Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2018
Using a wide variety of European archival sources, this article analyses the development of financial policies after the First World War. Through studying French politics it demonstrates how, following the significant increase in direct fiscal charges in order to cover the costs of the conflict, international fiscal competition exercised strong pressure on the tax systems of large European countries and, as a result, contributed over the course of the 1920s to a process of lowering the taxes levied on high revenues and fortunes. Significantly, the stabilisation of the French franc in 1926 was supported by a simultaneous alignment of the French tax system and neutral tax havens which in turn enabled the return of previously exported assets.
1 The academic debate on tax competition began at the end of the 1980s. See Lee, Dwight and McKenzie, Richard, ‘The International Political Economy of Declining Tax Rates’, National Tax Journal, 42, 1 (1989), 79–83Google Scholar; Frenkel, Jacob, Razin, Assaf and Sadka, Efraim, International Taxation in an Integrated World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Steinmo, Sven, Taxation and Democracy. Swedish, British, and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 156–92Google Scholar; Tanzi, Vito, Taxation in an Integrating World (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995)Google Scholar.
2 See, for instance, Alvaredo, Facundo, Atkinson, Anthony, Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel, ‘The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 3 (2013), 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 See, for instance, Delalande, Nicolas, Les batailles de l'impôt. Consentement et résistances de 1789 à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 2011), 243–374Google Scholar; Thorndike, Joseph, Their Fair Share: Taxing the Rich in the Age of FDR (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 2013)Google Scholar.
4 See, for instance, Witt, Peter-Christian, ‘Tax Policies, Tax Assessment and Inflation: Towards a Sociology of Public Finances in the German Inflation, 1914–1923’, in Witt, Peter-Christian, ed., Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe. The History and Sociology of Public Finance (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), 137–60Google Scholar; Tristram, Frédéric, ‘L'administration fiscale et l'impôt sur le revenu dans l'entre-deux-guerres’, Etudes et documents, 11 (1999), 211–42Google Scholar.
5 On the development of tax havens before the Second World War, see Palan, Ronen et al., Tax Havens. How Globalization Really Works (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 107–23Google Scholar; Farquet, Christophe, ‘The Rise of the Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period’, EHES Working Papers, 27 (2012)Google Scholar; Farquet, Christophe, La défense du paradis fiscal suisse avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale: une histoire internationale (Neuchâtel: Editions Alphil-Presses universitaires suisses, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Farquet, Christophe, Histoire du paradis fiscal suisse, (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 2018)Google Scholar. For the limited extent of this phenomenon before the First World War, see also Spoerer, Mark, ‘Wann begannen Fiskal- und Steuerwettbewerb? Eine Spurensuche in Preussen, anderen deutschen Staaten und der Schweiz’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 43, 2 (2002), 35–59Google Scholar.
6 Recently researchers have preferred to focus on transnational influence of tax norms. See, for instance, Elliot Brownlee, W., Ide, Eisaku and Fukagai, Yasunori, eds., The Political Economy of Transnational Tax Reform. The Shoup Mission to Japan in Historical Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 See, for instance, James, Harold, ‘Financial Flows across Frontiers during the Interwar Depression’, The Economic History Review, 45, 3 (1992), 594–613CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feldman, Gerald, The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 598–9Google Scholar; Eichengreen, Barry, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 172–83Google Scholar; Ferguson, Niall, Paper and Iron. Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897–1927 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 274–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For references on French history, see note 32.
8 There are a few exceptions. See, for instance, Eichengreen, Barry, ‘The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice’, in Dornbusch, Rüdiger and Draghi, Mario, eds., Public Debt Management: Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 202–13Google Scholar; Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille and Sicsic, Pierre, ‘Threat of a Capital Levy, Expected Devaluation and Interest Rates in France during the Interwar Period’, European Review of Economic History, 3, 1 (1999), 25–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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10 See Badulesco, Victor, Le prélèvement extraordinaire sur le capital dans l'Empire allemand (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1922)Google Scholar; Rostás, László, ‘Capital Levies in Central Europe, 1919–1924’, The Review of Economic Studies, 8, 1 (1940), 20–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eichengreen, ‘The Capital Levy’.
11 See Tartaglia, Filomena, Fisco e mercato finanziario in Italia 1914–1945 (Napoli: Prismi, 2000), 21–7Google Scholar; Sichtermann, Siegfried, Bankgeheimnis und Bankauskunft. Systematische Darstellung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung und unter Heranziehung ausländischen Rechts (Frankfurt: Fritz Knapp, 1957), 61–7Google Scholar.
12 See Report by Clavier, Director of the Contributions directes belges, ‘La supertaxe. Ses principes, ses résultats, sa révision’, 1925, Archives générales du Royaume (AGR), Brussels, T 122: 601.
13 See ‘Evaluation de la fraude en matière de déclarations d'Impôt général sur le Revenu’, Note for de Lasteyrie, French Finance Minister, transmitted 25 Jan. 1924, Centre des archives économiques et financières (CAEF), Paris, B 58613.
14 For Germany, see Witt, ‘Tax Policies’, 151–5. See also Maier, Charles, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 82Google Scholar.
15 Report of Sub-Committee on Evasion of Death Duties through the medium of Private Companies, 3 Feb. 1926, Public Record Office (PRO), London, IR 40/3576.
16 Daunton, Just Taxes, 62.
17 See, for instance, ‘Commission chargée d’étudier la réorganisation des régies financières, constituée par arrêté ministériel du 17 juin 1921’, 24 Mar. 1922, CAEF, B 43157.
18 See Farquet, La défense du paradis fiscal suisse.
19 Until 1924 the only agreements on the exchange of tax information on movable assets were the following: an agreement signed in 1907 between France and Great Britain for succession duties as well as a few conventions concluded between Germany, Austria and East European countries. See Report by Carroll, Expert at the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations, 25 Mar. 1939, Archives of the League of Nations (ALON), Geneva, F/Fiscal/114.
20 For some details on non-resident taxes and banking secrecy in Europe, see Farquet, ‘The Rise of the Swiss Tax Haven’.
21 See, for instance, Perrenoud, Marc et al., La place financière et les banques suisses à l’époque du national-socialisme. Les relations des grandes banques avec l'Allemagne (1931–1946) (Lausanne: Payot, Zurich: Chronos, 2002), 44–71Google Scholar; Farquet, Histoire du paradis fiscal suisse, 84-94.
22 See Minutes of the Conseil national, 3 Feb. 1920, Bulletin officiel de l'Assemblée fédérale, 1 (1920), 34. For the amount of French bank deposits, see Bonin, Hubert, Les banques françaises de l'entre-deux-guerres (1919–1935), 1 (Paris: Plage, 2000), 524Google Scholar.
23 See Mazbouri, Malik, Sébastien Guex and Rodrigo López, ‘Finanzplatz Schweiz’, in Halbeisen, Patrick, Müller, Margrit and Veyrassat, Béatrice, eds., Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert (Basel: Schwabe, 2012), 477Google Scholar.
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25 See Annuaire statistique de la Suisse (Berne, Bâle), 1921–31.
26 See Nicole Piétri, ‘La Reconstruction économique et financière de l'Autriche par la Société des Nations (1921–1926)’, Ph.D. thesis, Université Paris I, 1981.
27 See ‘Loi fédérale du 27 novembre 1922 . . . ’, Appendix to a Report of the League Delegation, 15 Dec. 1922, ALON, C./S.C.A.17.
28 Fior, Michel, Institution globale et marchés financiers: la Société des Nations face à la reconstruction de l'Europe, 1918–1931 (Berne: Peter Lang, 2008), 377Google Scholar.
29 See Marini, Philippe, L'impôt sur le capital en Italie (Paris: Sagot, 1928), 71–3Google Scholar.
30 Dubergé, Jean, La politique fiscale de l'Italie fasciste (Paris: Alcan, 1938)Google Scholar; Marongiu, Gianni, La politica fiscale del fascismo (Lungro di Cosenza: Marco Editore, 2005), 91–148Google Scholar. For the laws, see Bulletin de statistique et de législation comparée, 93 (1923), 356–63 and 94 (1923), 1063–79 and 1307–17.
31 See Steiner, Zara, The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 443–4Google Scholar.
32 See, for instance, Jeanneney, Jean-Noël, Leçon d'histoire pour une gauche au pouvoir. La faillite du Cartel 1924–1926 (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 70–7Google Scholar; Sargent, Thomas, ‘Stopping Moderate Inflations: The Methods of Poincare and Thatcher’, in Dornbusch, Rüdiger and Henrique Simonsen, Mario, eds., Inflation, Debt and Indexation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 54–96Google Scholar; Prati, Alessandro, ‘Poincaré’s Stabilization: Stopping a Run on Government Debt’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 27, 2 (1991), 213–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hautcoeur and Sicsic, ‘Threat of a Capital Levy’; Mouré, Kenneth, The Gold Standard Illusion. France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 87Google Scholar.
33 See, for instance, the following book co-written by one of the foremost experts on the Swiss financial centre, Léo Wulfsohn: Léo Wulfsohn and Gabriel Wernlé, L'Evasion des capitaux allemands (Paris: Société anonyme d’éditions, 1923).
34 See Report of Rheinboldt, transmitted to the Auswärtiges Amt, 23 Dec. 1921, Bundesarchiv (BArch), Berlin, R 3101/19550. For French and British statements, see, for instance, Allizé, French Ambassador in Bern, to Poincaré, French Premier, 9 Apr. 1922, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), Paris, Série Z, Allemagne, no 510; Russel, British Minister in Bern, to Curzon, Foreign Secretary, 22 July 1921, PRO, FO 371/7144.
35 On the importance of the issue of control of German finance in Reparations debates, see Trachtenberg, Marc, Reparation in World Politics. France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980)Google Scholar.
36 See Boyce, Robert, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 112CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 Auditions of the Financial Commission of the Chambre des députés de l'Assemblée nationale, 21 Feb. 1922, 180, Centre d'accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales (CARAN), Paris, C 14685 (translation from French).
38 See Note of the League Secretariat on the resolution XIII of the Financial Commission in Genoa about tax evasion and capital flight, 29 May 1922, ALON, A. 165.
39 See Note of Léon-Dufour, French Secretary of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, about Resolution 13 of the Financial Committee of Genoa, classified 16 May 1922, AMAE, Service français de la Société des Nations, no. 1297.
40 See Minutes of the Committee of Guarantees, 28 Oct. 1922, CARAN, AJ/5/4.
41 Note from a Meeting in Downing Street, 10 Dec. 1922, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Documents diplomatiques. Demande de moratorium du gouvernement allemand à la Commission des Réparations. Conférence de Londres. Conférence de Paris (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1923), 54–5 (translation from French).
42 On the McKenna Committee, see, for instance, Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, The German Inflation 1914–1923, Causes and Effects in International Perspective (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 185 ss. The Committee was composed of the Director of the Banque nationale de Belgique, Albert-Edouard Janssen, R. McKenna, Chairman of the Midland Bank, André Laurent-Atthalin, Director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, Mario Alberti, Director of the Credito Italiana, and Henry Robinson, of the First National Bank of Los Angeles.
43 Report transmitted by Niemeyer, Controller of Finance, to McKenna, 2 Jan. 1924, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, Papers of Reginald McKenna, MCKN 7/8.
44 See ‘Réponse au questionnaire du Second Comité d'experts par la Mission financière de la Ruhr’, 30 Jan. 1924, Archives of the Banque nationale de Belgique, Brussels, 0312/5.
45 See Second Committee of Experts, Minutes, 22 Mar. 1924, Churchill Archives Centre, Papers of Reginald McKenna, MCKN 7/8.
46 See Rapport du second comité d'experts, Paris, 1924.
47 See Sichtermann, Bankgeheimnis und Bankauskunft, 67–8. For examples of these pressures, see Report of the Reichsbank-Direktorium transmitted to Hermes, German Finance Minister, 9 Oct. 1922, BArch, R 901/28335; Bank-Archiv, 22, 3, 1 Nov. 1922, 29–32.
48 See Report of the Financial Service of the Reparations Commission, ‘Abolition par le Gouvernement allemand du contrôle fiscal par l'intermédiaire des banques’, 29 May 1923, CARAN, AJ/5/33.
49 See Bulletin de statistique et de législation comparée, 97 (1925), 789–92. In August the top rate was nevertheless increased to 40 per cent. See Bulletin de statistique et de législation comparée, 98 (1925), 598. For a general view see Ullmann, Der deutsche Steuerstaat, 108–9.
50 See, for instance, the letter from twelve economic associations, including the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie and the Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, to Luther, German Finance Minister, ‘Wiederherstellung des Bankgeheimnisses’, 6 Aug. 1924, BArch, R 3101/10036.
51 See Letter from the Reichsfinanzministerium to the German Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce, 21 Jul. 1927, BArch, R2/19799.
52 See Feinstein, Charles and Watson, Katherine, ‘Private International Capital Flows in Europe in the Inter-War Period’, in Feinstein, Charles, ed., Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 McNeil, William, American Money and the Weimar Republic. Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 138–41Google Scholar.
54 The Dawes loan was divided into several issues: USA, 110 million dollars (around 22 million pounds); Great Britain, 12 million pounds; Switzerland, 3 million pounds; France, 3 million pounds; the Netherlands, 2.5 million pounds; and some small issues in Sweden, Belgium, Italy and Germany. See ‘Report of the Agent General for Reparation Payments’, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug. 1925, 552.
55 This figure is for the end of 1930: Born, Karl, Die deutsche Bankenkrise 1931: Finanzen und Politik (München: R. Piper, 1967), 18Google Scholar.
56 See Jeroen Euwe, ‘“It is therefore both in the German and in the Dutch interest . . . ”: Dutch-German relations after the Great War. Interwoven economies and political détente, 1918–1933’, Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2012, 112–5.
57 See Schuker, Stephen, ‘American “Reparations” to Germany, 1919–33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis’, Princeton Studies in International Finance, 61 (1988), 117Google Scholar. See also James, Harold, ‘The Causes of the German Banking Crisis of 1931’, Economic History Review, 37, 1 (1984), 77–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
58 See Jeanneney, Jean-Noël, ‘De la spéculation financière comme arme diplomatique. A propos de la première “bataille du franc” (novembre 1923–mars 1924)’, Relations internationales, 13 (1978), 5–27Google Scholar.
59 See Schuker, Stephen, The End of French Predominance in Europe. The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 31–123Google Scholar.
60 See Hautcoeur and Sicsic, ‘Threat of a Capital Levy’. For the decrease of the value in real terms of French bonds and shares see also the figures in Alfred Sauvy, Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres, 1 (Paris: Fayard, 1965), 392.
61 On the crisis of confidence of the Cartel at the end of 1924 see Jeanneney, Leçon d'histoire, 58–78. On the relations with the United States see Rhodes, Benjamin, ‘Reassessing “Uncle Shylock”, The United States and the French War Debt, 1917–1929’, The Journal of American History, 55, 4 (1969), 794–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 Le Temps, ‘Le défaitisme capitaliste’, 11 Nov. 1924 (translation from French). Gribouille is, in French popular theatre, a comic character who jumps into the water to protect himself from the rain.
63 See Poriquet, French consular in Lausanne, to Herriot, President of the Council, 5 Dec. 1924, AMAE, Série Y Internationale, no. 259. On the capital flights to Switzerland during the Cartel see Guillen, Pierre, ‘Les relations financières franco-suisses après la Première Guerre mondiale’, in Poidevin, Raymond and Roulet, Louis-Edouard, eds., Aspects des rapports entre la France et la Suisse de 1843 à 1939 (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1982), 166–7Google Scholar; Fior, Michel, Les banques suisses, le franc et l'Allemagne. Contribution à une histoire de la place financière suisse (1924–1945) (Genève: Droz, 2002), 48–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Extraordinary estimates of capital flight were circulating in French ruling circles at the beginning of 1925. For instance, Clémentel's successor Anatole de Monzie said in parliamentary hearings that during the three first months of 1925 14 billion French francs were hidden in one single foreign bank. See Minutes of the Financial Commission of the Chambre des députés, 7 Apr. 1925, 78, CARAN, C 14776.
64 See Clémentel, French Finance Minister, to Herriot, President of the Council, 16 Sep. 1924, and attached to it a copy of a letter from Clémentel to Theunis, Belgian premier, 16 Sep. 1924, CAEF, B 54216.
65 See Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 21 Oct. 1924, ALON, EFS/DT/4e session/PV3.
66 Cited in Jaunez, Chargé d'affaires of France in Brussels, to Herriot, President of the Council, 30 Sep. 1924, CAEF, B 54216 (translation from French).
67 See Jaunez, Chargé d'affaires of France in Brussels, to Herriot, President of the Council, 8 Oct. 1924, AMAE, Série Y Internationale, no. 259. For an example of the press campaign, see La Libre Belgique, ‘Le bordereau excellent . . . mais pas chez nous’, 19 Nov. 1924.
68 See Herbette, French Ambassador in Belgium, to Herriot, President of the Council, 27 Nov. 1924, AMAE, Série Y Internationale, no. 259.
69 The normal rate of 15 per cent was lowered to 4 per cent. See Letter of 4 Oct. 1924, signed in the name of Theunis, Belgian premier, by Clavier, Director of the Belgian Contributions directes, cited in La Libre Belgique, 17 Nov. 1924, AMAE, Série Y Internationale, no. 259.
70 Herbette, French Ambassador in Brussels, to Herriot, President of the Council, 21 Jan. 1925, AMAE, Série Y Internationale, no. 259 (translation from French).
71 See Farquet, Christophe, ‘Le secret bancaire en cause à la Société des Nations (1922–1925)’, Traverse. Revue d'histoire, 1 (2009), 102–15Google Scholar.
72 Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 21 Oct. 1924, 8, ALON, EFS/DT/4e session/PV3 (translation from French).
73 Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 22 Oct. 1924, 4, ALON, EFS/DT/4e session/PV4 (translation from French).
74 See Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 23 Oct. 1924, 2, ALON, EFS/DT/4e session/PV7; Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 3 Feb. 1925, 9–10, ALON, EFS/DT/5e session/PV3; Minutes of the Federal Council (=government): ‘Völkerbund: Konferenz betr. Internationale Doppelbesteuerung und Steuerflucht’, 23 Jan. 1925, Swiss Federal Archives (SFA), Bern, E 2001 B, 1000/1508, 34.
75 See Barbey, Swiss Minister in Brussels, to Motta, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 Jan. 1925; de Pury, Swiss Minister in the Hague, to Motta, 20 Jan. 1925, SFA, E 2001 B, 1000/1508, 34.
76 See, for instance, Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 22 Oct. 1924, 7, ALON, EFS/DT/4e session/PV4.
77 See Atkin, John, ‘Official Regulation of British Overseas Investment, 1914–1931’, The Economic History Review, 23, 2 (1970), 330–1Google Scholar.
78 See Telegram from Hennessy, French Ambassador in Bern, 3 Mar. 1925, AMAE, Série Z, Suisse, no. 127. See also, in the same archive box, the telegrams from Hennessy, 24 Feb., 28 Feb., 1 Mar. and 2 Mar. 1925, as well as the Minutes of the Federal Council, ‘Frankreich. Anleihe in der Schweiz’, 28 Feb. 1925, in Documents diplomatiques suisses, 9 (Berne: Benteli, 1980), 19, and Guillen, ‘Les relations financières franco-suisses’, 166–8.
79 On Dubois’s attitude, see Minutes of the Federal Council, ‘Völkerbund. Konferenz betr. internationale Doppelbesteuerung und Steuerflucht’, 23 Jan. 1925, 11, SFA, E 2001 B, 1000/1508, 34. On Niemeyer's position on tax evasion, see Note of Niemeyer to Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 Nov. 1923, PRO, IR 40/3419. In June 1925, after receiving encouragement from these two experts, the Financial Committee published an official reservation about the League's efforts against tax evasion. See Minutes of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, 6 and 7 June 1925, ALON, F/18e session/PV6 and 7.
80 Minutes of the Direction of the Swiss National Bank, 178, 19 Feb. 1925, 29, Swiss National Bank Archives, Zürich (translation from German). However, the French government received some financial support in the United States from J.P. Morgan, its best foreign partner since the war: in September 1924, before the beginning of the collapse of the franc, the bank prolonged the 100 million dollar short-term credit granted in March, which was converted in November in a long-term loan. Schuker, The End, 140–68.
81 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 35.
82 Minutes of the Federal Council, ‘Völkerbund. Konferenz betreffend internationale Doppelbesteuerung und Steuerflucht’, 19 Mar. 1925, 3, SFA E 2001 B, 1000/1508, 34 (translation from German).
83 See Jeanneney, Leçon d'histoire, 88–94.
84 Chambre des députés, 16 Feb. 1925, in Journal officiel. Débats parlementaires, 17 Feb. 1925, 902 (translation from French). However, the balance sheets were eventually disclosed, and Herriot's cabinet was brought down in April of the same year.
85 See Jeanneney, Jean-Noël, François de Wendel en République. L'argent et le pouvoir 1914–1940 (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 321–54Google Scholar.
86 See Mouré, The Gold Standard, 129 for the estimates on inflows and outflows. See also Rist, Léonard and Schwob, Philippe, ‘Balance des paiements’, Revue d’économie politique, 53 (1939), 536–9Google Scholar. On the monetary stabilisation, see Blancheton, Pierre, Le Pape et l'Empereur. La Banque de France, la Direction du Trésor et la politique monétaire de la France (1914–1928) (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001)Google Scholar.
87 For this contradictory attitude, see Weill-Raynal, Etienne, Les réparations allemandes et la France, 2 (Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1947), 611–3Google Scholar.
88 See Piketty, Les hauts revenus, 267 (rate for for married couples).
89 ‘Rapport du Comité des experts (créé par décret du 31 mai 1926)’, 3 Jul. 1926, in Les Documents politiques diplomatiques et financiers, Jul. 1926, 318 (translation from French).
90 See, for instance, Tristram, ‘L'administration fiscale’.
91 Borduge, Director of the Administration des Contributions directes, to Painlevé, French Finance Minister, 10 Nov. 1925, CAEF, B 56813 (translation from French).
92 Note from Borduge, Director of the Administration des Contributions directes, to Poincaré, President of the Council, 1 Oct. 1928, CAEF, B 56813 (translation from French).
93 See ‘Prospectus: Emprunt 7 per cent des Chemins de fer de l'Etat français’, Journal de Genève, 3 Sept. 1926.
94 See Letter from Hennessy, French Ambassador in Switzerland, to Briand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 Sep. 1926, AMAE, Série Z, Suisse, no. 127. For the negotiations on the loan, see Minutes of the Federal Council, ‘Französische Anleihen’, 19 Aug. 1926 and Minutes of the Federal Council, ‘Emprunt français’, 24 Aug. 1926, in Documents diplomatiques suisses, 9, 362–5. For French loans in Switzerland at the end of the 1920s see also Perrenoud, Marc and López, Rodrigo, Aspects des relations financières franco-suisses (1936–1946) (Lausanne: Payot, Zurich: Chronos, 2002), 42–4Google Scholar.
95 See League of Nations, ‘Europe's Capital Movements, 1919–1932. A Statistical Note’, June 1943, 32–3, and Appendices 3d–3i.
96 See Vanthemsche, Guy, ‘De val van de regering Poullet-Vandervelde: Een “samenzwering der bankiers”?’, Revue belge d'histoire contemporaine, 9 (1978), 165–214Google Scholar. The Swiss legation in Brussels reproduced estimates of Belgian assets deposited in foreign banks – specifically in the Netherlands, Great Britain and Switzerland – of more than 15 billion Belgian francs. See Political Report of the Swiss Legation in Brussels, transmitted to Motta, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 Jul. 1926, SFA, E 2200.44, 1000/598, 2.
97 On monetary stabilisation see Baudhuin, Fernand, Histoire économique de la Belgique. 1914–1939, 1 (Bruxelles: Emile Bruylant, 1946), 161–73Google Scholar; Van der Wee, Hermann and Tavernier, Karel, La Banque nationale de Belgique et l'histoire monétaire entre les deux guerres mondiales (Bruxelles: Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1975), 169–203Google Scholar. For the fiscal plan see Hardewyn, André, Tussen sociale rechtvaardigheid en economische efficiëntie. Een halve eeuw fiscaal beleid in België (1914–1962) (Brussels: Vubpress, 2003)Google Scholar, 155–7 and 187 (note 42).
98 Minutes of the Conseil des ministres, no. 80, 27 Jun. 1929, 9, AGR (translation from French). For the fiscal normalisation see Hardewyn, Tussen sociale, 172–82. On the willingness of some members of the government to dismantle progressive taxation at the end of 1926 see, for instance, Minutes of the Conseil des ministres, no. 46, 15 Dec. 1926, 2–3, AGR.
99 National Bank of Belgium to Houtart, Belgian Finance Minister, 23 Nov. 1926, Archives of the Banque nationale de Belgique, 0150/4 (translation from French).
100 See Van der Wee and Tavernier, La Banque nationale.
101 Swiss issues were 200 million Belgian francs (30 million Swiss francs) for the first loan and 32 million Swiss francs for the second. See ‘Prospectus: Société nationale des Chemins de fer belges’, Journal de Genève, 20 Aug. 1926; ‘Prospectus: Emprunt de stabilisation du Royaume de Belgique, 7%, 1926’, Journal de Genève, 30 Oct. 1926.
102 For the same analysis on relations between Switzerland and France, see Guillen, ‘Les relations financières franco-suisses’, 166–71.
103 Minutes of the Direction of the Swiss National Bank, no. 1061, 18 Nov. 1926, 5, Swiss National Bank Archives (translation from German). See also Peltzer, Belgian Minister in Bern, to Vandervelde, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 25 Sep. 1926, AGR, T 073: 493. It is true that contradictory information was produced on the subscription to the first French loan in Switzerland in 1926. See Hennessy, French Ambassador in Switzerland, to Briand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 Sep. 1926, AMAE, Série Z, Suisse, no. 127. However, one thing is clear: if the Swiss banks were able to grant these loans, it was thanks to the abundant imported capital placed in their accounts and deposits. See Switzerland. Extracts from the Report of the Department of Overseas Trade, Feb. 1927, Archives of the Bank of England, London, OV 63/1.
104 Siepmann to Rodd, 3 Sept. 1930, Archives of the Bank of England, OV 63/22.
105 In April 1927 Belgian delegate C. Clavier was even forced to read in front of the Fiscal Committee of the League a formal denial, written by M. Houtart, of his own previous efforts to fight international tax evasion. See Minutes of the Experts Committee on double taxation and tax evasion, 8 Apr. 1927, 12–13, ALON, EFS/DT/8e session/PV5. For precision on offshore finance and the disappearance of pressure against it after the monetary stabilisations see Farquet, La défense du paradis fiscal suisse.