¹ Halpern, Manfred, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, 1963), pp. 51–78. See especially footnotes 3 and 4 on pp. 54–55, also pp. 56–57, on the qualities of this new class, and on Young's and Johnson's evidence for the emergence of what Johnson prefers to call the “middle sectors” (a designation accepted by Halpern), as a new class, in developing areas.Google Scholar

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¹¹ John Harsanyi defines dynamic explanation “when at least some of the explanatory variables used to belong to an earlier period than the variables to be explained. More generally, we should speak of the dynamic explanation also if what we directly try to explain, and/or what we offer as explanation, involve not only the values of certain social variables at a given time, but also their time trends (time derivatives, i.e., the directions and rates of their change).” Harsanyi, John C., “Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science”, Behavioral Science, Vol. 5, no. 2 (04, 1960), p. 137.Google Scholar

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²³ As for the ulema Ali was aware of its potential danger to his modernization policies. The Mameluk massacre of 1811 served as a warning to the ulema. A British traveler, Augustus St. John, described the ulema's opposition to Ali in visiting mosques, bazaars and schools. See James Augustus John, St., Egypt and Mohammed Ali: Travels in the Valley of the Nile, 2 volumes (London, Longman, 1834), Vol. 1, pp. 39–48.Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 56–57.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 58.

⁴⁷ This term Mannheim has borrowed from Alfred Weber but made wider use of it. See Mannheim, , Ideology and Utopia (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1953)Google Scholar. Mannheim elaborated and modified this concept in his “The Problem of the Intelligentsia”, Essays on the Sociology of Culture (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), pp. 91–170.Google Scholar

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⁵⁰ O'Brien, Patrick, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System (London, Oxford, 1966).Google Scholar

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⁵⁹ These dangers are clearly demonstrated in Bendix's illuminating comparison of Japan and Germany. See Bendix, Reinhard, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1964), Part II, Chapter 6, pp. 177–214, especially p. 208–213.Google Scholar

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⁶⁹ Again we caution with Bendix against the “fallacy of retrospective determinism” (Bendix, , Nation Building, op. cit., p. 208)Google Scholar, in comparing such different states, social structures, and political practices. Egypt under Muhammad Ali suffered from total lack of local political autonomy. In Japan and Prussia local government was fairly well established and acted as an intermediary between the national government and the people. Once harnessed to national authority, local authorities acted to diffuse political and economic policies and were thus instrumental in reform. Comparing political management with the emergence of autonomous political structures and practices in Japan and Prussia and its absence in Egypt only demonstrates the extraordinary burdens which have been relegated to the NMC. On the rise of central power in Japan see Whitney, John Hall's seminal Government and Local Power in Japan 500 to 1700 (Princeton, 1966Google Scholar); on Prussian bureaucracy see Hans Rosenberg's excellent treatise Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660–1815 (Harvard, 1966).Google Scholar

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