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A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894–1896
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 June 2009
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In the period 1894–96, when the Ottoman Empire was ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, tens of thousands of Armenians were massacred. Nineteen years later, when the empire was weakened by disintegration and war, some one million persons—half of the Armenian population—were killed with the active participation of the Committee of Union and Progress, the ruling party of the day. The massacres and the genocide—for that is what the second act of violence has come to be called—must rank among the most terrible catastrophes of our era. Two questions come to mind: why did these things happen, and what is there to be learned from the Armenian case? We shall attempt to answer these two questions, keeping in mind that for historical events of such complexity and magnitude there are no final answers, merely more or less credible, more or less convincing, formulations. And given the obvious limitations, this article will focus on the massacres alone.
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- Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1982
References
Though often they questioned my interpretations, and the views in this essay are my own, the following colleagues were most helpful in their criticisms: V. Azarya, D. Caputo, R. Davison, A. Fisher, M. Halabian, M. Hale, J. Romberg, M. Ma'oz, R. E. Melson, E. Nordlinger, D. Ronen, M. Young, S. Zelniker, and M. Zonis. I am especially grateful to Vahakn N. Dadrian, Richard G. Hovannisian, and Jacob Landau. Earlier versions of this study were presented at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Tel-Aviv University; the Holocaust Study Group, Purdue University; the Africana Studies Center, Purdue University; and the G. E. von Grunebaum Center for Middle-Eastern Studies, U.C.L. A. I would also like to thank the Harry S. Truman Research Institute of Hebrew University and the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University for their support.
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44 A brief methodological point is in order here: despite writers such as Edwin Pears who argue that Abdul Hamid was a sadist and insane, it is not, for our purposes, necessary to probe the ego-defensive functions of the sultan's ideology and actions. As will be seen, given the prevailing ideology concerning dhimmis and given the sultan's position and power, we can account for his attitudes and intentions without resorting to depth psychology. See Pears, Life of Abdul Hamid, and Greenstein, Fred I., Politics and Personality (New York: Norton, 1975).Google Scholar
45 For a discussion of the millet system and of the role of dhimmis in it, see, among others, Gibb, H. A. R. and Bowen, Harold, Islamic Society and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965);Google ScholarLewis, B., Pellat, Ch., and Schacht, J., eds. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition (London: Luzak & Co., 1961), 227–31;Google ScholarLewis, Bernard and Braude, Benjamin, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Holmes and Meier, forthcoming)Google Scholar. That sacred principles were involved in Abdul Hamid's own mind becomes clear in the sultan's attempts to reinstate the caliphate and to make the Ottoman Empire the center of world Muslim culture. Shaws, , 259–60.Google Scholar
46 The conscription was a practice whereby Orthodox Christian boys (most Armenians and Jews were excluded) were recruited as slaves for the sultan's household or for the army. Though at first resented, in time it became a gateway to high position. After the sixteenth century the practice was discontinued. Gibb, and Bowen, , Islamic Society, 210.Google Scholar
47 In the case of the Bulgarians, “so complete was their absorption in the Greek millet that in the first place there is actually no mention of them by name in Ottoman official documents … and in the second their very existence as a people was almost unknown in Europe even to students of Slavonic literature as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century.” Gibb, and Bowen, , Islamic Society, 234.Google Scholar
48 Gibb and Bowen, Ibid., 232.
49 Hovannisian, , Armenia on the Road to Independence, 25.Google Scholar
50 Through Armenians were barred from bearing arms and defending themselves by force, in practice, as we have seen in Sassoun, some Armenian communities had recourse to weapons. These always had to be smuggled and hidden. When used, they endangered the community because of Hamidiye repression.
51 “Christians came to be regarded as the natural allies of the external enemy.” Gibb, and Bowen, , Islamic Society, 232.Google Scholar
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53 This point is of course made by many writers, most notably Bernard Lewis in his classic study, The Emergence of Modern Turkey; for a recent discussion, see the excellent essay of Davison, “Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem.”
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56 Ibid., 212.
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60 Britain, Great, Correspondence, Sessional Papers, c. 7894, Inclosure 1 in No. 35, 4 November 1897.Google Scholar
61 Ibid.
62 Kemal, , Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, 255–56.Google Scholar
63 Hovannisian, Richard G., Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1.Google Scholar See, as well, Sarkiss, H. J., “The Armenian Renaissance, 1500–1863.” Journal of Modern History, 9 (12 1937), 433–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
64 According to the figures of the Armenian patriarchate, by 1901–2, there were 483 Armenian schools manned by 897 teachers educating 29,054 boys and 7,785 girls in the territory of the 6 vilayets. For the empire as a whole, there were 903 Armenian schools, 2,088 teachers, and a student population of 59,513 boys and 21,713 girls. See Britain, Great, The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916; documents presented to Viscount Grey ofFallo- don, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London: H.M.S.O., 1916), 662–63.Google Scholar For education data on the empire as a whole, including Muslim students, see Shaws, 112, Table 2.2; and 113, Table 2.3; and 244, Table 3.15.
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66 Vahakn N. Dadrian notes that “even though they represented a mere 12 percent of the total population of the Ottoman Empire … the Armenians dominated the fields of banking and money lending … moreover, by the second half of the nineteenth century, clothing manufacturing, mining, shipping, and milling were mostly controlled by Armenians.” See his “The Structural and Functional Components of Genocide: A Victimological Approach to the Armenian Case,” in Drapkin, Israel and Viano, Emilio, eds., Victimology (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1975), 127.Google Scholar In a private correspondence, however, Hovannisian has noted, “Your thesis of difficulties for minorities at times of upward mobility is, of course, logical and seems borne out of many other instances. In the Armenian case, too, the threshold of tolerance decreased while corruption and anarchy increased, creating explosive circumstances. Yet also in the Armenian experience it should be remembered that there was not just one national experience in the empire…. The Armenians of Constantinople and the coastal city, together with those in the bureaucracy, were experiencing rapid economic and cultural upward mobility. And while the same could be said on a more retarded basis for those of the interior provinces in matters of education, cultural endeavors, and national consciousness, this was not always true economically. Many regions in the eastern provinces were actually more impoverished at the end of the nineteenth century than ever before. The large migration of peasants toward the cities was in part due to that impoverishment, together with the growing physical insecurity caused by breakdown of authority and unbridled raids. This disparity does not necessarily detract from your thesis but notice should be given to it.” Letter received from Hovannisian, Richard G. 25 September 1979.Google Scholar
67 Hepworth, George Hughes, Through Armenia on Horseback (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1898), 339.Google Scholar
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