¹ See Cipolla, Carlo M., The Economic History of World Population (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 24–28Google Scholar. By focussing attention on the technical and economic effects of the process, Cipolla provides a comprehensive formulation of what is meant by industrialization. Nothing like that clarity can be achieved with regard to “modernization”, which is more inclusive and refers, albeit vaguely, to the manifold social and political processes that have accompanied industrialization in most countries of Western civilization. The following discussion contains contributions towards a definition of “modernization”.

² See Nisbet, Robert A., Entile Durkheim (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 20Google Scholar.

³ Ibid., p.21 n.

⁴ Kant, Immanuel, “Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent”, in Friedrich, Carl J., ed., The Philosophy of Kant (New York, Modern Library, Random House, 1949), p. 121Google Scholar. Note the relation of this view with the intellectual tradition traced in Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Harper Torchbooks) (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961)Google Scholar, passim.

⁵ Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, fifth ed. (London, T. Codell, 1782), pp. 302–303Google Scholar.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 308–309.

⁷ Ibid., p. 305.

⁸ See John Millar, “Social Consequences of the Division of Labor”, reprinted in Lehmann, William C., John Millar of Glasgow, 1735–1801 (Cambridge, At the University Press, 1960), pp. 380–382Google Scholar. This volume contains a reprint of Millar's Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, first published in 1771.

⁹ Burke, Edmund, “Thoughts and Details on Scarcity (1795)”, in Works (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1869), V, pp. 134–135Google Scholar. Burke himself used the laissez-faire doctrine to support his argument by “showing” that the law of supply and demand governed the wages paid to labor and that interference with that law would merely aggravate the condition of the poor. The traditional argument against the injustice of this system is exemplified by Godwin, William, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness, Priestley, F. E. L., ed. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1946), I, pp. 15–20Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Cf. the survey of these opinions by Michels, Robert, Die Verelendungstheorie (Leipzig, Alfred Kroener, 1928)Google Scholar, passim.

¹¹ Möser, Justus, Sämtliche Werke (Berlin, Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1842), IV, pp. 158–162Google Scholar. I owe this reference to the article by Karl Mannheim, cited below.

¹² Goethe, J. W., Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, tr. by Boylan, R. Dillon (London, Bell and Doldy, 1867), p. 268Google Scholar. See also Knigge, Baron, Practical Philosophy of Social Life (Lansingburgh, Perriman and Bliss, 1805), pp. 307–308Google Scholar.

¹³ Goethe, op. cit.

¹⁴ See Wittich, Werner, “Der soziale Gehalt von Goethes Roman ‘Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre’”, in Palyi, Melchior, ed., Hauptprobleme der Soziologie, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1923), II, pp. 278–306Google Scholar.

¹⁵ For documentation of the social and literary life of the period cf. Bruford, W. H., Germany in the 18th Century (Cambridge, At the University Press, 1939)Google Scholar, passim. The literary and philosophical response to the French revolution is analyzed in Stern, Alfred, Der Einfluss der französischen Revolution auf das deutsche Geistesleben (Stuttgart, Cotta, 1928)Google Scholar, but I know of no comparable summary treatment of the German response to English industrialization. Cf., however, Freyer, Hans, Die Bewertung der Wirtschaft im philosophischen Denken des 19 Jahrhunderts (Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1921)Google Scholar for some relevant materials.

¹⁶ Bonald, M. de, Oeuvres Complètes (Paris, J. P. Migne, 1864), II, pp. 238–239Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Ibid. Note in passing that this contrast between agricultural and industrial work is made in almost identical terms by John Millar, years earlier. The difference between Millar's liberalism and Bonald's conservatism seems to be reflected only in Millar's emphasis on the knowledge of the peasent and Bonald's greater stress on his religion. Cf. Lehmann, op. cit., pp. 380–382. As Max Weber has pointed out, this emphasis on the piety of the peasant is a distinctly modern phenomenon, related to invidious contrasts between town and country. See Weber, Max, Sociology of Religion (Boston, The Beacon Press, 1963), p. 83Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Proudhon, P. J., A System of Economic Contradictions or The Philosophy of Misery (Boston, Benjamin R. Tucker, 1888), I, p. 138Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Proudhon, P. J., General Idea of the Revolution in the 19th Century (London, Freedom Press, 1923), p. 215Google Scholar. This work was written in 1851.

²⁰ Proudhon, Philosophy of Misery, p. 132.

²¹ Cf. Jacobson, Norman, The Concept of Equality in the Assumptions of the Propaganda of Massachusetts Conservatives, 1790–1840 (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951)Google Scholar.

²² Fitzhugh, George, Sociology for the South (Richmond, A. Morris, Publisher, 1854), pp. 233, 235Google Scholar.

²³ Ibid., p. 161.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 106–107, 253–254. A major analysis of this Southern ideology in historical perspective is contained in Cash, W. J., The Mind of the South (Garden City, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1954)Google Scholar, passim.

²⁵ Brownson, Orestes A., Works (Detroit, T. Nourse, 1884), V, pp. 116–117Google Scholar. This passage was written in 1857, after the author's conversion to Catholicism.

²⁶ Mannheim, Karl, “Conservative Thought”, in Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 74–164Google Scholar.

²⁷ Different meanings of “alienation” as a central tenet of anti-capitalist ideology are examined in Lewis Feuer's essay on this concept in Stein, Maurice and Vidich, Arthur, eds., Sociology on Trial (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 127–147Google Scholar. That men of opposite political persuasion have come to employ this concept is analyzed sociologically by König, René, “Zur Soziologie der Zwanziger Jahre”, in Reinisch, Leonhard, ed., Die Zeit ohne Eigenschaften (Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1961), pp. 82–118Google Scholar.

²⁸ The following account is based in part on Bendix, Reinhard and Lipset, Seymour M., “Karl Marx's Theory of Social Classes”, in Class, Status and Power (New York, The Free Press, 1966), pp. 6–11Google Scholar.

²⁹ See Bottomore, T. B. and Maximilien Rubel, eds., Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (London, Watts & Co., 1956), p. 179Google Scholar. My italics.

³⁰ Cf. T. H. Marshall's definition of class as “a force that unites into groups people who differ from one another, by overriding the differences between them”. See his Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City, Doubleday & Co., 1964), p. 164Google Scholar.

³¹ Bottomore and Rubel, op. cit., pp. 186–187.

³² A recent massive study by Thompson, E. K., The Making of the English Working Class (New York, Pantheon Books, 1964)Google Scholar, passim, enables us to appreciate this Marxian perspective in that it describes the movements Marx observed with the benefit of another hundred years of scholarship. However, the author faithfully reproduces Marx's own blindness to the strongly conservative elements that were an enduring part of working-class agitation (by treating these elements as a passing phase) as well as to the mounting gradualism of the labor movement (by terminating his study in the 1830's).

³³ A convenient compilation of relevant quotations from Marx is contained in Bottomore and Rubel, op. cit., Part III, chapter 4. To my knowledge the most penetrating analysis of this complex of ideas is that of Lowith, Karl, From Hegel to Nietzsche (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964)Google Scholar.

³⁴ Marx, Karl, Capital (New York, The Modern Library, 1936), p. 92Google Scholar. Marx attributed religious beliefs and ideologies which disguise the “actual” relations of men in society to the conflicts of interest engendered by its class structure. It was therefore logical for him to anticipate that the advent of a classless society would coincide with the “end of ideology”, since then the “need” for ideology would disappear. Human relations become transparent, Marx believed, once the materialist interest in distorting them vanishes.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 12–13 (from the preface to the first edition).

³⁶ Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, The Free Press, 1964), p. 46Google Scholar. The reasoning in this work (originally published in 1958) is paralleled at many points by that contained in Rostow, W. W., The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, At the University Press, 1961)Google Scholar. For a critical evaluation of the latter cf. Rostow, W. W., ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth (Proceedings of a Conference by the International Economic Association) (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Lerner, op. cit., pp. 65–68. Cf. also the 1964 preface to the paperback edition.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 78. My italics.

³⁹ Cf. the discussion of the “system” of modernity in Ibid., pp. 54–65. See also David Riesman's comment on p. 13 of his introduction.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. vii (1964 preface).

⁴² Ibid., pp. vii–. The fact that Lerner chooses to ignore what he so clearly recognizes was explained by David Riesman in his introduction to the original edition by “the general belief that there must be a way — a way out of poverty and the psychic constriction of the ‘Teaditionals' — [which] links the author of this volume with his own national tradition. — But this very American belief that there is a way is a dream. And Professor Lerner, as a student of communications, understands that it is dreams that inspire not only new wants but new solutions — as well as violent gestures toward modernity. What seems required from his perspectives is an allopathic rationing of dreams, enough to spark the religion of progress, of advance, without inciting to riot.” To which Riesman adds the observation that “the emotional and political fluency of newly-liberated illiterates can be quite terrifying”, and that “a movie image of life in America … is a radical ‘theory’ when it appears on the screens of Cairo, Ankara or Teheran”. Ibid., p. 10.

⁴³ See Lipset, S. M., Political Man (Garden City, Doubleday & Co., 1950), Ch. IIGoogle Scholar and the references cited there. Cf. also Cutright, Phillips, “National Political Development”, American Sociological Review, XXVIII (1963), pp. 253–264CrossRefGoogle Scholar, by the same author, “Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Security Programs”, American Journal of Sociology, LXX (1965), pp. 537–550Google Scholar, but also the critical contribution by Stanley H. Udy, Jr., “Dynamic Inferences from Static Data”, Ibid., pp. 625–627. Meanwhile, massive studies along similar lines are under way. See Banks, A. S. and Textor, R. B., A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963)Google Scholar and Russett, Bruce M., Alker, Hayward R. et al. , World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ See Mead, Margaret, Continuities in Cultural Evolution (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), p. 7Google Scholar, where the author cites Franz Boas' acceptance of evolution on a planetary scale, but also his rejection of the application of evolutionary concepts to temporal sequences of a few centuries since short-run changes can go in any direction — a position accepted by most modern evolutionists.

⁴⁵ Despite cautionary comments the tendency is to substitute a “horizontal” compilation for the “vertical dimension” of history. Cf. Grew, Raymond and Thrupp, Sylvia L., “Horizontal History in Search of Vertical Dimensions”, CSSH, VIII (01, 1966), pp. 258–264Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ David Riesman in Lerner, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴⁷ In the countries of Western Europe that extension was relatively gradual during the nineteenth century; the establishment of universal suffrage dates only from the first World War or the early 1920–s. See Rokkan, Stein, “Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation”, Archives Europèennes de Sociologie, II (1961), pp. 132–152CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By contrast, a compilation shows that of 39 nations that have become independent and joined the United Nations between 1946 and 1962 only seven do not have universal suffrage. The restrictions usually refer to members of Buddhist religious orders, whose rules do not permit them to vote, and to members of the armed forces.

⁴⁸ Sometimes, as in statistics on economic growth and demographic trends, data of current trends from one country are superimposed onto the past trend-data of another, more advanced country, but the similarity of current with past trends does not resolve the question of sequence and timing. Note the critical analysis of this approach by Kuznets, Simon, “Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries”, in Feinstein, Otto, ed., Two Worlds of Change {Anchor Books) (Garden City, Doubleday and Co., 1964), pp. 1–21Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Kerr, Clark, Dunlop, John T., Harbison, Frederick, and Myers, Charles A., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 49Google Scholar and passim.

⁵⁰ The first phrase occurs several times in Pye, Lucian W. and Verba, Sidney, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, passim. The second is the title of a book by Harold Rosenberg.

⁵¹ Weber, Max, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949), p. 101Google Scholar.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 102–103.

⁵³ Redfield, Robert, The Folkculture of Yucatan (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 343–344Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Cf. the related discussion in Bendix, Reinhard, “Concepts and Generalizations in Comparative Sociological Studies”, American Sociological Review, XXVIII (1963), pp. 532–539CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 33Google Scholar. My indebtedness to Gerschenkron will be evident throughout; in several respects my analysis represents a sociological extension of points first suggested by him in the context of economic history.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 40. Cf. also Gerschenkron's critical discussion of Rostow along similar lines in Rostow, , ed., The Economics of Take-Off, pp. 166–167Google Scholar. See also for a related discussion Hirschman, Albert O., “Obstacles to Development”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIII (1965), pp. 385–393CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ Walter Elkan and Lloyd A. Fallers, “The Mobility of Labor”, in Moore, Wilbert E. and Feldman, Arnold S., eds., Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1960), pp. 238–257Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Milton Singer, “Changing Craft Traditions in India”, in Moore and Feldman, eds., op. cit., pp. 258–276.

⁵⁹ Smelser, Neil J., The Sociology of Economic Life (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 105–106Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Moore, Wilbert, The Impact of Industry(Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 19Google Scholar. Cf. also the same writer's earlier monograph on Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1963Google Scholar), Ch. V. Similar critiques of evolutionism are contained in the writings of Eisenstadt, S. N., esp. in two recent essays “Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution”, American Sociological Review, XXIX (1964), pp. 375–386CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Social Transformation in Modernization”, Ibid., XXX (1965), pp. 659–673.

⁶¹ See Smelser, op. cit., pp. 101–102, 106.

⁶² Ibid., p. 112.

⁶³ Cf., for example, the analysis of changes in industrial organization by Freudenberger, H. and Redlich, F. “The Industrial Development of Europe: Reality, Symbols, Images”, Kyklos, XVII (1964), pp. 372–401CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁴ The characterization of pre-modern treatises on economics is contained in Brunner, Otto, Neue Wege der Sozialgeschichte (Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), pp. 33–61Google Scholar. Cf. also the analysis by Laslett, Peter, The World We Have Lost (London, Methuen & Co., 1965Google Scholar), passim.

⁶⁵ Smelser, op. cit., p. 110.

⁶⁶ See Grana, Cesar, Bohemian Versus Bourgeois (New York, Basic Books, 1964Google Scholar), passim for a sympathetic analysis of this imagery. Marcuse's, HerbertOne-Dimensional Man (Boston, Beacon Press, 1964Google Scholar) appeared too late to be included in Grana's concluding analysis.

⁶⁷ It may well be the present-day absence of a need for self-help and defense which makes the closely-knit solidarity of such groups appear oppressive to a modern observer, especially if he discounts the romanticism with which such solidarities have been interpreted in the past. By the same token, it may be the absence of that need for self-help and defense which weakens the solidarity of groups in modern societies and allows for the development of individualism. The older pattern often arose from the imposition of taxes in return for privileges, which necessitated the organization of communities for self-help and defense; Max Weber discussed this device under the concept of “liturgy”. Cf. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 312–313Google Scholar. A society like the Russian in which this older pattern was preserved up to the present time may well engender customs and attitudes markedly different from those that are familiar to us today. For an insightful discussion of these customs and attitudes see Miller, Wright W., Russians as People (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1961Google Scholar), Ch. 5.

⁶⁸ See Mannheim, Karl, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1941), p. 44Google Scholar. The foregoing discussion develops ideas presented in another context in Bendix, Reinhard, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 105–106Google Scholar and passim.

⁶⁹ See Hintze, Otto, “Weltgeschichtliche Bedingungen der Repraesentativverfassung”, in Staat und Verfassung (Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 140–185Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ For the link between the theological conception of emanationism with theories of social evolution and functionalism cf. Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Loewith, Karl, Meaning in History (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949Google Scholar), and Kenneth Bock, “Theories of Progress and Evolution”, in Cahnmann, Werner J. and Boskoff, Alvin, eds., Sociology and History (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1964), pp. 21–41Google Scholar. The intellectual tradition discussed in these works has been criticized very effectively, and in a manner that corroborates the present discussion at many points, by Gellner, Ernest, Thought and Change (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964Google Scholar), passim.

⁷¹ So, of course, did the initial development of England depending as it did on intense competition with Holland. The point that social structures cannot be understood by exclusive attention to their internal developments is a general one. Cf. Hintze, Otto, “Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung”, in Staat und Verfassung (Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 52–83Google Scholar. The essay was originally published in 1906.

⁷² See Milton Singer, op. cit., p. 262.

⁷³ Cipolla, Carlo, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400–1700 (London, Collins, 1965Google Scholar), passim.

⁷⁴ Cf. footnotes 1, 47, and 68 for earlier references to changes in agriculture and political participation. The changes in literacy and the availability of printed matter are surveyed for England in Williams, Raymond, The Long Revolution (London, Chatto & Windus, 1961), pp. 156–172Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ The terms of that distinction do not stay put. Before the “modern” period England was a “follower” society while Holland and Sweden were “advanced”, especially in the production of cannons. Cf. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, pp. 36–37, 52–54, 87 n. In the twentieth century the Russian revolution, the Fascist regimes, and the Chinese revolution have added their own modifications of this distinction as an aspect of modernization. Singer, op. cit., pp. 261–262 refers to the same distinction by speaking of “early” and “late” arrivals, but I wish to emphasize the sense of pioneering or backwardness which has animated people in “advanced” and “follower” societies. These terms refer to the evaluations of the participants rather than to my own assessment of “progress” or “backwardness”.

⁷⁶ There are those who consider societies closed systems. They would counter this diffusionist argument with the contention that societies are not passive recipients of external stimuli, but select among them in accordance with the dictates of their internal structure. This interpretation is an extension of the equilibrium model and as such a secular version of the original, theological belief in “pre-established harmony”. That older view was as compatible with the existence of evil in a Divinely created world as the functionalist interpretation is compatible with the existence of conflict and change. Neither view is compatible with the possibility of a self-perpetuating disequilibrium, or cumulative causation as Myrdal has called it.

⁷⁷ Gerschenkron, op. cit., pp. 26, 44, and passim.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 46.

⁷⁹ Cf. the analysis of this complex of ideas in the work of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716), especially the interesting contacts between Leibniz and Peter the Great with regard to the modernization of Russia, in Groh, Dieter, Russland und das Selbstverständniss Europas (Neuwied, H. Luchterhand Verlag, 1961), pp. 32–43Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ David Landes, “Technological Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750–1914”, in Habbakuk, H. J. and Postan, M., eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe; The Industrial Revolutions and After (Cambridge, At the University Press, 1965), Vol. VI, Part I, p. 366Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Notethefrequencywithwhich“politicalunity”appearsasanindexofmodernityintheseverallistsofattributespresentedinJansen, Marius, ed., ChangingJapaneseAttitudesTowardsModernization(Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,1965), pp.18–19Google Scholar, 20–24, andpassim.

⁸² For a discussion of this point cf. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, pp. 15–29.

⁸³ On the “ad hoc diffusion” of items of modernity cf. the illuminating discussion by Laue, Theodore H. von, “Imperial Russia at the Turn of the Century”, CSSH, III (1961). pp. 353–367Google Scholar and Wright, Mary C., “Revolution from Without?”, CSSH, IV (1962), pp. 247–252Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Shils, E. A., “Political Development in the New States”, CSSH, II (1960), p. 281Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Gerschenkron, op. cit., pp. 41–44.

⁸⁶ Cf. Landes, op. cit., pp. 354, 358.

⁸⁷ The concept “reference society” has been chosen in analogy to Robert Merton's “reference groups”. Cf. Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957), pp. 225Google Scholar ff.

⁸⁸ Cf. the succint overview of the “intelligentsia” by Seton-Watson, Hugh, Neither War Nor Peace (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1960), pp. 164–187Google Scholar. See also Bendix, Nation-Building …, pp. 231ff.

⁸⁹ The most sensitive analysis of this bifurcation I have found in the literature is the study by Levenson, Joseph, Modern China and its Confucian Past (Garden City, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1964Google Scholar), passim. Cf. also Cipolla, Guns and Sails, pp. 116–126.

⁹⁰ Cf. the analysis of these tensions by E. A. Shils, “Political Development in the New States”, cited above

⁹¹ Cf. the chapter on “Die Proletarier der Geistesarbeit” in Riehl, Wilhelm, Die Bürgerliche Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, J. G. Cottasche Buchhandlung, 1930), esp. pp. 312–313Google Scholar.

⁹² For a vigorous critique of this tendency cf. Hexter, J. H., Reappraisals in History (New York, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, 1963Google Scholar), passim. Note also the cautionary comments regarding the problem of historical continuity in Gerschenkron, op. cit., pp. 37–39.

⁹³ For a more balanced assessment of the European bourgeoisie, cf. Otto Brunner, Neue Wege der Sozialgeschichte, pp. 80–115.

⁹⁴ Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 136–137Google Scholar. See also pp. 12–13 for a more generalized statement. Substantially the same observations were made by Frederick Engels in 1892, but the political primacy of the aristocracy and the secondary role of the bourgeoisie appeared to him only as a "survival" which would disappear eventually. See Engels, Frederick, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr, 1905Google Scholar), pp. xxxii–xxxiv. For an empirical study cf. Guttsman, W. L., The British Political Elite (New York, Basic Books, 1963Google Scholar).

⁹⁵ Cf. Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost, p. 22 and passim.

⁹⁶ Cf. Barker, Ernest, The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930 (London, Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 1–6Google Scholar and passim.

⁹⁷ Cf. Geertz, Clifford, “The Integrative Revolution”, in Geertz, , ed., Old Societies and New States (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105ffGoogle Scholar. Cf. my article “Bureaucracy” in the forthcoming edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

⁹⁸ Cf., for example, the statement that “In Egypt, the middle class has been weak in numbers and influence, and civil servants have comprised a large proportion of it.” See Berger, Morroe, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 46Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York, International Publishers, n.d.), p. 109.

¹⁰⁰ See Mill, John Stuart, Principles of Political Economy (Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1848), pp. 322–323Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Cf. the analysis of growing class consciousness among workers in Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York, International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 145–146, but note also the evidence adduced by Mitrany, David, Marx against the Peasants (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951)Google Scholar, passim.

¹⁰² To discount such beliefs because they disappeared eventually is no more plausible than to make the aristocracy's role decline in advance of its eventual demise. Cf. the discussion of the “traditionalism of labor” in my book Work and Authority in Industry (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1956), pp. 34ffGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰³ For a fuller statement of this interpretation cf. Bendix, Nation-Building…, pp. 61–74.

¹⁰⁴ As always, the contrast is not absolute. During the nineteenth century, as one went eastward in Europe, one encountered certain parallels to the “underdeveloped syndrome” of today, namely an increased importance of government and rather weakly developed middle strata. Cf. the illuminating statement by David Landes: “The farther east one goes in Europe, the more the bourgeoisie takes on the appearance of a foreign excrescence on manorial society, a group apart scorned by the nobility and feared or hated by (or unknown to) a peasantry still personally bound to the local seigneur.” See Landes, op. cit., p. 358.

¹⁰⁵ The debate concerning the deprivations of early English industrialization continues. But whatever its final resolution in terms of the changing standard of living, there is probably less disagreement on the psychological repercussions. The separation of the worker's home from his place of work, the novelty of factory discipline which had previously been associated with the pauper's workhouse, the brutalization of work conditions for women and children merely by the shift away from home, and related matters constitute impressive circumstantial evidence. Note also that the statement in the text makes sense of Germany's pioneering in the field of social legislation as an attribute of an early follower society.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Landes, op. cit., pp. 344–347 for a summary analysis of the labor-supply problem in the English industrial revolution in terms of the current state of research. These findings can be contrasted readily with comparative materials on various follower societies contained in Wilbert Moore and Arnold Feldman, eds., Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, passim.

¹⁰⁷ Note that Marx and others with him considered that separation a prerequisite of capitalist development. Cf. the discussion of the distinctive position of workers in African countries by Lloyd A. Falters, “Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States”, in Geertz, ed., op. tit., pp. 187–190. See also Lambert, Richard D., “The Impact of Urban Society upon Village Life”, in Turner, Roy, ed., India's Urban Future (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 117–140Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ In these respects there are of course striking differences between France and England which can be considered symptomatic of the radical and the conservative approach to education and conscription. For a comparative treatment of these issues cf. Ernest Barker, The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, Chs. 2 and 5.

¹⁰⁹ The circularity of this statement is unavoidable. In a general sense pursuits engaging the intellect refer to the creation and maintenance (transmission) of cultural values, but each of these terms (cultural values, creation, maintenance, transmission) is the subject of constant debate, and that debate itself is an important intellectual pursuit. Since this debate involves the pejorative as well as appreciative use of these terms, and by that token the endeavor of speakers to “belong” to the positive side of the cultural process (in however marginal a fashion), no one set of defining terms will be wholly satisfactory. In view of this difficulty the most reasonable alternative is to set up a typology of intellectual pursuits and leave the group of persons called “intellectuals” undefined. For one such attempt cf. Geiger, Theodor, Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1949), pp. 1–24, 81–101Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ Cf. the case study of this process in England by Lowenthal, Leo and Fiske, Marjorie, “The Debate over Art and Popular Culture”, in Komarovsky, Mirra, ed., Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957), pp. 33–112Google Scholar.

¹¹¹ I avoid the term “alienation” because misuse has made it worthless. For a scholarly treatment of this intellectual response to “bourgeois society” in nineteenth-century Europe cf. Karl Loewith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, passim. Cf. also the analysis of the social distance between “intellectuals” and “practical men” in Joseph Schumpeter, op. cit., pp. 145“155 as well as the unusual acceptance of that distance by at least one great artist, William Faulkner, who speaks of writers “steadily occupied by trying to do the impossible” while keeping “out of the way of the practical and busy people who carry the burden of America”. See Faulkner's speech on the occasion of receiving the National Book Award in The New York Times Book Review, February 6, 1955, p. 2.Google Scholar

¹¹² See Shils, E. A., “Intellectuals, Public Opinion and Economic Development”, World Politics, Vol. 10 (1958), pp. 232–255CrossRefGoogle Scholar.