The author would like to thank Shannon R. Brown, Joe Moore, Beverley Hooper, and the CSSH reviewer for many carefully considered and helpful comments.

¹ Chesneaux, J., “The Chinese Labour Force in the First Part of the Twentieth Century,” in The Economic Development of China and Japan, Cowan, C. D., ed. (London, 1964), 124–25.Google Scholar

² In Britain, this was called the subcontract system (see Taylor, A. J., “The Sub-contract System in the British Coal Industry,” in Studies in the Industrial Revolution, Pressnell, L. S., ed. (London, 1960), 215–35),Google Scholar but the normal terminology in the literature on China is used here. The system is referred to as the gang-boss system in Brugger, W., Democracy and Organization in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise (1948–1953) (Cambridge, 1976), 42.Google Scholar

³ For some discussion of this, see Toshiyoshi, Okabe, “Shina bōsekigyō ni okeru rōdō ukeoi seido,” Tōa keizai ronsō, 1:1 (02 1941), 220–21.Google Scholar

⁴ Chesneaux, J., The Chinese Labor Movement, Wright, H. M., trans. (Stanford, 1968), 57.Google Scholar

⁵ Torgashev, B. P., “Mining Labor in China,” Chinese Economic Journal, 6:5 (05 1930), 533.Google Scholar

⁶ Ting, Leonard G., “The Coal Industry in China,” Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly, 10:2 (07 1937), 243.Google Scholar

⁷ Jiu Zhongguo de zibenzhuyi shengchan guanxi bianxiezu, Jiu Zhongguo de zibenzhuyi shengchan guanxi (Beijing, 1977), 180. This work also stresses the preexistence of a feudal Chinese institution which was readily available for use by foreign capital.Google Scholar

⁸ Chuan-hwa, Lowe, Facing Labour Issues in China (London, 1934), 20;Google Scholarkaigisho, Tokyo shōkō, Chosabu, , ed. Shina keizai nempō (Tokyo, 1936), 544;Google ScholarChesneaux, , Chinese Labor Movement, 60.Google Scholar

⁹ Elvin, M., The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, 1973), 281.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Horihiro, Furubayashi, “Sōdai no kōshō to sono soshiki,” Tōhōgaku, 33 (01 1967), 35–36.Google Scholar

¹¹ Jiu Zhongguo, 189.Google Scholar

¹² See Suguru, Yokoyama, “Shindai ni okeru hōtōsei no tenkai,” Shigaku zasshi; 71:1, 2 (1962),Google Scholar and Takanobu, Terada, “Soshū tempugyo no keiei keitai,” Bungakubu kenkyū nempō, 18 (1968), 121–72.Google Scholar The system originated in the rapid expansion of the industry in the late Ming, necessitating a scale of operation by the wholesale merchants which was beyond their capacity for direct management. Even in the Qing, the contractor, who had at first been a mere intermediary, did not directly hire his artisans; rather, they in turn worked on contract. This was similar to the sweating system in the nineteenth-century British and American tailoring industries. A major difference between the operation of the system in premodern Suzhou and in twentieth-century Shanghai was that in the former case the contractor's monopoly was enforced by law, but in Shanghai it was merely a matter of practice.

¹³ Sun, E-tu Zen, “Mining Labor in the Ch'ing Period,” in Approaches to Modern Chinese History, Feuerwerker, A., ed. (Berkeley, 1967), 59–61.Google Scholar Memorial by Zexu, Lin in Xu Yunnan tongzhi gao, Wenshao, Wang, ed. (Yuechixian, Sichuan, 1900) 43:7.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Seiji, Imahori, “Hatōsei,” in Ajia rekishijiten, Shigeki, Kaizuka et al. , eds., 10 vols. (Tokyo, 1962), VII, 393.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For the baojia system, see Kung-chuan, Hsiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, 1960), ch. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Modern coal mines were concentrated almost exclusively in north China, as indicated by the fact that only two of these thirty-three mines were situated south of the Yangzi.

¹⁷ The same situation was found in India (see Buchanan, D. H., The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India (New York, 1934), 270)Google Scholar and in Staffordshire (see “Report on the Charter Master System,” British Parliamentary Papers, Reports, 1907, XIV, 404).Google Scholar

¹⁸ This paragraph does not mean that the lower the proportion of contract labor at any mine the higher was the proportion of skilled workers. The differences are much more likely to result from whether or not surface workers were included in the contract labor system. In the two cases where Table 1 gives a proportion of contract workers of under half, the figures are open to doubt.

¹⁹ South Manchurian Railway Company (hereafter SMR), chōsaka, Shomubu, Kairan tankō chōsa shiryō (Dairen, 1929), 107;Google ScholarKuangye zhoubao (hereafter KYZB), 180 (28 February 1932), 177–78.Google Scholar This was the case not only at Kailuan; for Jingxing, see KYZB, 152 (28 July 1931), 891–94;Google Scholar for Liujiang, see KYZB, 143 (21 May 1931), 747–49.Google Scholar

²⁰ SMR, Rōmuka, Minami Manshū kōzan rōdō jijo (Dairen, 1931), 33–34;Google ScholarTorgashev, , “Mining Labor,” 539;Google Scholar“Labour Management at the Fushun Coal Mines,” Contemporary Manchuria, 2:5 (09 1938), 41–44.Google Scholar

²¹ Taylor, “Sub-contract System,” passim; Pollard, S., The Genesis of Modern Management (London, 1965), 38–43,Google Scholar from which book the phrase “a method of evading management” used in the title of this paper was taken. Imahori, , “Hatōsei,” 393;Google Scholarkenkyūjo, Nihon keizaishiNihon keizaishi jiten, 2 vols. and index (Tokyo, 1940), II, 1357;Google ScholarReport ofthe Royal Commission on Labour in India (H.M.S.O., 1931) (hereafter Report), 119;Google ScholarThompson, V., Labor Problems in Southeast Asia (New York, 1947), 201–202.Google Scholar For Russian mines, see McKay, J. P., Pioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885–1913 (Chicago, 1970), 254, 260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² Blackwell, W. L., The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, 1800–1860 (Princeton, 1968), 299;Google ScholarZwanenberg, R. M. A. van, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919–1939 (Kampala, 1975), ch. 6.Google Scholar

²³ Chesneaux, , Chinese Labor Movement, 57.Google ScholarNisaburō, MurakushiNinon tankō chin rōdō shiron (Tokyo, 1976), 87–88, 222;Google Scholar In Report, 116, the Royal Commission noted: “Most collieries recruit through a contractor. Some make a special contract for the supply of labour, which is then employed and paid by the mine management; but the more usual method is to employ a raising contractor to whom are assigned other important functions.” For the sardars, see International Labour Office, Industrial Labour in India (Geneva, 1938), 156.Google Scholar For the Chinese cotton industry, see Toshiyoshi, Okabe, “Shina bōseki rodo ukeoi seido no hattatsu,” Tōa keizai ronsō 1:3 (09 1941), 227–28.Google Scholar

²⁴ For Jingxing, see Lang, Gu, Zhongguo shi da kuangchang diaocha ji (Shanghai, 1916), sec. 6, p. 20.Google Scholar

²⁵ Imahori, , “Hatōsei,” 393;Google ScholarShina keizai nempō, 543.Google Scholar A detailed study of the Longyan iron mine in the late 1930s and early 1940s also provides evidence of close personal links between the contractor and his workers, and cities recruitment as one of the central tasks of the contractor. See Takatoshi, Nakamura, Hatō seido no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1944), 22.Google Scholar See also Okabe, , “Shina bōseki rōdo ukeoi seido no hattatsu,” 233–34.Google Scholar

²⁶ Bumpei, Sakamori, “Hoku-Shi tankōgyō ni okeru rōdō soshiki,” Mantetsu chōsa geppō 22:7 (07 1942), 60–61;Google Scholar SMR, chōsajo, Hoku-Shi keizai, Chūkō tankō rōdō gaiyō chōsa hōkoku (Beijing, 1941), 31–32. Both these references are to 1941, but there seems no reason to expect this to invalidate the findings. The Japanese found that after 1937 the contractors were unable to secure sufficient labor for the needs of Zhongxing.Google Scholar

²⁷ SMR, Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha dainiji jūnenshi (Dairen, 1928), 702.Google Scholar In 1917 1918, although output rose, the shortage of labor meant that production still fell short of demand and that therefore export sales dropped sharply.

²⁸ Minami Manshuū kōzan rōdō jijō, 6, 63ff.Google Scholar The direct involvement of the management in recruitment, however, caused problems when the workers were put to work under contractors, and it was found to be more difficult to keep discipline in such cases. Therefore the management later reverted to recruitment through the batou though management still covered the expenses for the recruiters and for the workers to come to the mine. Local labor was recruited by contractors throughout. See Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha dainiji jūnenshi, 565, and “Labour Management at Fushun,” 43–44.Google Scholar

²⁹ Torgashev, , “Mining Labor,” 539.Google Scholar

³⁰ This point is strongly made in Pollard, , Genesis of Modern Management, 39.Google Scholar

³¹ Murakushi, , Nihon tankō, 236, 317–19.Google Scholar Ashtpn and Sykes suggest, however, that in eighteenth-century England longwall was more conducive to the use of the butty than was stall-and-pillar (see Taylor, , “Sub-contract System,” 220,Google Scholar and Ashton, T. S. and Sykes, J., The Coal Industry of the Eighteenth Century, 2d ed. (Manchester, 1964), 111–12),Google Scholar though Griffin disputes this (see Griffin, A. R., The British Coalmining Industry, Retrospect and Prospect (Buxton, England, 1977), 111). Even if Ashton and Sykes are correct, the two interpretations are not necessarily contradictory, for at that time the general scale of production was smaller, favoring an individual contract in the stall-and-pillar and the butty in longwall.Google Scholar

³² Masao, Tezuka, “Shina tankō no dohō keitai,” Tōa kenkyū shohō 20 (02 1943), 165;Google Scholaridem, Shina jukōgyō hattatsushi (Kyoto, 1944), 274–75.Google Scholar

³³ For example, in Jiaozuo in Henan in the 1920s, the Zhongyuan Company leased out small mines in its area to contractors who hired their own labor and provided their own equipment. Where they could, the contractors sold to outside buyers at a price higher than that paid by thecompany but lower than that charged by Zhongyuan to its customers. This led to a serious conflict of interest between the two parties. See KYZB, 60 (28 08 1929), 179–80;Google ScholarKYZB, 67 (21 10 1929), 289, 299–300.Google Scholar In these mines the recruitment of labor was sometimes entrusted to subcontractors by the main contractors. See KYZB, 177 (7 February 1932), 129.Google Scholar For similar arrangements in other areas, see SMR, Chōsabu, , Shisen Hakusan Shōkyū tanden chōsa shiryō (Dairen, 1937), 476Google Scholar for Shandong and KYZB, 83 (21 02 1930), 549 for Anhui.Google Scholar

³⁴ KYZB, 142 ( 14 May 1931), 724.Google Scholar

³⁵ Shina keizai nempō, 544.Google Scholar

³⁶ Marakushi, , Nihon tankō 27–31, 205–10.Google Scholar

³⁷ Sakamori, , “Hoku–Shi tankōgyō,” 40–41, 45–46.Google Scholar

³⁸ Hansheng, Quan, Hanyeping gongsi shilue (Hongkong, 1972), 239–41;Google ScholarFeuerwerker, A., Economic Trends in the Republic of China, 1912–1949 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977), 38;Google ScholarSutcliffe, R. B., Industry and Underdevelopment (London, 1971), 129–30.Google Scholar

³⁹ Defeng, Hou, Disanci Zhongguo kuangye jiyao (Beijing, 1929), 260;Google ScholarMurakushi, , Nihon tankō, 235–39.Google Scholar In Fushun, Japanese staff played this role, and when their number and quality declined after 1937, the strength of the contract system revived. See Nakamura, , Hatō seido, 11–12.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Nathan to Young, 15 July 1929; Nathan to Turner, 18 April 1932, Nathan Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. In the second of these letters, Nathan expresses his dissatisfactionwith his Chinese staff: “The conclusions I came to were that a desperate and progressively losing fight was being waged by our foreign senior staff to retain that technical efficiency which has in the past been such a conspicuous feature of our operations, and which the very fine equipment we possess makes possible. In this struggle the Chinese senior staff are playing an almost negligible part.” The management at Kailuan did, however, start a foreman training school, graduates of which played an important role in changing the contract system. See Nakamura, , Hatō seido, 11.Google Scholar

⁴¹ For a general interpretation along these lines, citing evidence from China, Egypt, India, and Vietnam, see Moore, W. E., Industrialization and Labor (New York, 1951), 129–31.Google Scholar

⁴² In some cases the same man filled both posts (see Chesneaux, , Chinese Labor Movement, 60, 453).Google Scholar

⁴³ Report, 120.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Wanyan, Zheng, Minguo shijiunian Shandong kuangye baogao (Jinan, 1931), 151–52.Google Scholar The need for native intermediaries was stressed in the case of Fushun: “Since the Japanese find little in common with the racial habits, customs and language of the coolies, patou [batou] are placed over the labourers, who act as liaison agents between the management and working force by relaying orders and instructions and keep strict vigilance over morals and discipline.” “Labour Management at Fushun,” 40.

⁴⁵ Nathan to Young, 19 February 1925, 6 December 1925, [sic, but from the order in which the letter is filed, it should probably be 6 December 1924] and 15 July 1929; Nathan to Turner, 10 November 1931, Nathan Papers. Nathan wrote of one unfortunate man: “Callaghan, I am sorry to say, proved a failure, as he was quite unable to handle Chinese properly … so I paid him six months' salary and got rid of him on the spot.”

⁴⁶ Kinder, C. W., “Railways and Collieries of North China,” Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 103 (1890–1891), 285;CrossRefGoogle ScholarYutang, Sun, Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao, diyiji, 1840–1895 nian (Beijing, 1957), 1245.Google Scholar Contract labor was also used in the Mohe Gold Mine before 1895 (see He Hanwei, , “Qingji de Mohe jinkuang,” Xianggang Zhongwen daxue Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao, 8:1 (12 1976), 240–41). See also Okabe's criticism of Lowe's attribution of the origins of contract labor to the needs of foreign textile factories in “Shina bōseki rōdō ukeoi seido no hattatsu,” 224.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Chūkō tankō rōdō gaiyō 31;Google ScholarSakamori, , “Hoku-Shi tankōgyō,” 45–46.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Report, Evidence, vol. 4, pt. 2, p. 242;Google Scholarkenkyūjo, Nihon keizaishi, Nihon keizaishi jiten, II, 1357.Google Scholar See also Mikio, Sumiya, Nihon chin rōdō no shiteki kenkyū (Tokyo, 1976), 92–93.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Nathan to Turner, 27 April 1934, Nathan Papers.

⁵⁰ Jiu Zhongguo, 200–202.Google Scholar Although receiving considerable publicity, this aspect does not seem to have been central to the operation of the system, especially in the larger, more modern mines. For some examples of extraeconomic means of control, see Dunkui, Liu and Zhen, Mei “Zhongguo zaoqi meikuang zibenjia dui gongren de canku boxue,” Xinjianshe, 1965:6 (June 1965), 66–69.Google Scholar

⁵¹ KYZB, 143 (21 05 1931), 747.Google Scholar At Kailuan, the contractors were responsible for all timbering, haulage, and ventilation within the specified area (see Kairan tankō chōsa shiryō 106). The situation was similar at Zhengfeng (see Sakamori, , “Hoku-Shi tankōgyō,” 48–49).Google Scholar The butties performed the same function in Britain (see Griffin, , British Coalmining Industry, 57).Google Scholar

⁵² See Wright, T., “Shandong Mines in the Modern Chinese Coal Industry up to 1937” (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1976), 55, 85–87, 415–17.Google Scholar

⁵³ The degree to which this burden was really shifted depended of course on the length of time between the date the workers were paid and the date the company paid the contractor. There is not much information on this. At Liujiang, workers had to be paid every ten days in arrears, but the company advanced to the contractors 70 percent of the contract price for the coal extracted in those ten days in order to enable them to pay the wages. The rest they presumably paid over at the end of the month.

⁵⁴ Sakamori, , “Hoku-Shi tankōgyō,” 53–55.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The manager of the Jingxing mine explicitly mentioned this factor as one of the chief reasons for the continued use of the contract system in his mine in the 1930s (see Gongshang banyuekan, 3:14 (15 07 1931), 145–46).Google Scholar The need to adjust to the changing demand for labor was also one of the factors behind the emergence of the contract system in the docks in the nineteenth century (see Jiu Zhongguo, 189).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Zheng, , Minguo shijiunian Shandong kuangye baogao, 247;Google ScholarHuiruo, Zhang, Diwuci Shandong kuangye baogao (Jinan, 1936), 118–20.Google Scholar Not all sources agree on the exact figures for ligong and waigong, but the general picture remains the same. Other similar examples can be quoted, for instance from Jingxing (KYZB, 111 (7 April 1936), 1141)Google Scholar and Jiawang, (KYZB, 99 (21 06 1930), 43).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Jiu Zhongguo, 207;Google ScholarTaylor, , “Sub-contract System,” 228–30;Google ScholarPollard, , Genesis of Modern Management, 38.Google Scholar The Royal Commission was told: “In most cases it [contracting] results in economy of working.” Report, Evidence, vol. 5, pt. 1, 179.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Kairan tankō chosa shiryō, 99.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Quoted in Taylor, , “Sub-contract System,” 218.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Shiyebu, , laodong nianjian bianzuan weiyuanhui, Ershiernian Zhongguo laodong nianjian (Nanjing, 1934), sec. I, 265–66.Google Scholar The lack of incentive to the workers was also seen as a major problem in the textile industry (see Okabe, , “Shina bōsekigyō ni okeru rōdō ukeoi seido,” 226).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Hou, Disanci Zhongguo kuangye jiyao, 260;Google ScholarKYZB, 36 (28 02 1929), 586–87;Google ScholarKYZB, 84 (28 02 1930), 562.Google Scholar

⁶² For England, see Taylor, , “Sub-contract System,” 231,Google Scholar and Pollard, , Genesis of Modern Management, 42.Google Scholar For India, see Buchanan, , Development of Capitalist Enterprise, 271. A manufactory is a site where many workers are gathered together in one unit, but where no mechanical power is used.Google Scholar

⁶³ Murakushi, , Nihon tankō, 108;Google ScholarSumiya, , Ninon chin rōdō 106.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ “The Ryuho Coal Mine,” Contemporary Manchuria, 1:4 (11 1937), 64.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ KYZB, 22 (14 11 1928), 357.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Panandikar, S., Industrial Labour in India (Bombay, 1933), 96.Google Scholar It is also interesting that Sumiya attributes the fact that contracting out the extraction of coal disappeared more rapidly in Japan than in England to the circumstance that, whereas in England the mine operators generally leased the mineral lands, in Japan they owned them and thus had a greater interest in their long-term conservation. See Nihon chin rōdō, 101.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ “Report on Charter Master System,” 404. Another report said that the system was conducive to the “working of the pits in an unskilful way, and to the neglect of discipline and measures of safety.” See also Pollard, , Genesis of Modern Management, 38.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For the Changcheng mine (in northeast Hebei), see KYZB, 22 (14 11 1928), 358;Google Scholar for Liujiang, see KYZB, 143 (21 May 1931), 748.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Lowe, , Facing Labour Issues, 22.Google Scholar See also Gongshang banyuekan, 3:14 (15 07 1931), 145–46.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The exigencies of seasonality were such that if the contractors wished to keep up output they sometimes had to raise wages in order to attract labor from the alternative agricultural employment in the busy season; this happened in 1931 at Jiawang where, however, the contractors found it rather more difficult to enforce a cut once the temporary shortage had passed. See KYZB, 163 (21 october 1931), 1057.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Nathan to Turner, 8 May 1932, Nathan Papers.

⁷² Panandikar, , Industrial Labour, 96;Google ScholarKYZB, 331(21 April 1935), 291; Nathan to Turner, 6 March 1935, Nathan Papers.Google Scholar

⁷³ “Report … on the State of the Population in the Mining Districts,” British Parliamentary Papers, 1859, sess. 2, XII, 6; Murakushi, , Nikon tankō 46–50, 113–14.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Womack, Lynda Shaffer, “Anyuan: The Cradle of the Chinese Workers' Revolutionary Movement, 1921–1922,” in Columbia Essays in International Affairs (New York, 1970), V, 176, 178;Google Scholar Hoover to Detring, 4 August 1899, Nathan Papers. For the Secret Societies, see Chesneaux, J., Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Nettle, G., trans. (Hong Kong, 1971).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Womack, , “Anyuan,” 188–89,Google Scholar citing Hongqi piaopiao, 12 (May 1959), 158–59.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Zhongxia, Deng, Zhongguo zhigong yundong jianshi, 1919–1926 (Beijing, 1953), 78–84;Google Scholar Beijing shifan daxue, lishixi, sannianji, yanjiuban, Mentougou meikuang shigao (Beijing, 1958), 33–37.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ KYZB, 137 (7 April 1931), 647;Google ScholarKYZB, 140 (28 April 1931), 693;Google ScholarKYZB, 143 (21 May 1931), 747;Google ScholarKYZB, 273 (7 February 1934), 514.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ The contractors paid out in wages from around 60 percent up to 90 percent of what they received from the company. Their share included, however, the expenses they incurred in providing materials as well as some of the costs of supervision, both of which would still have to be met even if the system were abolished.

⁷⁹ Chaojun, Ma chief, ed., Zhongguo laogong yundong shi, 5 vols. (Taibei, 1959), I, 232; III, 1104, 1127.Google ScholarErshiernian Zhongguo laodong nianjian, sec. 2, p. 134.Google ScholarYishibao, 19 May 1931,Google Scholar reprinted in Gendai Shina no kiroku (Beijing, 1924–1932), Ken'ichi, Hatano, ed. (05 1931), 279–84.Google Scholar

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⁸⁷ Ting, , “Coal Industry,” 249. Ting cites the Sino-British mine at Mentougou as an example, but Mentougou meikuang shigao does not mention the abolition of the system there.Google Scholar

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⁸⁹ Brugger, , Democracy and Organization, 90–95.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Apart from its use in the coal industries mentioned above, contracting was described as practically ubiquitous in British industries in the nineteenth century (Schloss, D. J., Methods of Industrial Remuneration, 3d ed. (London, 1907), 202).Google Scholar It was found in many American industries in the early part of that century (Commons, J. R. et al. , eds., History of Labour in the United States, 2 vols. (New York, 1926), I, 103, 309–10, 339ff.),Google Scholar and the Moscow-Saint Petersburg Railway was built using it (Blackwell, , Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, 297–302).Google Scholar In this century it was found in many underdeveloped areas in Africa as well as in East Asia (see Moore, , Industrialization and Labor, 126–30, 142–44).Google Scholar For Japan, see Hirschmeier, J. and Yui, Tsunehiko, The Development of Japanese Business, 1600–1973 (London, 1975), 119–20, 192.Google Scholar