¹ Esmein, A., “La maxime Princeps legibus solutus est dans l'ancien droit public français”, Essays in Legal History, ed. Vinogradoff, P. (Oxford, 1913), pp. 201–214.Google Scholar

² Accursius died between 1259 and 1263. On the chronology of his life and work see Genzmer, E., “Zur Lebensgeschichte des Accursius”, Festschrift für Leopold Wenger, Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung and antiken Rechtsgeschichte, XXXV (1945), pp. 223–241.Google Scholar

³ For modern literature concerning the autonomy of medieval kingdoms with respect to papacy and empire see “Some Recent Works on the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists”, Traditio, X (1954), pp. 594–625Google Scholar. On the question of internal sovereignty see David, M., La souveraineté et les limites juridiques du pouvoir monarchique (Paris, 1954)Google Scholar and, especially, Kantorowicz, Ernst H., The King's Two Bodies (Princeton, 1957)Google Scholar. The present state of the whole question is reviewed by Post, Gaines, “Ratio publicae utilitatis, ratio status and ‘Staatsrason’ (1100–1300 )”, Die Welt als Geschichte, XXI (No. 2, 1961), pp. 8–28, 71–99. Post discusses and argues against the views of various historians, including Meinecke, Kern, Gilbert, Friedrich, who, although starting from different premises, all treat the emergence of the state as a post-medieval phenomenon.Google Scholar

⁴ R. W., and Carlyle, A. J., A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West (Edinburgh, 1903–1936), II, p. 75.Google Scholar

⁵ Mcllwain, C. H., The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York, 1932), p. 383,Google Scholar“Esmein has shown how the truly absolutist Roman doctrine of monarchy affected the monarchy of France …”; idem, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (Ithaca, 1940), pp. 43–68Google Scholar. See also Mcllwain's remarks on law, Roman in “Mediaeval Institutions in the Modern World”, Speculum, XVI (07, 1941), pp. 275–283Google Scholar and in “The English Common Law, Barrier Against Absolutism”, American Historical Review, XLIX (10, 1943) pp. 23–31Google Scholar. On the same theme see also Neuner, R., “The Democratic Spirit of the Roman Law and the Common Law”, Seminar, III (1945), pp. 57–68.Google Scholar

⁶ On this see especially Post, Gaines, “Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies”, Traditio, I (1943), pp. 355–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, , “A Romano-Canonical Maxim ‘Quod Omnes Tangit’ in Bracton”, Traditio, IV (1946), pp. 197–251Google Scholar; Congar, Yves, “Quod Omnes Tangit ab Omnibus Tractari et Approbari Debet”, Revue historique de droit français étranger, XXXV (No. 2, 1958), pp. 210–259Google Scholar. Riesenberg, P. N. has dealt with the relationship between public utility and inalienability of public rights in Accursius and other medieval Roman lawyers, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Thought (New York, 1956), pp. 68–79Google Scholar. Gilmore's, M. P.Argument from Roman Law in Political Thought 1200–1600 (Cambridge, Mass., 1941)Google Scholar, was concerned with the imperium of inferior magistrates as a factor limiting the absolute authority of the Prince. For constitutional ideas among the canonists contemporary with Accursius I may refer to my own Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (Cambridge, 1955)Google Scholar and “Pope and Council: Some New Decretist Texts”, Mediaeval Studies, XIX (1957), pp. 197–218.Google Scholar

⁷ Dawson, John P., A History of Lay Judges (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London, 1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ For a general survey of the growth of legislative activity in the thirteenth century with references to the modern literature, see Sten Gagnér, Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Gesetzgebung (Uppsala, 1960)Google Scholar. On England in particular see Plucknett, T.F.T., Legislation of Edward I (Oxford, 1949)Google Scholar and Gough, J. W., Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford, 1953)Google Scholar; for France Langmuir, G. I., “ludei Nostri' and the Beginning of Capetian Legislation”, Traditio, XVI (1960), pp. 203–239CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Odenheimer, M. J., Der christliche-kirchliche Anteil an der Verdrangung der Vorherschaft des staatlich gesetzen Rechts (Basle, 1957).Google Scholar

⁹ The problems to be considered do not arise in the same way in countries with written constitutions that provide for judicial review of legislation. In these cases it is much easier to see analogies with medieval concepts of fundamental law.

¹⁰ Marshall, G., Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth (Oxford, 1957), pp. 267–272Google Scholar provides a good bibliography of modern writing on the problems of sovereignty in England and the Commonwealth, much of it critical of Austinian concepts. He includes some of the work by analytical philosophers as well as that of the constitutional lawyers. See too Heuston, R.F.V., Essays in Constitutional Law (London, 1961)Google Scholar. Bertrand de Jouvenel, drawing on French rather than English constitutional experiency and on anthropological data, has also criticised positivist conceptions of sovereignty as in consistent with the real structure of modern states in his Sovereignty, transl. J. F. Huntingdon (Cambridge, 1957). In America Jacques Maritain even suggested that, since the word “sovereignty” is inextricably associated in our minds with the ideas of Hobbes, Rousseau and Austin, and since these ideas are essentially alien to the nature of the modern Western state, we ought to abandon the use of the word altogether, Man and the State (Chicago, 1951), pp. 28–53Google Scholar. For the latest round in the continuing argument concerning the nature of governmental authority between American upholders of “classical natural right” and exponents of “empirical social science” see S. Rothman, “The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Critique”, and Cropsey, J., ‘A Reply to Rothman’, American Political Science Review, LVI (06, 1962), pp. 341–352 and pp. 353–359. It is unnecessary for us to take sides in this dispute. Neither a commitment to the doctrine of natural rights nor, I trust, an enthusiasm for empirical observation could lead to the conclusion that Austin's system or Rousseau's provides an adequate model for understanding the structure and functioning of modern constitutional states.Google Scholar

¹¹ J. N. Figgis, in his Birkbeck lectures of 1900, was perhaps the first to challenge the view that “there is no Austinian sovereign in the medieval state”, finding a doctrine “substantially the same as Austin's” in medieval canonistic theories of papal authority. See his Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius (Reprinted, New York, 1960), pp. 20Google Scholar, 65–66. He was no doubt influenced by Gierke's view that Innocent IV's legal theory of corporations opened the way for the growth of “antique-modern” conceptions of the state in place of the pre-existing “properly medieval” ones. More commonly Marsilius of Padua has been favored as a candidate for the role of “the prophet of modern times … the most modern of mediaeval thinkers” (as Previté-Orton called him). D'Entrèves, A. P., Natural Law (London, 1951), p. 75Google Scholar, found in the Defensor Pads an anticipation of the general will theory and considered Marsilius “a striking and untimely fore-runner” of Rousseau. The relationship between the two thinkers was examined in more detail by S. Stelling-Michaud, “De Marsile de Padoue á Jean-Jacques Rousseau”, Bulletin de l'Institut National Genevois, LIV (1951), pp. 1–35Google Scholar. Gewirth preferred to emphasise the novelty of the Austinian element in Marsilius, “Thus in contrast to the entire medieval tradition which insisted that a law which is not just … is not a law at all, Marsilius makes the positivist aspect of coerciveness basic”,Google ScholarMarsilius of Padua. The Defender of the Peace, II (New York, 1956), p. xxxvi.Google Scholar Most recently Wilks, M. J. has discovered anticipations of both Austin and Rousseau in the works of Augustinus Triumphus, “The Idea of the Church as ‘Unus homo perfectus’ and Its Bearing on the Medieval Theory of Sovereignty”, Miscellanea Historiae Ecclesiasticae. Stockholm 1960 (Louvain, 1961), pp. 33–49Google Scholar at pp. 33–34, “This theory of sovereignty … was a true theory of sovereignty in the Austinian sense, and went far beyond the hesitations and retractions of a Bodin or Hobbes … The theory of sovereignty is, in fact, not the least of the contributions which the Medieval Church had to make to the modern world.” For Rousseau see p. 46. Ehler, S. Z., in his essay “On Applying the Modern Word ‘State’ to the Middle Ages”, Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J. (Dublin, 1961), pp. 492–501, is concerned mainly with external sovereignty. He strongly emphasises the “universalist organising forces” of the Middle Ages but blankly ignores develnnments in enntemnnrary Fnrnne In writing ahnnt the “mndern” state his gaze seems firmly fixed on mid-nineteenth century European realities rather than on mid-twentieth century ones.Google Scholar

¹² The most explicit attempt along these lines was the fine essay of Latham, R. T. E., The Law and the Commonwealth (Oxford, 1949). On his views see below, p. 397.Google Scholar

¹³ Dicey, A. V., The Law of the Constitution (8th ed., London, 1927), p. 198.Google ScholarJouvenel, De, op. cit., pp. 297–298.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Hart, H. L. A. (New York, 1954), Lecture VI, p. 254, “Now it follows…that the power of a monarch properly so called, or the power of a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is incapable of legal limitation.”Google Scholar

¹⁵ Several aspects of this ambivalence have been intricately worked out by Kantorowicz, Ernst H., op. cit., pp. 97–192.Google Scholar

¹⁶ E.g. on divine origin Dig. Prologue (Constitutio Deo auctore) and Nov. 73.1; on popular origin Inst. 1.2.6, Cod. 1.17.1, Dig. 1.4.1. In subsequent notes quotations from Accursius are taken from the glossed edition of the Corpus luris Civilis of Lyons, 1627. But since the numeration of titles varies in the different early editions all references to texts of Roman law are given to the standard modern edition of Mommsen, Krueger, Schoell and Kroll (Reprinted, Berlin, 1954).

¹⁷ Inst. 1.2.6 and Cod. 1.14.8.

¹⁸ Dig. 1.3.31 and Cod. 1.14.4.

¹⁹ Gloss ad Dig. 1.1.1.2. Accursius wrote that public law existed to preserve the state, lest it perish, “ad statum conservandum, ne pereat.”

²⁰ Gloss ad Dig. 1.3.31. In all subsequent quotations in the text Accursius's references (which cited Book and Title by name and the first words of the relevant law) have been transposed into modem numerical references. In the passage quoted above the reference to Cod. 6.23.3 is given incorrectly, though this is certainly the law intended. The reference should read Cod. de testa. 1. ex imperfecto.

²¹ Dist. 8 c.2 (Rubric), “Adversus naturale ius nulli quidquam agere licet.”

²² Dig. 4.8.4, “Nam magistratus superiore aut pari imperio nullo modo possunt cogi.”

²³ Dig. 4.8.51, “Si de re sua quis arbiter factus sit, sententiam dicere non potest, quia se facere iubeat aut petere prohibeat: neque autem imperare sibi neque se prohibere quisquam potest.”

²⁴ Gloss ad Inst. 2.17.8, “Vivimus, id est vivere volumus ut hic et Cod. de leg, et consti. prin. 1. digna vox et facit ff de leg. ii 1. quod principi et 1. seq. et ff de leg. iii 1. ex imperfecto et ff de inoffi. test. 1. Papinianus § si Imperator.” Gloss ad Dig. 32.1.23, “Inverecundum, i.e. valde verecundtun, sic supra de liberis postu. 1. Gallus § illo, et facit C. de testament. i. iii et qui testamenta facere possunt 1. cum heres et Institut. quibus modis testamenta infirmantur § fin. et C. de legibus et const. I. digna et sup. de iud. 1. non quicquid.” An investigation of these references produces no more glosses of major significance except those on the lex Digna discussed below.

²⁵ Gloss ad Cod. 6.23.3, “Lex imperil, id est lex regia, dando supremam potestatem principi ut Instit. de iur. na. § sed et quod principi. Et eximit eum a solennibus iuris, ut licet non observet in testamentis et in aliis solennia iuris, tamen nemo sit qui ea possit infirmare ut ff de arbit. 1. nam magistratus.”

²⁶ On the leges de imperio see Schulz, F., “Bracton on Kingship”, English Historical Review, LX (05, 1945), pp. 136–176CrossRefGoogle Scholar and, for a surviving example, Riccobono, S., Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani I (Florence, 1941), pp. 154–156. Schulz argued that it was Justinian's compilers, not the glossators (as Esmein asserted), who first substituted an absolutist principle for the constitutional law of classical times. He maintained, however, that the glossators faithfully adhered to the absolutist doctrine that they found ready-made in their texts.Google Scholar

²⁷ Inst. 1.2.6, “Sed et quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem concessit.”

²⁸ Gloss ad Dig. 4.8.4, “Imperio, scil magistrates. Et sic nota quod par parem cogere non potest ut hie et C. de ap. 1. praecipimus § penult, et i. ad Treb. 1. ille a quo § tempestivum et C. de leg. et const. 1. digna.” See also the glosses ad Dig. 32.1.23 and Inst. 1.2.6 quoted above. The other law cited in this group, Cod. 6.61.7, referred to the special privileges attached to donations from the emperor. The gloss there has nothing relevant to our theme.

²⁹ Cod. 1.14.4, “Digna vox maiestate regnantis legibus alligatum se principem profiteri: adeo de auctoritate iuris nostra pendet auctoritas: et re vera maius imperio est submittere legibus principatum: et oraculo praesentis edicti quod nobis licere non patimur indicamus.”

³⁰ Gloss ad Cod. 1.14.4, “Digna vox. Ponit casum et eius rationem et commendationem et exemplum. Sed quomodo est digna vox cum sit falsum ut ff eo. 1. princeps et ff de leg. iii 1. ex imperfecto et in auth. de consulibus § fin. col. iiii et i. de testa. 1. ex imperfecto? Resp. digna est si dicat se velle non quod sit ut Instit. quib. mod. testa infir. § fin et in praealleg. l. ex imperfecto. Alii dicunt quod hie permittitur mentiri ut Instit. de act. § aliae, quod non placet.”

³¹ Gloss ad Cod. 1.14.4, “De auctoritate. Haec est ratio primi dicti et quod dicit iuris, scilicet legis regiae quae est de imperio transferendo de populo in principem ut Instit. de iur. nat. § set et quod princ. et i. de vete. iu. enu. 1. i § hoc etiam.”

³² Gloss ad Cod. 1.14.4, “Principatum, sub. quam leges principatui sive imperio, q.d. maior est honor, et maior est convenientia cum imperium sit de fortuna, unde dicitur “Si fortuna volet, fies de rhetore consul. Si volet haec eadem, fies de consule rhetor.” At leges sunt divino nutu prolatae ut i. de praescrip. long. tern. 1. fin. et sic immutabiles.” The last words can only mean that laws which actually existed were to be rigorously observed, not that existing laws could never be changed. The latter position would have been impossible for any interpreter of Roman law.

³³ Gloss ad Cod. 7.33.12, “Divino. Nota divinitus leges factas ff de legib. et senatusc. 1. lex est (Dig. 1.3.2)…”

³⁴ Dig. 1.3.2, “Lex est cui omnes decet obedire, propter alia multa et maxime quia omnis lex inventum ac munus deorum est, decretum vero prudentum hominum, coercitio eorum qui sponte vel ignorantia delinquuntur, communis sponsio civitatis, ad cuius praescriptum omnes qui in ea respublica sunt, vitam instituere debent.”

³⁵ Kantorowicz, Hermann, The Definition of Law (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 32, 50. Kantorowicz understood of course that there could be a conflict between some particular law and some particular tenet of a moral or religious system. His point was that virtually all ethical systems ascribe a value to the maintenance of law in general, and that if any society adopted a system of belief that failed to do so, e.g. radical anarchism, “law would cease to function.”Google Scholar

³⁶ It should be noted that, although the Institutes stated that the emperor's will was a source of law, they did not by any means assert that it was the only source. The words, “Sed et quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem” came after several sections describing other modes of legislation. The significance of the particle et has recently been discussed by Kantorowicz, Ernst H.The King's Two Bodies, p. 103.Google Scholar

³⁷ Accursius did not discuss in detail the problem of tyranny, of persistent disobedience to the law by the Prince, but it must have been obvious enough to any writer in the first half of the thirteenth century that illegal actions by the ruler were likely to evoke extra-legal remedies. The point is that, unless the law was maintained, the whole system—which included the powers of the Prince—was not viable in theory or practice.

³⁸ Goodhart, A. L., English Law and the Moral Law (London, 1953), pp. 50–62.Google Scholar

³⁹ G. Marshall, op. cit., p. 39.

⁴⁰ R. T. E. Latham, op. cit., p. 523.

⁴¹ Gloss ad Inst. 1.2.6, “Placuit, causa faciendi communem legem et generalem: alias non esset lex communis ut sequitur et C. de sent. et interl. om. iud. 1. ex stipulatione. Nam ibi dicitur, non omnis vox iudicis est sententia: et sic non omnis vox principis est lex.”

⁴² Gloss ad Cod. 1.14.12, “Si imperialis. Hanc legem intellige in his quae non sunt decisa per leges ut in feudo et similibus: in aliis enim potius legem servaremus scriptam cum haec sententia non sit lex constituta sicuti debet constitui ut s. eo. 1. humanum (Cod. 1.14.8).”

⁴³ Cod. 1.22.6, “Omnes cuiuscumque maioris vel minoris administrationis universae nostrae rei publicae iudices monemus, ut nullum rescriptum, nullam pragmaticam sanctionem, nullam sacram adnotationem, quae generali iuri vel utilitati publicae adversa esse videatur in disceptatione cuiuslibet litigii patiantur proferri, sed generates sacral constitutiones modis omnibus non dubitent observandas.”

⁴⁴ On the related principle, “The Prince has all the laws in the shrine of his breast”, see Gillmann, F., “Romanus pontifex iura omnia in scrinio pectoris sui censetur habere”, Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht, XCII (1912), pp. 3–17Google Scholar and Ernst Kantorowicz, H., op. cit., pp. 153–154Google Scholar. The medieval argumentation about “implicit” repeal of legislation by subsequent contrary acts of the sovereign has been repeated (unconsciously of course) in the modern constitutional disputes to which we have referred. See Marshall, G., op. cit., pp. 33ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Gloss ad Cod. 1.22.6. The whole subject was considered at length there and then again at Dig. 1.4.1.

⁴⁶ Heuston, R. F. V., op. cit., pp. 6, 28.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The position of Bracton is discussed in detail in the article “Bracton on Govern. ment”, Speculum, XXXVIII (1963).Google Scholar