This article is based in part on a paper prepared for the XIII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, July 1985. I would like to thank Norman Cloutier, Mark Kann. Thomas Moore, and Raymond Plant for their suggestions in writing this article.

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⁵ The claim here is not that ideas cause events. Rather, it is similar to that made by Tholfsen, Trygve in Ideology and Revolution in Modern Europe: An Essay on the Role of Ideas in History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984)Google Scholar: unlike the extrinsic relations that govern physical nature, human society is influenced by intrinsic logical and conceptual relations that are embedded in antecedent traditions and beliefs—among the most powerful of which are political ideologies. See Tholfsen, 2–3. Where causation lies cannot be determined; where influence lies is explored in studies such as that undertaken here.

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⁷ Robert Behrens locates the fault line in the Conservative Party between the Ditchers, who have bought into the postwar politics of statism, and the Diehards, who insist on the “true faith” of the free market and personal responsibility. The libertarian-traditionalist distinction differs in assessing the historical dimension of this split and its impact on current policy. Traditionalists, in our view, deviate only when they compromise Burke; and the faith of the Diehards, as Behrens allows, is in an adaptation of utilitarianism and laissez faire, not the conservative tradition. Cf.Behrens, , “Diehards and Ditchers in Contemporary Conservative Politics,” The Political Quarterly, 50 (07–09 1979), 287–88, 292CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem. The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher (London: Saxon House, 1980), 7–9, 39Google Scholar. For terminology used in the analysis of developments in Great Britain, see the distinction between the New Right and the Tory Far-right in Dunleavy, Patrick, “Analysing British Politics,” in Developments in British Politics, Drucker, Henry, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 292–93Google Scholar; the discussion of Drys and Wets in Butt, Ronald, “Thatcherissima: The Politics of Thatcherism,” Policy Review, 26 (Fall 1983), 30–35Google Scholar. Cf.Felker, Lon and Thompson, Robert, “The Intellectual Roots of Economic Conservatism in the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations,” Journal of the North Carolina Political Science Association, 3 (1983), 38–55.Google Scholar

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⁹ For a critique of Hayek's argument in this respect, see Plant, Raymond, “Hirsch, Hayek, and Habermas: The Dilemmas of Distribution,” in Dilemmas of Liberal Democracies, Ellis, A. and Kumar, K., eds. (London and New York: Tavistock, 1983), 45–64Google Scholar.

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¹⁶ Nixon is reported to have specifically endorsed the “Tory men, liberal principles” theory of policy innovation. Ibid., 214–15.

¹⁷ Ibid., 374–75; Leman, Christopher, The Collapse of Welfare Reform (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), 92Google Scholar.

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¹⁹ Ibid., 202–7.

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²⁹ Nathan, Richard and Doolittle, Fred, “Reagan's Surprising Domestic Achievement,” Wall Street Journal, 18 09 1984, p. 28.Google Scholar

³⁰ Weicher, John (American Enterprise Institute), “Welfare ‘Reforms’ Will Stick,” Chicago Tribune, 16 08 1984, p. 27Google Scholar. The president indicated that total spending on the poor went up during his administration, but that was the effect of the recession on the size of entitlement populations.

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³⁶ Congressional Budget Office projections, February 1983, cited in “The Combined Effectsof Major Changes in Federal Taxes and Spending Programs since 1981,7” staff memorandum, April 1984, prepared by the staff of the Human Resources and Community Development and Tax Analysis Division of the Congressional Budget Office, Table 3, p. 7a.

³⁷ Newsweek, (9 09 1985), 24Google Scholar. This is the lowest percentage recorded for the bottom 40 percent since the Census Bureau began collecting this data in 1947.

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⁴⁰ Noble, Kenneth, “Study Finds 60% of 11 Million Who Lost Jobs Got New Ones,” New York Times, 6 02 1986, p. 1Google Scholar. Noble reports that “the study said a large proportion of the displaced workers were middle-aged people in manufacturing ‘with long and stable job histories,’ rather than young people who change jobs often,” and estimated that the program instituted in 1982 to deal with displaced workers reached no more than 5 percent of them.

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⁵⁶ Hoskyns, John, “Conservatism Is Not Enough,” Political Quarterly, 55 (01–03 1984), 10–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The government is also criticized by the libertarians for being “inadequately radical.” See Thomas, Hugh (chairman of the (Conservative) Centre for Social Studies), “The Fruits of Conservatism,” New Society, 67:13 (1984), 435–36.Google Scholar

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⁷⁰ Lelyveld, Joseph, “Thatcher Government Upset over a Critical Church Report,” New York Times, 2 12 1985, p. 11Google Scholar.

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⁷² Behrens, , Conservative Party, 118Google Scholar. Cf. “Thatcher's Answer to Deficits: Tax!” Will, George, Los Angeles Times, 30 09 1983, sec. II, p. 7, col. 1Google Scholar; and Riddell, Peter, The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984)Google Scholar.

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⁷⁴ See Medcalf, Linda and Dolbeare, Kenneth, Neopolitics (New York: Random House, 1985), 50–51Google Scholar. Cf.Dolbeare, Kenneth, Democracy at Risk (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984), xii–xiiiGoogle Scholar.

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⁷⁶ This is the general argument of Bowles and Gintis, Adam Przeworski, and Immanuel Wallerstein and others. Cf.Slessarev, Helene, “Two Great Society Programs in an Age of Reaganomics” (Paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Convention, Chicago, 04 1984), 3–5Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Cf. British traditionalist Scruton, Roger, The Meaning of Conservatism (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1980), 127–28Google Scholar, and American traditionalist Kirk, Russell, “The Problem of Community,” in his A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Regnery, 1962), ch. 6, esp. 140–42Google Scholar.

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⁷⁹ According to Federal Reserve Board data, the annual net acquisition of United States assets by foreigners has more than tripled in the period 1980–85. Cf. Andrew Gamble's distinction between “liberal political economy” and “national political economy” in Gamble, Britain In Decline, 133 et passim.

⁸⁰ Cf.Wright, Patrick, On Living in an Old Country (London: Verso New Left Books, 1985)Google Scholar.

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