² Sources remain a problem, but much is now available by way of internal government documents up to the early 1960s in British, German and American archives, and even further, in the latter case, through Congressional hearings, etc. This paper necessarily is slanted towards these countries as few, if any, other governments have released relevant documents. It is pathetic that NATO still has not decided to release early documentation: we now know more about Warsaw Pact meetings, strategy and perceptions of NATO strategy than from NATO itself about its own work.

³ The terms ‘West’ and ‘Western’ are used here as a shorthand for ‘from all NATO member states to whose documents I have had access or about whose policies and perceptions something is known through other sources’. It has been used in preference to ‘NATO’ as NATO policy formulation takes place first and foremost on the level of national governments. I have adopted it to save space.

⁴ With the exception of the Netherlands, see Honig, Jan Willem, Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of the Netherlands (New York: Prager Publishers, 1993).Google Scholar

⁵ See e.g. the contributions in Schweitzer, Carl-Christoph, ed., The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat (London: Pinter, 1990).Google Scholar

⁶ For a discussion of Western perceptions, see Beatrice Heuser, ‘Stalin as Hitler's Successor: Western Interpretations of the Soviet Threat’, in Heuser, Beatrice & O'Neill, Robert, eds, Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62 (London: Macmillan, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, ‘NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making’, Review of International Studies (thereafter RIS), Vol. 17 (1991).Google Scholar

⁷ NSC 68, Section VIII.3, printed in Etzold, Thomas and Gaddis, John Lewis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 (thereafter Etzold and Gaddis, Containment) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 416.Google Scholar

⁸ Differences between various national perceptions, e.g. for the US and Britain, can be found. See Baylis, John, Ambiguity and Deterrence: The United Kingdom and Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1963 (thereafter Baylis, Ambiguity) (Oxford: Oxford University Press)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, forthcoming.

⁹ ‘Aufgabenstellung und Arbeit der Defense Planning Working Group’, 3 May 1965, Doc. no. 153, NHP Bonn.

¹⁰ See n. 6.

¹¹ ‘Aufgabenstellung und Arbeit der Defense Planning Working Group’, 3 May 1965, Doc. no. 153, NHP Bonn, my translation.

¹² Statement on Defence (British Defence White Paper) Cmnd. 8951 (London: HMSO, 1983).

¹³ See for example ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’, signed by Ronald Reagan (Washington DC, the White House, Jan. 1987), 6–7.

¹⁴ Heuser, Beatrice, ‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine: Findings in the East German Archives’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, no. 4 (1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹⁶ Macmillan, Harold, Tides of Fortune: Memoirs, 1945–1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969), 622.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Summary by the BMVg, ‘Sprechzettel für Sitzung des Bundesverteidigungs-Rats am 25.3.1958, hier: Unterrichtung über Document MC 70 (Entwurf), 20 Mar. 1958, Doc. no. 23, NHP Bonn, emphasis in the original.

¹⁸ ‘Sprechzettel für Herrn Minister zum Besuch Präsident Kennedys’, 21 June 1963, Doc. no. 139, NHP Bonn, emphasis in the original.

¹⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States (thereafter FRUS), 1949, iv (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 352–8.

²⁰ Incidentally, a reasonable assumption about Soviet strategy in the 1950s for general war, see Garthoff, Raymond, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962)Google Scholar, passim.

²¹ See, for example, the US short-range emergency plan DOUBLESTAR of 21 June 1948, JCS 1844/10, on microfilm no. 63 in Liddell Hart Archives, King's College London (thereafter LHA-MF); Brown, Anthony Cave, ed., Operation World War III: The Secret American Plan ‘DROPSHOT’ for War with the Soviet Union, 1957 (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1979)Google Scholar, for DROPSHOT, dating from 31 Jan. and 19 Dec. 1949. For the December version, after the first Soviet nuclear test, see LHA-MF 65, JCS 1920/5. See also ‘Short-term Strategic Concept and Emergency War Plan as Related to the North Atlantic Pact, OFFTACKLE’, LHA-MF38, JSPC 876/38, 7 Sep. 1949, and ‘Strategic Guidance for the Initiation of Regional Planning’, LHA-MF39, JCS 1868/136, 25 Oct. 1949; and ‘Implications of Soviet Possession of Atomic Weapons’, US National Archives, CCS 471.6 USSR (11–8–49) Sec. 2, JCS 2081/1, 13 Feb. 1950.

²² The ‘NATO Strategic Guidance’, MC 14/1, 9 Dec. 1952, possibly also still revolves around this strategic concept.

²³ ‘The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years’.

²⁴ ‘The Evolution of Foreign Policy’, printed in Bobbitt, Philip, Freedman, Lawrence and Treverton, Gregory, eds, US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (thereafter Bobbitt et al., Nuclear Strategy) (London: Macmillan, 1989), 122–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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²⁷ ‘Defence: Outline of Future Policy’, (London: HMSO, 1957), Cmnd. 124.

²⁸ Christian Greiner, ‘Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO 1954 bis 1957’, in Ehlert, Hans, Greiner, Christian, Meyer, Georg and Thoß, Bruno, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, Die NATO-Option (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 705–6.Google Scholar

²⁹ Ibid., 724, 736.

³⁰ Duffield, John S., ‘The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation’ (thereafter Duffield, ‘Evolution’), Security Studies, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³² Steinhoff, Johannes and Pommerin, Reiner, Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepublik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ära Adenauer-Kennedy (thereafter Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strategiewechsel) (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1992), 98.Google Scholar

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³⁴ Duffield, ‘Evolution’, passim.

³⁵ Michael, Legge J., ‘Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response’ (thereafter Legge, ‘Weapons’), RAND Paper R-2964-FF (1983).Google Scholar

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³⁷ Summary published by NATO Press Service Communiqué S-1(91)85 of 7 Nov. 1991, ‘The Alliance's New Strategic Concept’.

³⁸ Konrad Adenauer and his general inspector, Heusinger, in the mid-1950s, Helmut Schmidt, admittedly for different reasons, in the 1960s; the Dutch in the 1980s.

³⁹ The differences between the European and the US viewpoints are summarised succinctly in Daalder, Ivo H., The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces since 1967 (thereafter Daalder, Flexible Response) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 40–6.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Rosenberg, , ‘Planning’, 35–56.Google Scholar For a discussion of British thinking – and the British were at the time the only Europeans who had thoughts on this matter – see Macmillan, Alan, ‘British Atomic Strategy, 1945–52’, in Baylis, John and Macmillan, Alan, eds, The Foundations of British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1960 (thereafter Macmillan ‘Strategy’), International Politics Research Papers, No. 12 (Aberyst-wyth: University College of Wales, 1992), 41–5.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See n. 19.

⁴² Lewis, Julian, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942–1947 (London: Sherwood Press, 1988), 371.Google Scholar

⁴³ D.C. 6/1, FRUS 1949, iv. 354, my emphasis.

⁴⁴ With the ‘Global Strategy Paper’ of 1952, see Macmillan, , ‘Strategy’, 52–3Google Scholar; Baylis, John and Macmillan, Alan, ‘The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, Journal of Strategic Studies (thereafter JSS), Vol. 16, no. 2 (June 1993), 200–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁵ Robert A. Wampler, ‘From Lisbon to M.C. 48: the United States, Great Britain, and the “New Look” in NATO, 1952–1954’, paper presented at the conference, ‘The United States and West European Security, 1950–1955: Strategic Concerns, Diplomatic Restraints and the Question of Neutralism’, Harvard University, Dec. 1987.

⁴⁶ With MC 48 ‘Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years’, adopted by the North Atlantic Council in Paris on 18 Dec. 1954. Not yet declassified. For a discussion of this document, see FRUS, 1952–4, v. 1 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 524–5, 536–8, 557–9, and Wampler, ‘From Lisbon to M.C. 48’.

⁴⁷ For the Asian background to the policy of ‘Massive Retaliation’, see Foot, Rosemary J., ‘Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict’, IS, Vol. 13, no. 3 (1988/9)Google Scholar; Roger Dingman, ‘Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War’, ibid.; Calingaert, Daniel, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War’, JSS, Vol. 11, no. 2 (1988).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Documents Diplomatiques Français 21 July–31 Dec. 1954 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), no. 399, 819, 20 Nov. 1954.

⁴⁹ Greg Herring and Richard Immermann, ‘“Le jour où nous ne sommes pas entrés en guerre” – la politique américaine de Diên Biên Phu: un réexamen’, in Artaud, Denise and Kaplan, Lawrence, Diên Biên Phu: L'Alliance atlantique et la défense du Sud-Est asiatique (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1989).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Printed in Bobbit et al., Nuclear Strategy, 122–30.

⁵¹ Dulles, John Foster, ‘Policy for Security and Peace’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, no. 3 (1954), 353–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵² See below.

⁵³ Duval, Marcel and Baut, Yves Le, L'arme nucléaire français: pourquoi et comment? (Paris: Kronos, 1992), 37–65.Google Scholar The consequences for French strategy deriving from France's signature of the new NATO strategic concept MC 400 of Nov. 1991 are not yet totally clear, and in my view depend very much on the personal preferences of the current French president.

⁵⁴ Particularly by Bernard Brodie in his prophetic article of Nov. 1945, ‘The Atomic Bomb and American Security’, repr. Bobbit et al., Nuclear Strategy, 64–94, esp. pp. 67–8.

⁵⁵ Macmillan, , ‘Strategy’, 41.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ FRUS, 1949 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), i. 616–17. Professor David Yost brought this document to my attention.

⁵⁷ NSC 68, Section IX, Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 422.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 25; my italics.

⁵⁹ Clark, Ian and Wheeler, Nicholas J., The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (thereafter Clark and Wheeler, Strategy) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 186–7.Google Scholar

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⁶¹ See, for example, the summary of MC 70, Doc. no. 23, NHP Bonn.

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⁶³ Although he did not use this expression, found mainly in the writing of Herman Kahn.

⁶⁴ Stromseth, , Response, 42–68.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Macmillan, ‘Strategy’, passim.

⁶⁶ Summary by the BMVg, 20 Mar. 1958, Doc. no. 23, NHP Bonn.

⁶⁷ Clark, & Wheeler, , Strategy, 186–7Google Scholar; Baylis, John, ‘Anthony Buzzard’, in Baylis, John and Garnett, John, eds, Makers of Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter, 1991), 136–49.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Cf. Ibid., 148–9.

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1949, i. 616.

⁷⁰ For a summary of the later thinking of McNamara, see, for example, Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).Google Scholar

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⁷² FRUS, 1949, i. 616.

⁷³ Kennan, George, McNamara, Robert and Smith, Gerard, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, no. 4 (1982).Google Scholar

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⁷⁵ ‘Sprechzettel für Herrn Minister zum Besuch Präsident KENNEDYS’, 21 June 1963: ‘limited aggression … Für Bundesrepublik ist ein konventioneller Krieg gleich tödlich wie ein nuclearer [sic] Krieg.’ Doc. no. 139, NHP Bonn.

⁷⁶ Stromseth, , Response, 18–19.Google Scholar

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⁷⁸ ‘Kurzbericht über das Kolloquium des Bundesverteidigungsministeriums und des Auswärtigen Amtes in der ‘Netten Mühle’ am 27. und 28.4.1964’, Doc. no. 148, 30 May 1964, NHP Bonn.

⁷⁹ See the articles by Barbier, Colette, Nuti, Leopoldo, Conze, Echart and Vaïsse, Maurice in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, Vol. 104, nos 1–2 (1990).Google Scholar

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⁸² Cf. the Nassau Protocol, 21 Dec. 1962, Survival, Vol. 5, no. 2 (1963), 46–7.

⁸³ Not to be confused with Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, for which this acronym was used in the 1980s.

⁸⁴ Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO, see above.

⁸⁵ D(61)2, 13 Jan. 1961, Annex A: ‘N.A.T.O. Strategy and Nuclear Weapons’, CAB 131/25, PRO.

⁸⁶ Italy, Diario Storico dello Stato Maggiore Difesa, promemoria in data 25.2.1961, 1 Reparto – 1 sezione: ‘Relazione sull'attività svolta dalla 1 sezione durante it mese di marzo 1961 – 1 – Politia militare NATO’; John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, National Security Files, Countries: Italy, box 121, folder Italy; Subjects Fanfani visit 6/12/61–6/13/61 (A). I am grateful to Professor Leopoldo Nuti for making transcripts of these documents available to me.

⁸⁷ Annex ‘A’ to D(61)23, 1 May 1961, answer to question 17(a), CAB 131/25, PRO.

⁸⁸ Ibid., answer to question 17(f).

⁸⁹ Ibid., answer to question 17(b).

⁹⁰ Ibid., answer to question 17(c).

⁹¹ A departure from earlier thinking, see Baylis, Ambiguity.

⁹² ‘Gedacht war an die Detonation eines Sprengkopfes in 10 000 Metern Höhe oder eines air burst, einer Bombe geringen nuklearen Sprengwerts, über der Ostsee.’ Steinhoff and Pommerin, Strate-giewechsel, 87, no footnote reference, therefore probably eye-witness account of General Steinhoff.

⁹³ Annex ‘A’ to D(61)23, 1 May 1961, answer to question 17(d), CAB 131/25, PRO.

⁹⁴ Doc. 23 of 20 Mar. 1958, NHP Bonn.

⁹⁵ Doc. 105, ‘Kurzfassung des Stikker-Memorandum vom 4.9.1962’, NHP Bonn.

⁹⁶ Annex to JP(61)68 Final of 7 July 1961, DEFE 4/137, PRO.

⁹⁷ Bobbitt et al., Nuclear Strategy, 214 f.

⁹⁸ ‘Briefs for Anglo-French Staff Talks’, 17 Apr. 1962, COS(62)246, 5 in DEFE 5/127, PRO.

⁹⁹ Legge, , ‘Weapons’, 18–21.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Morris, C. E., ‘The future of the North Atlantic Alliance’, Army Quarterly, Vol. 99, no. 1 (1969), 11.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Summary in Mey, , NATO Strategie, 71Google Scholar, emphasis in the original.

¹⁰² Quinlan, Sir Michael, ‘Nuclear Weapons – the Basic Issues’, lecture, Nov. 1982, Ampleforth Journal, Vol. 91, pt 2 (1986), 66.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Daalder, , Flexible Response, 92.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁵ It is of interest in this context that Lynn Davis, who together with James Thompson advocated the acquisition of the INF in the Pentagon under President Carter, has become Assistant Secretary of State for National Security Affairs in the State Department under President Clinton.

¹⁰⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of the different lines of thought in the US, see Levine, Robert A., ‘The Strategic Nuclear Debate’, RAND Paper R-3565-FF/CC/RC (1987).Google Scholar

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