¹ By political culture, I mean the orientation toward the political process expressed in attitudes toward politics, the construction of organizations like parties and bureaucracies, and methods of political socialization. The concept is discussed by Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J., 1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² The term “municipal revolution,” not used in 1789, is commonly used by historians of the French Revolution. Most historians mention the municipal revolution only in passing. See Daniel Ligou: “there is no complete and analytical study of this interregnum, during which the administrative structure of the Old Regime disappeared while the new administration had not yet been installed.” “A propos de la revolution municipale,” Revue d'histoire èconomique et sociale, 34 (1960), 146–77, quotation from p. 146 (my translation).Google Scholar

³ The 30 towns (listed from largest to smallest) are Paris, Lyon, Bordeaux, Marseille, Rouen, Nantes, Lille, Toulouse, Strasbourg, Nimes, Metz, Amiens, Orleans, Nancy, Brest, Reims, Caen, Angers, Clermont-Ferrand, Montpellier, Montauban, Toulon, Troyes, Besangon, Limoges, Tours, Grenoble, Dijon, Rennes, and Poitiers.

⁴ The Paris revolution has been described by Bourne, Henry E., “Improvising a Government in Paris in July 1789,” American Historical Review, 11 (1905–1906), 263–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Michel Lhéritier attributes great importance to the example of Paris in “La revolution municipale: point de départ de la Révolution franchise,” Révolution Francaise, n.s. 5 (1939), 121–35.Google Scholar

⁵ Lourde, C., Histoire de la Révolution à Marseille et en Provence depuis 1789 jusqu'au consulat (Marseille, 1838).Google Scholar

⁶ The rank-correlation coefficient measuring the correlation between the date of committee establishment and distance from Paris = .3. Dates are given in secondary sources for committee establishment; information on distance from Paris is from Arbellot, G., “La grande mutation des routes de France au milieu du XVIIIe siècle,” Annales. Economies, Societes, Civilisations, 28 (1973),Google Scholar carte 6 (1780). If Marseille is eliminated from the sample, the rank-correlation coefficient is .4.

⁷ The secondary works consulted for individual towns are not all listed. A partial bibliography can be constructed from Walter, Gérard, Répertoire de l'histoire de la Révolution frangaise: travaux publiés de 1800 à 1940. Lieux (Paris, 1951);Google Scholar and Dollinger, Philippe et al. , Bibliographie d'histoire des villes de France (Paris, 1967).Google Scholar

⁸ Louise Tilly compares prices in Paris, Beauvais, and Toulouse to demonstrate the existence of a national grain market in “The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 2 (1971), 23–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Schmidt, Charles, “La crise industrielle de 1788 en France,” Revue historique, 97 (1908), 78–94.Google Scholar Like the price rise in grain, effects of the textile depression varied, yet in both there was a national pattern.

¹⁰ Deputies to the National Assembly did not seem to realize the extent of provincial revolts. The mayor of Paris, Bailly, remembered revolts in Rouen and Rennes, but even more clearly an atmosphere of fear: “les provinces etaient livrees aux plus grandes terreurs; les citoyens des villes, les laboureurs dans les campagnes quittaient leurs travaux et couraient aux armes.… II me semble que du 13 au 14 il y a eu un soulèvement à Rouen… Mais ce dont je me crois bien sûr, c'est que ces mêmes jours, et les mêemes jours qu'à Paris, il y a eu à Rennes une révolution.…” Berville, A. and Barrière, , eds., émoires de Bailly, 3 vols. (Paris, 1821–1822), quote from vol. 2, pp. 161–62, entry for July 27, 1789.Google Scholar

¹¹ On July 23, Mounier and Mirabeau debated the virtues of local self-government in the National Assembly. Discussion about municipal reorganization first focused on Bourne, Paris., “Municipal Politics,” pp. 269–70.Google Scholar

¹² The National Assembly faced the task of reconstructing the “habit of obedience;” according to Amann, Peter, a problem in every revolution. “Revolution: a Redefinition,” Political Science Quarterly, 77 (1962), 36–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Reuss, Rodolphe, “Le sac de l'Hôtel-de-Ville de Strasbourg (juillet 1789), épisode de l'histoire de la Revolution en Alsace,” Revue historique, 120 (1915), 26–55, 289–322.Google ScholarFord, Franklin L., Strasbourg in Transition, 1648–1789 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Eleven towns had more than one committee. In five, the second committee replaced the town council. Four of the six committees first installed in August had complete control of town affairs.

¹⁵ Daniel Ligou suggests a division between north and south on one hand and east and west on the other and attributes this to differences in communal traditions. I question this; Grenoble and Toulouse were in the south and Lille in the north, but the first municipal revolt occurred in the south and all other northern towns experienced revolutions. “À propos de la révolution municipale,” passim.

¹⁶ Ideally, we would consider several parameters of socioeconomic structure: town size, density of population, rate of urbanization, relationship to rural areas, distribution and position of various social groups, differential effects of demographic growth, etc. But only a few towns have been studied in depth. See Garden, Maurice, Lyon et les Lyonnais an XVlll^e siècle (Paris, 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Argument about causal explanations runs the risk of being circular. Here differences in the municipal revolution can be explained by adding enough factors to take care of each recalcitrant case. Further research may introduce evidence to invalidate my tentative conclusions.

¹⁸ We can see the difference between prices in the north and south by comparing Toulouse and Montpellier with Troyes and Reims. Between January and July 1789, the price of wheat (blé) dropped 3% in Toulouse and 15% in Montpellier. At the same time, it rose 41% in Reims (the price difference for froment) and 60% in Troyes. The price of seigle dropped 11% in Toulouse and 25% in Montpellier in this period while it rose 37% in Reims. These are the average monthly prices. For Toulouse, see Georges, and Frêche, Geneviève, Les prix des grains, des vins et des légumes à Toulouse (1486–1868),Google ScholarTravaux et recherches de la Faculté de Droit et des sciences économiques de Paris, no. 10 (Paris, 1967), p. 74.Google Scholar For Montpellier: Hérault, A. D., C 5942, “Etats du prix des grains et autres denrées donné par les marchands de Montpellier, 1789.”Google Scholar For Reims: Reims, A. C., Register 689, fonds anciens, “Vicomté: Mercuriale des grains, 1759–1789.”Google Scholar For Troyes: Ricommard, Julien, La Lieutenance générate de police à Troyes au XVIII^e siècle (Troyes, 1934), graph III.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Lambert-Dansette, Jean, Quelques families du patronat textile de Lille-Armentières (1789–1914): Origines et évolution d'une bourgeoisie (Lille, 1954).Google Scholar For Toulouse see Sentou, Jean, Fortunes et groupes sociaux à Toulouse sous la Révolution: 1789–1799 (Toulouse, 1969);Google Scholar and Higgs, David, Ultraroyalism in Toulouse from its origins to the revolution of 1830 (Baltimore, 1973).Google Scholar

²⁰ Egret, J ., “Les origines de la Révolution en Bretagne (1788–1789),” Revue historique, 213 (1955), 189–215.Google Scholar For Dijon see Millot, H., Le Comite permanent de Dijon (Enquêtes sur la Révolution en Côte-d'Or, n.s. fasc. 1, Dijon, 1925).Google Scholar

²¹ Limoges, important neither as an administrative nor market center, had a committee but not a powerful one.

²² Schmidt, “la crise industrielle…” claims silk towns began to suffer in 1787–88 from diminished raw materials and unemployment. The crisis was related to the bad harvest of silk, caused in turn by the same bad weather that forced grain prices higher. Decline in cotton and wool production, caused by English competition and overproduction, began earlier. Silk production, especially around Nimes, was also affected by Spanish restrictions on the importation of silk articles for trade in the American colonies. See Blue, George Verne, “French Protests against Restrictions in Trade with Spanish America, 1788–1790,”Google ScholarThe Hispanic American Historical Review, 13 (1933), 336–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Schmidt sees less unemployment in the silk industry than in cotton or wool.

²³ In some southern towns, Protestant-Catholic divisions reinforced social distinctions, e.g., between merchants and workers in Nimes. Confessional conflict sometimes exacerbated political conflict. But it is difficult to determine whether it made the politics of towns like Nîmes and Montauban significantly different in 1789 from those of other French towns. Ligou, Daniel, Montauban à la fin de I'Ancien Régime et aux débuts de la Révolution: 1787–1794 (Paris, 1958),Google Scholar and Hood, James Norton, “The Riots in Nimes in 1790 and the Origins of a Popular Counter-Revolutionary Movement” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1968).Google Scholar

²⁴ Baldwin, William Clinton, “The Beginnings of the Revolution and the Mutiny of the Royal Garrison in Nancy: L'Affaire de Nancy, 1790” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1973), pp. 120–23,Google Scholar Tables 9 and 10.

²⁵ Ford, Strasbourg in Transition.

²⁶ Eimer, Manfred, Die Politischen Verhdltnisse und Bewegungen in Strassburg im Elsass im Jahre 1789 (Strassburg, 1897).Google Scholar

²⁷ Egret, “Les origines de la Révolution en Bretagne.”

²⁸ The town council in Rouen met with the electors as a new municipal organization. Poullain, Charles, Rouen. Analyses des délibérations de I'Assemblee municipale et electorate du 16 juillet 1789 au 4 mars 1790 (Rouen, 1905).Google Scholar

²⁹ The extent of revolution (committee status) was independent of population size in 1789. I did two chi-square tests of this hypothesis. In one, the towns were divided into two categories of population (20–40,000 and over 40,000) and three of revolution (no committee, one sharing power with the town council, and one with sole power). In the other, they were divided into three categories of population (20–30,000; 30–50,000; and over 50,000) and two of revolution (committees with little power or no committee at all; those with sole power). In both, with 2 degrees of freedom, the hypothesis of independence was accepted at the 5% level of significance. A two-way-classification table with Jhree rows and three columns was impossible to test because three of the cells had a theoretical frequency of less than 2.

³⁰ History in Geographic Perspective: The Other France (New York, 1971).Google Scholar Fox does not explicitly discuss the reaction of the towns to the beginning of the Revolution, but his interpretative framework is important.

³¹ The Paris committee of July 25 included 17% avocats an Parlement; 13% avocats; and a total of 50% members of the liberal professions (N = 120). The committee of September 18 included 53% members of the liberal professions (N = 300). The representation of the merchants went from 13% to 11%. My figures are based on lists of names in Robiquet, Paul, Le personnel municipal de Paris pendant la Révolution: période constitutionnelle (Paris, 1890), pp. 205–11 and 213–29.Google Scholar

³² The Dijon committee elected July 18 included 6 avocats, 1 procureur an Parlement, 2 notaires, 1 chirurgien, 1 médecin, and 1 marchand. Millot, , Le Comité permanent de Dijon, p. 200.Google Scholar The comité municipal of Metz (a military-administrative center) elected Sept. 25, 1789 included 20 clergymen, 20 nobles, and 40 deputies from the Third Estate. Like other administrative centers, Metz had many officials and members of the liberal professions: 33% of the Third Estate deputies were members of the liberal professions, and 20% were officials in various royal jurisdictions. Only 12% were merchants. Half the nobles were officials in the parlement. Harsany, Zoltan-Etienne, “Metz pendant la Révolution: la chute de l'Ancien Regime (1789),” Memoires de VAcademie Nationale de Metz, 142, 5th series, 6 (1959–1961), 4–45.Google Scholar

³³ In Montpellier, e.g., the committee (elected August 28) included 21 merchants, 20 members of the liberal professions, 14 officials of the Cour des Aides and 6 officials in the various royal jurisdictions among its 99 members. Duval-Jouve, J., Montpellier pendant la Revolution, 2 vols. (Montpellier, 1879), I, 64–65.Google Scholar

³⁴ In Reims, over half the deputies (elected August 21) were merchants or clothiers. Reims, A. C., Register 226, fonds moderns, “Délibérations du Comite permanent,” 08 21, 1789.Google Scholar In Orléans, 11 of 20 committee members (elected July 19) were merchants. Orléans, A. C., AA (Suppl.) 13, 07 19, 1789s.Google Scholar

³⁵ The 64 deputies to the Troyes committee were divided as follows: 25% merchants, 25% artisans and shopkeepers, 17% from the liberal professions, the rest from various social groups. Troyes, A. C., A Register 54, 08 29, 1789.Google Scholar I have not been able to locate precise information for other towns.

³⁶ Hunt, Lynn A., “The Municipal Revolution of 1789 in Troyes and Reims” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1973).Google Scholar

³⁷ Some militias were formed as early as the spring of 1788, but like those of July, 1789 they were created in response to local riots. Although some towns did not organize militias until the period of the Great Fear (late July), most towns had already done so. The Great Fear did not originate in Paris but had independent sources throughout the country. The municipal revolution was neither an effect nor a cause of the Great Fear; there is no correlation between the formation of committees and its presence. See Lefebvre, Georges, La Grande Peur de 1789 (Paris, 1932), especially maps pp. 197 and 199.Google Scholar

³⁸ A good example is provided by the regulations of the Reims committee. Within a week of election, the committee reorganized the militia: two army officers were put in charge of each company to ensure cooperation between armed civilians and the garrison. Arms for the militia were to be kept in the town hall; only those men who paid 4 or more livres capitation were allowed to serve. Property qualification eliminated 60% of the taxpaying townsmen from guard service. This estimate is made from a geographically distributed sample of one-fourth of the Reims capitation roll of 1789. In the town's wealthy center, up to 90% of male taxpayers were eligible; in working-class areas, only 10% to 20%. A. C. Reims, Register 679, fonds anciens, “Capitation, 1789.”

³⁹ Lourde, Histoire de la Révolution à Marseille.

⁴⁰ Hunt, “The Municipal Revolution.”

⁴¹ Property qualifications for voting affected the manufacturing towns most. R. R. Palmer says that about a quarter of the adult males in France were excluded by reason of poverty, but in Reims one-third and in Troyes more than one-half the adult males were denied the vote. Hunt, , “The Municipal Revolution,” pp. 306–7.Google Scholar See Palmer, , The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1959–1964), I, 523.Google Scholar

⁴² The Bureau municipal of Paris included 29% legal professions and 48% liberal professions. The merchants increased their representation from 11% in the September committee to 25% in the new municipal government. Robiquet, , Le personnel municipal, pp. 513–21.Google Scholar The 13 new municipal officers in Dijon included 2 avocats, 1 procureur au Parlement, 1 procureur à la cour, 1 notaire, 1 médecin, 1 imprimeur, 1 bourgeois, 1 marchand, 1 quincaillier, 1 vicaire général, 1 trésorier des États de Bourgogne, and 1 commissaire de police. Lawyers were not so powerful in the new government as in the committee of July 18, but the liberal professions still dominated. Millot, , Le Comité permanent, p. 200.Google Scholar In Metz, the new municipal government included 2 avocats au Parlement, 2 avocats, 1 huissier au Parlement, 1 notaire, 1 médecin, 1 architecte, 1 ingénieur des ponts et chaussées, 1 président des finances, 1 ancien caissier des guerres, 3 negogiants and 1 chanoine. Thus the liberal professions benefited most from the 1790 elections. Harsany, Zoltan-Etienne, “Metz pendant la Révolution,” Mémoires de I'Académie Nationale de Metz, 143, 5th series, 7 (1962), 21–70, p. 25.Google Scholar

⁴³ In Dijon, e.g., one artisan was elected to office as a municipal officer, but six as notables; in Reims, two were elected as officers and seven as notables.

⁴⁴ In Reims, 40% of the voters, but only 6% of those eligible for office, were textile workers. Reims, A. C., Carton 843, fonds moderns, liasse 211;Google ScholarReims, B. M., CR I 1050,Google Scholar “Liste des citoyens éligible pour la formation de la municipalité, 1790.” In most textile towns, about one-fifth the adult males were eligible (I found this true in Troyes, Reims, and Orle´ans).

⁴⁵ Table IV includes comparison from the most accurate available sources, and other sources confirm the pattern. In Montpellier, the consuls paid an average contribution fonciére of 28.1 livres as compared to an average of 194.4 1. for committee members and 171.3 1. for municipal officers of 1790. Hérault, A. D., L 3540, “Contribution fonciére, Montpellier, 1791.”Google Scholar In Troyes, town council members paid an average contribution patriotique of 381 1. as opposed to an average of 162 1. for committee members. The Troyes municipal government of 1790 was apparently wealthier than the committee (it paid an average of 205.7 1.), but less so than the group which ruled in 1789. Troyes, B. M., Fonds Francois Carteron, XXVII, “Tableau des contributions patriotiques.”Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Only six of the 64 (9%) Troyes committee members, and less than half the Reims committee men (45% ) had ever held an office in the Old Regime.

⁴⁷ The terminology here comes from Sartre, Jean-Paul, Critique de la raison dialectique (précédé de Questions de méthode), I (Paris, 1960), 63–4.Google ScholarDecouflé, André analyzes the notion in reference to revolution in Sociologie des révolutions (especially Chapter 1, “Le projet revolutionnaire”), 2nd ed. (Paris, 1970).Google Scholar The committeeas a revolutionary project is situated in history, its structure and content limited by the positions of the social groups participating. But as a project it was also directed against history, without the explicit intentions of the historical actors.

⁴⁸ Arendt, Hannah presents a suggestive analysis of the difference between the realms of freedom (politics) and necessity in The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Decoufle, Andre, La Commune de Paris {1871) (Paris, 1969), especially Chapter 1, “Les images de la Commune et la formation du pouvoir revolutionnaire.”Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract, tr. Willmoore Kendall (Chicago, 1954), p. 45.Google Scholar Rousseau's analysis of the social contract can be seen as an archaeology of the commune; he attempted to analyze the foundations of the community by looking at the act by which it constituted itself.

⁵¹ Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution (New York, 1963),Google Scholar especially Chapter 6. Arendt draws attention to “the amazing formation of a new power structure which owed its existence to nothing but the organizational impulses of the people themselves” (p. 260). While this was an essential part of the Revolution (and of any revolution), I do not accept her distinction between political and social questions.

⁵² “Quant aux humbles villes marchandes de l'Ouest européen, non seulment. elles eurent l'histoire pour elles, mais elles firent l'histoire. Elles en furent bien le‘sujet.’” Lefebvre, Henri. La pensée marxiste et la ville (Paris, 1972), p. 92.Google Scholar

⁵³ It is not my intention to give a “liberal” analysis of the committees like that given the communes of 1871 by Greenberg, Louis M., Sisters of Liberty: Marseille, Lyon, Paris and the Reaction to a Centralized State, 1868–1871 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).Google Scholar In general, those who supported decentralization during the Revolution were the same men who wanted the commune limited to the bourgeoisie. Decentralization was not a revolutionary project.