google Scholar

17 See Böhme, Klaus-Richard, ‘Ragnar Kumlin’, in Gunnar, Artéus and Leif, Leifland, eds., Svenska diplomatprofiler under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Probus, 2001), 230–49, esp. 240 ff.Google Scholar

18 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 396–7; Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 32.

19 Rainer Plappert, ‘Bevorzugte Partner. Die deutsch-schwedischen Außenhandelsbeziehungen nach 1945’, in Bohn, Robert, Elvert, Jürgen and Christian Lammers, Karl, eds., Deutsch-skandinavische Beziehungen nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000), 113–29 (115).Google Scholar

20 Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 33.

21 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 399; Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 32–3.

22 Note by Östen Undén on a conversation with the Soviet ambassador, Konstantin Rodionov, 28 March 1951, Riksarkivet Stockholm, Utrikesdepartementets Arkiv HP (48 A), vol. 1779.

23 Diary entry by Östen Undén, 17 March 1950, in Östen Undén, Anteckningar 1918–1952, ed. Karl Molin (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2002), 308.

24 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 399.

25 However, East Berlin's strategy of using the Trelleborg–Sassnitz link to pressure Sweden into setting up consular relations proved unsuccessful, mainly because the opening of the so-called ‘[Bird] Migration Route’, and the creation of new ferry links between Schleswig-Holstein and Scandinavia in the 1960s, increasingly shifted Swedish personal travel routes towards the FRG. See Linderoth, Kampen, 98–109, 179–83; Muschik, Dreiecksbeziehung, 126–34.

26 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 391–417.

27 Riksdagens Protokoll, andra kammaren 1950, 22 March 1950, No. 11, 10–11.

28 Klaus-Richard Böhme, ‘Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der schwedischen Sicherheitskonzeption 1945–1955’, in Bohn et al., Deutsch-skandinavische Beziehungen nach 1945, 98–105.

29 Undén expressed this opinion in conversation with a West German diplomat, Carl von Holten, in December 1950. Note by Holten, 24 Jan. 1951, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA/AA), B 11, vol. 447.

30 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 406–7.

31 Undén's vision of Germany was a subject of lively discussion in the SPD. Under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher a majority in the SPD had rejected the idea of German neutrality, but after publication of the Stalin Note the party cautiously changed tack. In early April 1952 Willy Brandt had a conversation with Arne Lundberg, state secretary in the Swedish Foreign Ministry, in which Brandt said that the SPD would be in favour of an unaligned FRG, if that was a valid path to reunification (memo by Lundberg of the UD, 31 March 1952, RA, UD HP, vol. 347). Immediately on his return from Stockholm Brandt told Kurt Schumacher that certain members of the Swedish government were convinced that the Stalin Note was to be taken seriously and offered a real possibility of reunification. Under the influence of his visit to Stockholm, Brandt advised the SPD leader to make the party's position on the German question clearer and firmer so as to present an alternative to Adenauer's policy. Brandt, who in 1951 still rejected the idea of a neutral Germany on the Swedish or Finnish model in view of its geographical situation and enormous economic potential, told the SPD congress in Dortmund at the end of September 1952 (the first congress after Schumacher's death) that this chance of reuniting Germany should not be passed over, even if it proved impossible for the reunited nation to be militarily or politically part of the Atlantic Alliance. However, in 1953 – perhaps as a consequence of the suppression of the workers’ revolt in the GDR – Brandt once again distanced himself from the idea of an unaligned Germany. See Schmidt, Wolfgang, Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte. Willy Brandt und die Deutschlandpolitik 1948–1963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001), 129–30, 147 ffGoogle Scholar. When Erich Ollenhauer took over after Schumacher's death, Herbert Wehner, who had not previously questioned Schmacher's views on foreign policy, began to develop his own views on the German question. Unlike Schumacher, who (while spurning Soviet proposals for a neutral Germany) had uncompromisingly insisted that a reunited Germany must be free to choose its own alliances, Wehner was anxious ‘to gain the co-operation of those elements in the CDU who in 1945 had devised a "third way", were willing to pay a certain price for reunification and were sceptical about integration’. März, Peter, Die Bundesrepublik zwischen Westintegration und Stalin-Noten. Zur deutschlandpolitischen Diskussion in der Bundesrepublik 1952 vor dem Hintergrund der westlichen und der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), 270.Google Scholar

32 Undén, Östen, ‘Ist die deutsche Frage unlösbar?’ Außenpolitik, 5 (1954), 95–103.Google Scholar

33 However, the US ambassador in Stockholm was persuaded that ‘the aging Mr. Undén, whose retirement as Foreign Minister may not be far off’ was not necessarily expressing the views of the Swedish government, and pointed to a ‘positive evolution’ in Social Democrat opinion on questions of both foreign policy and security. Silva, Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly, 206–8.

34 Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 53.

35 Note by state secretary Walter Hallstein, 6 June 1953, PA/AA, B 10, vol. 260; Kumlin, Swedish envoy in Bonn, to Undén, 17 June 1953, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 161.

36 Note by Jansen of the Auswärtiges Amt, 23 April 1954, PA/AA, B 10, vol. 298.

37 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 410; Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 38 ff.

38 Tamm, of the Swedish Consulate General in West Berlin, to the Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Foreign Ministry), 29 March 1954 and 30 March 1954, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 4.

39 See Undén's diary entry for 5 April 1954, in Undén, Anteckningar, 469.

40 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 411; Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 40. Grewe mentions this trip to Stockholm in his memoirs: Wilhelm Grewe, Rückblenden 1976–1951 (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 1979), 40.Google Scholar

41 Note by Grewe, 11 May 1954, PA/AA, Nachlass Grewe, vol. 47.

42 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 411.

43 Siegfried, of the Federal legation in Stockholm, to the Auswärtiges Amt, 3 July 1954, in PA/AA B 11, vol. 355; note by Brückner of the Auswärtiges Amt, 3 March 1955, PA/AA, B 12, vol. 98.

44 Report by Haack at the Federal German legation in Stockholm to the Auswärtiges Amt, 29 March 1954, PA/AA B 11, vol. 448.

45 Und, Östenén, ‘Die Weltanschauung der kollektiven Sicherheit’, Die neue Gesellschaft, 2 (1955), 95–103.Google Scholar

46 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 409.

47 Hans-Erich Volkmann, ‘Adenauer und die deutschlandpolitischen Opponenten in CDU und CSU’, in Josef Foschepoth, ed., Adenauer und die deutsche Frage, 2nd edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 183–206. Certain right-wing liberals who spoke in favour of German neutrality were obviously inspired by Sweden: for example, the first West German envoy to Stockholm, Kurt Sieveking of the CDU, had congratulated Undén on Sweden's ‘clever’ policy of neutrality and criticised Adenauer's foreign and security policies (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 Jan. 1954). See also Undén's diary entry for 19.1953, in Undén, Anteckningar, 463. The most notable FDP example is Karl Georg Pfleiderer, who rejected Adenauer's ‘policy of strength’ and, like Undén, preferred a collective security system. Pfleiderer congratulated the Swedish envoy in Bonn on Sweden's neutrality policy and saw it as a model for a reunited Germany. Kumlin to the UD, 20 May 1954, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 170. Cf. Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 53-4.

48 Notes of a discussion between Chancellor Adenauer and Robert D. Murphy, Undersecretary in the US Department of State, 14 Sept. 1954, in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, vol. II/4 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 144–52 (145).

49 Klaus Misgeld, ‘Deutschland – immer wieder ein Problem. Die schwedische Sozialdemokratie, die SPD und die Deutschlandfrage im ersten Nachkriegsjahrzehnt’, in Carlgren, Wilhelm M., Fritz, Martin and Olsson, Ulf, eds., Neuanfang. Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Deutschland 1945–1954. Sieben Beiträge (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1990), 165–77 (175).Google Scholar

50 Entry in Undén's diary for 30 April 1955, in Undén, Anteckningar, 496.

51 Petri, Lennart, Sverige i stora världen. Minnen och reflexioner från 40 års diplomattjänst (Stockholm: Atlantis, 1996), 236.Google Scholar

52 Kumlin to Undén, 25 Dec. 1955, Kungliga Biblioteket Stockholm, L 108:1.

53 Quoted in Misgeld, Sozialdemokratie, 341, footnote 51.

54 Nerman, Ture, Trots allt! Minne och redovisning (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1954), 248.Google Scholar

55 Misgeld, Sozialdemokratie, 455, 491 ff.

56 Tamm, of the Swedish Consulate General in West Berlin, to the UD concerning a conversation with Willy Brandt, 26 April 1955, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 179.

57 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 414.

58 ‘Jag har fäst mig vid att Adenauer numera fått franskt och eng. stöd för sin omöjl. tes att Västty:s reg. repr. hela Tyska riket. Sv. kan ju inte följa med i den svängen. Vi är visserl. ytterst försiktiga i vårt fhlde. till Östty. o har inga planer på erkännande. Men vi vidmakthåller de förbind. som vi finner av praktiska skäl påkallande och som under äldre tid skulle ha betytt ett de facto-erkännande. Vi kan inte betrakta Östtyskland som rena tomrummet.’ Handwritten note from Undén to Kumlin, 19 Oct. 1955, Kungliga Biblioteket Stockholm, L 108:2.

59 Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 40.

60 Note by the Auswärtiges Amt, 28 Sept. 1955, PA/AA, B 12, vol. 85.

61 Undén's memo of a conversation with Siegfried, the German envoy, 2 Dec. 1955, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 6.

62 Kumlin, Swedish envoy in Bonn, to the UD, 12 Dec. 1955 and 13 Dec. 1955, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 188.

63 UD memo on visit from Holliday, counsellor to the British embassy, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 7. See also Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 414–15.

64 See Booz, Rüdiger Marco, ‘Hallsteinzeit’ – Deutsche Außenpolitik 1955–1972 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995);Google Scholar Gray, William Glenn, Germanys Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003);Google Scholar Kilian, Werner, Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955–1973 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001).Google Scholar

65 Memo by Hamilton of the UD, 16 Jan. 1956, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 6; Memo, UD (copy), 27 Sept. 1957, Riksarkivet Stockholm, SUK, hemliga arkivet, F 2:13. When the head of the East German Chamber of Commerce gave a diplomatic reception on the GDR's national day on 7 October 1958, the FRG complained and the Swedish Foreign Ministry immediately told the Aliens Registration Bureau to threaten him with expulsion unless he confined himself strictly to matters of trade. Memo by Hennings of the UD, 14 Oct. 1958; Siegbahn of the UD to SUK, 18 Oct. 1958, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 8; Hilgard of the Stockholm embassy to the Auswärtiges Amt, 15 Oct. 1958, PA/AA, B 12, vol. 98; UD memo, 16 Oct. 1958.

66 Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 416.

67 Jöhdahl, of the Swedish embassy in Bonn, to Undén, 21 Oct. 1957, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 208 b.

68 In July 1946, under pressure from the Western allies, the Swedish government had signed the ‘Washington Agreement’ which obliged it to liquidate all German assets in Sweden. The Allied demands extended not only to German flight capital sent to neutral countries abroad towards the end of the war, but also to legally acquired German property. The proceeds of the liquidation were divided between the Allies, who used them as reparations, and the Swedes, who used them to offset Swedish claims against the German Reich in a compulsory clearing operation. Cf. Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 59 ff.

69 Ibid., 42–3, 277 ff.

70 Artner, Stephan, A Change of Course. The West German Social Democrats and NATO 1957–1961 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), 55–62.Google Scholar

71 Riksdagens Protokoll 1960, forsta kammaren, No. 10, 30 March 1960, 47.

72 Memo by Undén, 11 April 1960, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 9; note by Haack of the Auswärtiges Amt on a conversation with the Swedish diplomat Göran-Fredrik von Otter, 14 April 1960, PA/AA, B 23, vol. 175. See also Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 416.

73 Ibid.

74 Andreas Linderoth, ‘Schweden und der Bau der Berliner Mauer’, in Timmermann, Heiner, ed., 1961– Mauerbau und Außenpolitik (Münster: Lit, 2002), 245–267 (262–3).Google Scholar

75 Note by Willy Brandt, 18 April 1959, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie Bonn, Willy-Brandt-Archiv, Berlin, file 92. Cf. Schmidt, Wolfgang, Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte. Willy Brandt und die Deutschlandpolitik 1948–1963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001), 272.Google Scholar

76 Entry in Undén's diary, 7 Sept. 1961, in Undén, Anteckningar, 648; Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 416.

77 See Undén's remarks in the Riksdag: Riksdagens Protokoll 1959, andra kammaren, No. 7, 11 March 1959, 22–3; cf. Kaj Björk, ‘Atombomb i valkampanj’, Ny Tid, 15 July 1957.

78 ‘Adenauer är en verklig fara. Han driver en politik efter sina fixa idéer. . .’ (Adenauer is a real danger. He is following a policy based on his own idée fixe): Undén's diary, 10 May 1960, in Undén, Anteckningar, 611.

79 This is the background to the ‘Undén plan’ which he laid before the UN General Assembly in New York on 26 October 1961. Building on suggestions by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, Undén suggested creating a ‘non-nuclear club’ of states which would proceed to establish nuclear-free zones. This might put an end to the arms race and limit the risk of nuclear war. See Lödén, Hans, ‘För säkerhets skull.’ Ideologi och säkerhet i svensk aktiv utrikespolitik 1950–1975 (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus, 1999), 256 ff.Google Scholar

80 Memo by Åkerman of the UD, 12 July 1961, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 10; Jödahl, of the Swedish embassy in Bonn, to Åström in the UD, 19 Sept. 1961, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 240 b.

81 The founding of the EEC in 1957 and of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) two years later threatened to split Western Europe into two separate trade blocs. Sweden, along with Austria and Switzerland, sought economic links with the EEC after Denmark and Britain applied to join in summer 1961. Sweden felt compelled to make this move, despite misgivings on the neutrality issue, for fear of being sidelined economically. The French vetoing of Britain's application in early 1963 put a temporary stop to the Sweden's bid for association. From the neutrality point of view this was a relief; from the economic point of view, a worry. The prospect of EEC external tariffs in 1964 aroused Swedish fears of trade restrictions due to a heightened tariff barrier between the EEC and EFTA. Sweden hoped that the FRG would support its attempts to break down customs barriers between the two organisations. See Plappert, Bevorzugte Partner, 121 ff.; Lee Miles, Sweden and European Integration (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).Google Scholar

82 Riksdagens Protokoll 1963, första kammaren, No. 17, 23 April 1963, 28.

83 Memo by Blix of the UD, 25 April 1963, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 11.

84 Memo by Engfeldt of the UD, 19 Sept. 1963, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 12; Jödahl, of the Swedish embassy in Bonn, to Åström in the UD, 17 Oct. 1963, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 249.

85 A poll by a leading opinion research institute in 1966 showed a clear majority of the Swedish population in favour of recognition, irrespective of party allegiance. See Ekengren, Erkännandepolitik, 122, 261–3; Linderoth, Kampen, 190–1.

86 Note on discussions between Nilsson and Schröder, 2 Sept. 1966, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 258; PA/AA, B 31, vol. 390.

87 UD memo re East Germany, 23 March 1966, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 14.

88 Ekengren, Erkännandepolitik, 257.

89 Backlund, Swedish consul general in West Berlin, to the UD, 11 May 1966 and 8 June 1966, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 256. See also Engfeldt, Lars-Göran, ‘Sven Backlund’, in Artéus, Gunnar and Leifland, Leif, eds., Svenska diplomatprofiler under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Probus, 2001), 410–40 (414 ff.);Google Scholar Oredsson, Sverker, Svensk Oro. Offentlig fruktan i Sverige under 1900-talets senare hälft (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), 133–5.Google Scholar

90 Booz, ‘Hallsteinzeit’, 89–92.

91 Bender, Peter, Die ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ und ihre Folgen. Vom Mauerbau bis zur Vereinigung (Munich: dtv, 1995), 140–2.Google Scholar

92 Misgeld, Klaus, ‘Willy Brandt und Schweden – Schweden und Willy Brandt’, in Lorenz, Einhart, ed., Perspektiven aus den Exiljahren: Wissenschaftlicher Workshop in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Nordeuropa-Institut der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin am 9. Februar 2000 (Berlin: Verlag der Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, 2000).Google Scholar

93 Note on a discussion between Brandt and Nilsson in Stockholm, 22 June 1967, PA/AA, B 150, vol. 105; Brandt to Erlander, 22 July 1968, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 268; Nilsson to Brandt, 5 Nov. 1968, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Willy-Brandt-Archiv, Außenminister, file 7. Cf. Nilsson, Torsten, Lag eller näve (Stockholm: Tiden, 1980), 183.Google Scholar

94 Riksdagens Protokoll 1967, andra kammaren, No. 12, 8 March 1967, 76–80.

95 Motion 1969, första kammaren, No. 93, 1 Jan. 1969, 3; Riksdagens Protokoll 1969, andra kammaren, No. 4, 5 Feb. 1969, 57; Riksdagens Protokoll 1969, första kammaren, No. 13, 26 March 1969, 68; Utrikesutskottets utlåtande 1969, No. 18, 18 Sept. 1969, 3–4; Riksdagens Protokoll 1969, andra kammaren, No. 39, 3 Dec. 1969, 66.

96 Ekengren, Erkännandepolitik, 273–86.

97 The Swedish government believed that supranationalism in the EEC was tending to decrease, and unlike in 1961, when Sweden had sought only association, it did not now exclude ex ante the possibility of full membership, so long as the EEC respected its policy of neutrality. See Nils Andrén, Maktbalans och alliansfrihet. Svensk utrikespolitik under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Nordstedt, 1996), 140–1.

98 Statement by Chancellor Willy Brandt, 28 Oct. 1969, in Münch, Ingo von, ed., Regierungserklärungen 1949–1973 (Berlin and New York: Verlag Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 230.Google Scholar

99 Booz, ‘Hallsteinzeit’, 139 ff.

100 Aide-mémoire from the federal government to the UD, 31 Oct. 1969, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 276.

101 Booz, ‘Hallsteinzeit’, 142.

102 Montan, of the Swedish embassy in Bonn, to Brandt, 3 Oct. 1969, AdsD, Willy-Brandt-Archiv, Außenminister, file 7; Montan to Wachtmeister in the UD, reporting a discussion with Brandt as Chancellor, 22 Jan. 1970, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 277; Nilsson, ‘Därför erkänner vi inte DDR’, Arbetet, 23 Nov. 1969.

103 West German embassy in Stockholm to the Auswärtiges Amt, 16 April 1970, PA/AA, B 31, vol. 390.

104 Memos by Nyström of the UD, 4 March 1971, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 24; 1 Sept. 1971, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 288; Nier's report on his trip to Sweden, 17 April 1970, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Berlin (SAPMO), DY 30/IV A 2/20/583.

105 Therese Gerber, Steffen, Das Kreuz mit Hammer, Zirkel, Ährenkranz. Die Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und der DDR in den jahren 1949–1972 (Berlin: Spitz Verlag, 2002), 227.Google Scholar

106 Ibid., 222–3.

107 Seppo Hentilä, ‘Das Deutschland-Paket der finnischen Regierung 1971/72: Diplomatische Anerkennung – aber um welchen Preis?’ in Hösch, Edgar et al. , eds., Deutschland und Finnland im 20. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999), 169–198; Putensen, Konfliktfeld, 258 ff.Google Scholar

108 Swedish embassy in Bonn to UD, 14 Sept. 1971, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 25.

109 Booz, Hallsteinzeit, 152.

110 The Finnish Foreign Ministry stressed, however, that the fact that it had negotiated first with the GDR in no way infringed the principle of parity, because the offer of negotiations had been made to both Germanys simultaneously and did not imply recognition of the GDR. Moreover, the Finnish government had decided to recognise both German states simultaneously. See Hentilä, ‘Deutschland-Paket’, 185.

111 Steffen-Gerber, Schweiz, 346.

112 Petri, of the Swedish embassy in Vienna, to Wachtmeister in the UD, 4 July 1972, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 28.

113 Note by Nier of the Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten Ost-Berlin (MfAA, Ministry for Foreign Affairs in East Berlin), 2 June 1972, on a conversation with Rune Nyström on 1 June 1972, PA/AA-MfAA, C 336/74; memo by Nyström on talks in East Berlin on 15 Aug. 1972, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 295.

114 Memo by Jödahl of the UD, 24 Aug. 1972, UDA, HP 1 Ct, del 295.

115 Memo by Nyström, 7 Sept. 1972, UDA, HP 12 Ct, del 29. Cf. Ekengren, Av hänsyn till folkrätten, 283–6.

116 Note by Blech of the AA/II A 1, 9 Oct. 1972, PA/AA, B 38, vol. 1433; Stöcker in the Stockholm embassy to the Auswärtiges Amt, 27 Oct. 1972, PA/AA, B 31, vol. 429.

117 Staden, Von of the Auswärtiges Amt to the Stoecker in the Stockholm Embassy, 1 Dec. 1972, in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1972) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), doc. 390, 1758–60.Google Scholar

118 See also Misgeld, Deutschlandpolitik, 165–78; Scholz, ‘Östen Undén’, 391–417; Plappert, Zwangsclearing, 52–8.

119 Cf. Ekengren, Erkännandepolitik, 303.